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ABSTRACT
During the last decade there have been several new works on the 
impact of the 1929 depression on the Indian economy, but most have 
concentrated on single provinces or single sectors of the economy. 
This study aims to synthesise the trends discussed elsewhere at 
provincial level in an analysis of the slump at an All-India level, 
though the great diversity of agrarian conditions has necessitated a 
focus on one, hitherto neglected, province. It studies the tensions 
created by the sudden impact of a short-term downturn and the long­
term structural change in the Indian economy between the wars.
Several major conclusions emerge from this study. Firstly, that 
India withdrew from the international economy, partly through higher 
tariffs protecting the domestic market and partly the increasing 
uncompetitiveness of Indian exports, particularly after the 
devaluation of the yen in December 1931 . This trend was to continue 
through the 1930s. For the first time, this study has disaggregated 
Burma from the Indian trade statistics, which has shown that British 
trade to India, prior to the slump was of greater magnitude than 
suggested by traditional studies. This explains the aggressive 
reaction of British exporters in the early 1930s to the threat posed 
by the loss of trade to India. Removal of Burma from the trade 
statistics also demonstrates more clearly the tendency of India 
towards disengagement from world trade, especially its traditional 
intra-Asian trade. This had major implications not only for the 
Indian economy but for India’s partners within the Asian bloc, mostly 
Java.
v±
Secondly, a study of the process of commercialisation within the 
backward province of Bihar and Orissa has provided an addition to 
earlier work on those provinces more highly integrated into the 
global economy such as Bengal and the Punjab. This has revealed the 
importance of the extension of the road network in the establishment 
of a provincial market and the continuation of the process of 
commercialisation despite falling rural incomes arid a reduction of 
cash credit. The study of rural Bihar has shown also that by 
reducing land values, the depression pushed investment from rural to 
urban-industrial areas. Prior to the slump land values were 
increasing because of pressure on land created by a rapidly growing 
population. The collapse of prices of agricultural produce from 1929 
abruptly halted the rise in land values due to an increase in rent 
defaults. Thus, the traditional investment in land became 
unprofitable and new investment opportunities had to be found.
This new capital provided a basis for the rise during the slump 
of import-substitution industries managed both by traditional 
European and new Indian agencies. Much has been written about the 
rise of indigenous business groups, but the early 1930s also 
witnessed the advent of multinational companies such as Imperial 
Chemicals and Dunlop anxious to establish plant within the shelter of 
the high Indian tariff. The growing strength of the Indian 
entrepreneurial classes was marked by increasing competition between 
Indian firms, particularly notable in an east-west split of financial 
interest groups.
The role of the Government of India has been assessed,
especially its relationship with the British authorities. The action 
of the British Government during the Indian financial crisis of 1931
could be regarded as an attempt to re-impose imperial control over
India. However, it was for purely financial rather than political
reasons. This is seen in the economic results of the British action,
gold outflows from India which rendered the United Kingdom debtor and 
the curtailment of British trade to India, which weakened the 
economic rationale of a British presence in India and so paved the 
way for decolonisation. The attempts by the Government of India to 
deal with the crisis were ad hoc and unsatisfactory. There was no 
major re-orientation of government policy. A comparision with the 
Government of Argentina, rather than the usual one with Japan, 
however, suggests that even if an independent Nationalist Government 
had been in power during the depression the general underdevelopment 
of the Indian economy would have constrained the abilities of the 
authorities to promote a more rapid recovery.
viii
INTRODUCTION
The depression which shook the world economy in the late 1920s, 
differed from earlier recessions both in its severity, longevity and 
seemingly universal impact. Never before had the inter-dependence 
of the diverse elements of the global economy been so clearly 
demonstrated as in the rapid diffusion of the inter-war slump. The 
patterns of world trade and finance which had developed during the 
late nineteenth century had been disturbed by the dislocations of 
the First World War, but not destroyed. The dominant core-periphery 
relationships remained, particularly within the world’s colonial 
empires, and such links facilitated the swift spread of the 
depression.
Contemporary views on the nature of the slump emphasised a 
world 'over-production’ crisis in primary products, dating the onset 
of the crisis to the mid-1920s when prices of agricultural produce 
and raw materials began to decline from their inflated post-war 
peaks.1 Thus, contemporaries believed that the slump in the advanced 
economies in 1929 aggravated an existing downturn in primary 
producing economies. The 'over-production’ crisis resulted partly 
from the wartime expansion in primary produce and partly through the 
spread of mechanisation and the dissemination of new techniques 
during the 1920s. As a result, supply had outstripped demand, 
leading to price reductions and a growing balance of trade problem 
for primary producing nations which found it difficult to meet 
interest payments on loans. This in turn increased pressure on the 
London and New York Stock exchanges. The 'over-production’ crisis 
was exacerbated by the 1929 slump when the credit which had been
1
underpinning the expansion of production was halted abruptly and 
sales of primary produce to the advanced economies declined rapidly.
The 'over-production’ theory has to be linked to the conditions 
of world markets to understand the nature of the supply and demand 
disequilibrium, as attempted by Timoshenko and Rowe.2 Trade routes 
remained dominated by the core-periphery relationships evolved 
during nineteenth century. Thus, primary producers were competing 
in the same markets, principally those of Europe and North America. 
Over-production, then, was primarily in goods destined for the 
markets of the advanced economies, those markets increasingly being 
closed to primary producers in the 1920s through the imposition of 
tariff barriers. The formation of cartels and producers’ 
organisations and product restriction schemes helped to promote the 
belief in an 'over-production’ crisis without tackling the 
fundamental need to meet the changes in the demand structure.
In the wide and varied historiography prompted by the inter-war 
depression, it has now generally been accepted that the severity of 
the slump was the result of the combination of a crisis in the 
westernised finance and credit markets and a crisis in agricultural 
production in developing economies.3 The focus of this study is 
British India, an economy which would have been open to both crises, 
firstly as a primary producer and secondly as a colonial possessipn 
of the British Empire. When this study was begun in 1982, the years 
of the depression 1929 to 1936, were studied in Indian 
historiography simply as an adjunct to the political problems 
engendered by the Civil Disobedience Movement.4 Thus, for example,
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the no-rent and revenue campaign fostered by the Indian National 
Congress could be linked to the difficulties in paying fixed burdens 
due to the halving of cultivators * incomes during the slump. Since 
then, study of the economic and social impact of the inter-war 
depression in India has become more commonplace. At first there was 
a marked concentration in the historiography on imperial finance, 
peasant protest and the rise of an indigenous industrial elite.5 
Lately, however, there has been the first attempts to synthesise the 
information gathered to establish the networks of communication in 
the internal economy and the mechanism whereby an external crisis 
was transmitted to the internal economy. Such studies have suggested 
that the key mechanism behind the spread of the depression was a 
collapse of credit. The cultivation and marketing of agricultural 
products in India depended upon the transmission of credit from 
ports and urban areas through various intermediary 
traders/moneylenders/landowners, finally providing the peasant 
cultivator with the means to produce the crop for the next season, 
and so the credit cycle would begin again. Bose’s study of Bengal 
and Bhattacharya’s work on the Punjab have shown that falling demand 
and declining prices for agricultural produce during the slump were 
accompanied by a collapse of the credit mechanisms between urban 
areas and the mofussil. External credit agencies such as Marwari 
traders withdrew their credit operations from rural areas to 
concentrate upon investment in the urban-industrial sector, a 
sensible profit maximising change in investment practices at a time 
of falling land values and stagnant land market. This withdrawal of 
external cash credit, left rural dwellers, both landowner and 
tenant, without the means to pay their fixed burdens, ultimately
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leading to the curtailment of expenditure or a return to forms of 
credit in kind such as dadani, credit in the form of seeds for the 
next crop.6
The aim of this study is to assess the tensions created between 
the short-term stresses of the depression in 1929 to 1934 and the 
long-term structural change which was occurring in the Indian 
economy between the outbreak of the First World War and the award of 
independence in 1947. There are two central themes. Firstly, the 
changing colonial and imperial relationship between India and the 
United Kingdom. Secondly, the extent to which the depression had an 
impact on the process of commercialisation in India. It does not 
pretend to represent a complete synthesis of all trends present in 
India during the slump; there is still not sufficient data to do so. 
Also the sheer scale of the Indian economy prevents a completely 
comprehensive coverage and sectors such as indigenous banking and 
retail are not covered. This study, however, fills in some crucial 
gaps in the literature. Much of the recent work has been confined to 
the provincial level and most scholars have concentrated on those 
provinces most integrated into the international economy, most 
notably Bengal and the Punjab.7 This study attempts to synthesise 
the trends discussed elsewhere at provincial level into an analysis 
of the impact of the slump at an All-India level. To do so, in 
discussing agriculture, the focus is a study of the agrarian economy 
of Bihar and Orissa. This tests theories based on studies of highly 
commercialised provinces on the poorest and most densely populated 
province of British India. As such, it provides an important 
counter-balance to earlier research on Bengal and the Punjab.
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It has proved less difficult to test the most recent theories 
on the process of commercialisation of agrarian regions than some of 
the earlier work conducted in the mid-1970s on aspects of finance 
and trade. In the early 1980s many of the B and C proceedings of 
the finance and economic departments were destroyed due to the delay 
in completing the construction of the new National Archives of India 
in New Delhi. Attempts to repair the omissions in a tour of 
provincial archives in Northern India were thwarted by the 
political difficulties during my period of field study in Spring 
1984. The Punjab State Archives, for instance, were closed to 
western scholars. Similarly, the Bihar State Archives were closed 
for long periods due to a ministerial crisis in government. 
Although, therefore, it was difficult to obtain access to local 
archives in India, one consolation was the discovery of the under­
utilised Indian section of the National Library of Scotland which 
contains a wide variety of official publications, settlement reports 
and gazeteers of both Central and Provincial Governments in India.
Within the confines of the above, this study will attempt to 
assess the arguments about the nature of the impact of the 
depression set against the back-ground of long-term structural 
change in the Indian economy. Separate chapters will focus on 
trade, finance, agriculture, industry and the labouring classes and 
there will be a final overview. The study should then add both to 
the understanding of the long-term development of the Indian economy 
and add to the historiography of the impact of the slump on primary 
producers.
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CHAPTER ONE
Changes in the Structure of Indian Foreign Trade during the Slump
The foreign trade sector was one of the key mechanisms through 
which the international slump of the inter-war period was transmitted 
to the Indian economy. India’s initial contact with the world crisis 
came in the rapid decline in the price of its chief exports during 
the 1929-30 season and the contraction in international credit. 
Contemporary studies suggest that India was one of the first 
economies to experience such price declines, which occurred before a 
similar fall in the staple exports of advanced economies.1 Both 
official government statistics and League of Nations data provide 
evidence that the fall in Indian export values was relatively very 
heavy, declining by two-thirds between 1929 and 1933 for agricultural 
produce and raw materials.2 Although prices began to rise once more 
from 1935, the recovery was slow and unsteady so that by 1939 the 
prices of India’s staple exports were still below 1914 levels, far 
less those of 1929.3 One result of this pattern of the early 
decline in export values was a deterioration in the terms of trade, 
since the value of goods imported from advanced economies did not 
decline so severely. Thus, Indian trade would appear to have 
experienced difficulties similar to those of other primary 
producers.4 Changes in the volume of Indian trade followed the
pattern of prices. The volume of Indian exports declined until 1936, 
after which most staged a recovery, except for tea and hides and 
skins. In the early 1930s, the volume of all imports into India was 
reduced except caustic soda and raw cotton. However, few of the 
former staples of India’s import trade recovered the volume of 1929- 
30.
For India the depression was marked by the sudden fall in 
prices and the difficulty in obtaining credit. A decline in trade 
values helps to provide the parameters of the slump. The values of 
Indian exports had been falling since the mid-1920s, but the crisis 
of the depression was heralded by the first rapid reduction in export 
values in 1929, before the American stock market slump, but at a time 
when borrowing in international money markets was becoming 
increasingly difficult. As Table 1.1 (over) shows, the general index 
number for Indian export prices stood at 135.0 in 1929 (1914 =100)
declining to 78.1 by 1931. Export prices then fell more slowly to 
reach their lowest point in 1934, when the index stood at 73.1. The 
slight recovery thereafter was affected by the 1937 recession in the 
United States so that even in 1939 the index number for exports was 
only 83.1. Import prices had been declining also from 1925. 
However, initially, prices of Indian imports were not affected by the 
depression to any marked degree. A time-lag operated with the first 
marked decline in import values being delayed until 1931-32. Between 
1931 and 1934 the price of Indian imports declined from 143.8 to 
107.0, so even at their depth, import values never fell below 1914 
levels. The gap between the prices of exports and imports widened in 
favour of the latter, turning the terms of trade against India for 
the rest of the decade.
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Table 1.1: Index Numbers of Import and Export Prices and Terms of
Trade (1914=100)
Imports Exports Terms of T]
1925 185.0 145.6 78.7
1928 150.0 132.5 88.3
1929 149.1 135.0 90.5
1930 137.7 110.6 80.3
1931 143.8 78.1 54.3
1932 121.9 75.0 61.5
1933 112.2 73.7 65.2
1934 107.0 73.1 68.3
1935 107.0 80.0 74.7
1936 107.0 79.3 74.1
1937 126.3 83.1 65.7
1938 125.0 80.0 64.0
1939 119.5 83.1 69.5
Source: Index Numbers of Indian Prices 1861-1931 (Calcutta)
and annual supplements to 1940.
Recalculated from Base 1873 = 100.
Indian foreign trade was affected adversely by international 
trends of the late 1920s and early 1930s, with serious implications 
for the Indian economy as a whole. To assess this adequately, some 
estimate (however crude) must be made of the significance of foreign 
trade for the Indian economy in general. Unfortunately, there is as 
yet no satisfactory set of calculations for Indian national income 
between the wars which would permit accurate measurement of the 
foreign trade/national income ratio over time. However, employing 
official figures for the value of foreign trade in private 
merchandise, less the value of Burmese foreign trade, together with 
such estimates as exist, the following trends emerge. Rao’s estimate 
of Rs 16,890 million for national income in 1931-32 suggests that 
India’s foreign trade as a percentage of national income was 15.00 
per cent in that year. This estimate, however, is for a single year
10
only. When Gowri’s series of estimates of national income between 
1931-32 and 1937-38 is used, the proportion of foreign trade in 
national income varies between 15.38 per cent in 1931-32 and 17.18 
per cent in 1938-39.6 Both Rao’s estimate and the starting date for 
Gowri’s series, though, is 1931-32, generally accepted as the year 
marking the depth of the depression. While their data can be used,
therefore, to indicate the general level of importance of foreign
trade for the Indian economy, they cannot be employed for more
precise measurement of change through time.
More modem estimates are available for national domestic
product rather than national income. Although this omits the very 
sector in which we are interested, it may still be useful to employ 
the ratio of foreign trade to net domestic product as a- guide to the 
significance of the foreign trade sector for the Indian economy. 
Maddison’s revised figures of 1985 provide a series from 1928 to
1939, figures which are lower than those of both Heston and 
Sivasubramonian since Maddison is less optimistic of growth in the 
agrarian sector.7 These figures suggest a ratio of foreign trade to 
net domestic product which falls from 24.49 per cent in 1928 (net 
product = Rs 23,638 mill.) to a low point of 10.80 per cent in 1933 
(net product = Rs 24,788 mill.) with a recovery to only 12.11 per 
cent in 1939 (net product = Rs 26,540 million). Thus the declining 
share of foreign trade as a proportion of net product is set against 
a rising trend in net product. Outwith the foreign trade sector 
there were obviously other growth areas in the Indian economy.
At the onset of the depression foreign trade was clearly
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significant for the Indian economy.8 Trade had provided the initial 
stimulus to much of India’s early industrialisation, notably jute, 
cotton yam and woollens. The foreign exchange acquired through the 
export of India’s raw materials and agricultural produce went partly 
to purchase technology for further development. Also, because India 
was a colonial economy, trade surpluses were essential to meet its 
sterling remittances to London. The profits of foreign trade were 
also the essential lubricant of the Indian credit structure from port 
traders through various middlemen to the producer. In all these ways 
the foreign trade sector provided a mechanism for the transmission of 
the depression into the Indian domestic economy and to the distress 
and discontent which followed.
The literature on Indian trade during the 1930s dwells heavily 
on the short-term impact of the depression, mainly in terms of 
government policy responses which will be discussed in the following 
chapter. The most widely commented aspect of the developments during 
the 1930s has been the changing trade relationship between India and 
Britain. In many ways, the events of the depression years have been 
viewed as the last battleground between the Lancashire/Whitehall 
alliance and India.9 More important for Britain were the 
implications of changes in the structure of India’s balance of 
payments. It has been accepted generally that, prior to the First 
World War, India played a major role in the pattern of settlements of 
international trade. Britain is said to have used its large surplus 
balances with India to settle a substantial proportion of deficits 
with the rest of the advanced world.10 India continued to fulfil 
this role in a reduced capacity in the 1920s, but both Tomlinson and
12
Latham have argued that the changes wrought by the depression 
dislocated this pattern, with major implications for both India and 
Britain.1 1 An interesting line of debate has been suggested by Baker 
and Chaudhuri, that the depression helped to promote the 
disengagement of India from the international economy, most clearly 
visible in the decline of intra-Asian trade in the 1930s. This 
argument echoes a suggestion made by Ganguli in the 1950s.12
This chapter, then, will examine the extent to which the 
structure of Indian foreign trade was altered as a result of the 
depression. The changes in aggregate trade by both value and volume 
will be considered as will the question of changes in the composition 
of Indian trade. The relationship between India's visible trade and 
invisibles will be studied, particularly the problematical issue of 
external credit. Finally the changes in the direction of Indian 
trade will be considered.
Did the price falls which occurred between 1929 and 1933 lead 
to a change in the commodity composition of Indian foreign trade as 
the terms of trade turned against agricultural produce and raw 
materials? Some primary producers, particularly in Africa, attempted 
to increase and diversify their exports through government sponsored 
campaigns to promote peasant production of new commercial crops.13 
Alternatively, several countries such as Australia and Brazil sought 
to decrease their import spending to offset the reduced value of 
their exports and so preserve their balance of payments.14 In what 
ways did Indian trade adjust to the price falls? Were import levels
reduced or was the massive export of gold after 1931 used to maintain
the volume of imports? Were the contemporary commentators correct in
13
asserting that price-responsive cultivators could change their 
production to the most profitable export crops?
The effect of the slump on India's trade relations also must be 
considered. Even in the 1920s Indian trade was dominated by those 
routes established in the late nineteenth century. Particularly 
crucial, of course, was the influence of India’s colonial master, 
Britain. Up till the 1920s, Indian trade had been moulded by 
treaties concluded on India’s behalf by the United Kingdom, though 
not necessarily best suited to its developing needs. Were the 
changes brought about by the depression sufficient to break the 
historic patterns of Indian trade.?
1. Changes in Aggregate Trade by Value
Table 1.1 illustrated the differential reductions in the value 
of India’s imports and exports which had caused the terms of trade to 
turn against India, as had happened to most primary producing 
economies. These changes in the terms of trade are reflected in the 
differing experiences of the major commodities which India exported. 
The price of both raw and manufactured jute had been declining since 
the mid-1920s, reflecting the deep rooted problems of the jute 
industry. The decline accelerated between March 1929 and March 1930, 
with the index number for raw jute prices falling from 106 to 72. By 
March 1931 this figure was 45. Prices recovered slightly only to 
fall again, the index reaching its low point of 38 in March 1938.15 
The fall in the price of manufactured jute was equally as 
catastrophic in the early stages of the depression, the index number 
declining from 139 in March 1929 to 89 a year later. Since
14
manufactured jute was used predominantly for packaging of 
agricultural produce, this commodity immediately felt the impact of 
the slump. However, the price fall slowed down after 1930-31 unlike 
the fall in the price for raw jute, thus the gap between the prices 
of both commodities widened increasingly in favour of manufactured 
jute.
Raw cotton prices also fell from their high pre-depression 
level: between March 1929 and March 1931, cotton prices declined
from 161 to 107 to 93. Again the price levels of manufactured cotton 
did not decline to the same extent as those for raw cotton. Indeed, 
unlike most commodities, the price of manufactured cottons never fell 
below 1914 levels and recovery was steady from 1930. These cases 
illustrate that even within India, the terms of trade were favouring 
manufactured goods. Of course, this reflects the already diversified 
base of Indian trade in 1929^  unlike that of many other primary 
producers ^ and helps to explain why the terms of trade against India 
were not as poor as for other underdeveloped economies.16 Not all 
export commodities experienced the impact of the depression so 
rapidly. Oilseed prices, for example, were maintained until 1930-31 
when they halved. This maintained the profitability of oilseed crops 
against some other export crops whose prices had been reduced by two- 
thirds. Tea prices, meanwhile, did not fall until 1931-32 when they 
also halved, a sign of the ultimate weakness of international tea 
restriction schemes.
Import values also declined although not to the same extent as 
export values and,again, at a later date. This is explained by the 
fact that the composition of Indian import trade was predominantly in
15
manufactured goods. Metal goods imports did not fall until 1931 when 
they declined by one-third. Cotton piecegood prices did not decline 
until 1933. Meanwhile, the import price of kerosene remained 
remarkably static, falling by only one point on the index. This had 
major implications for the Indian consumer - a staple item of the 
domestic budget increasing in cost in real terms at a time of falling 
incomes. Overall, while export values declined by 45 per cent 
between September 1929 and 1931, the price of imports fell by only 17 
per cent. However, as import values continued to decline by a 
further 13 per cent to December 1934, the rate of decrease for 
exports had slowed to a further 4.9 per cent fall. Thus^between 1929 
and 1934 import prices fell generally by one-third compared to the 
halving of export prices.
To what extent, then, did the structure of India’s foreign 
trade adjust to these changes in price levels? Tables 1.2 illustrate 
the changing value of India’s foreign trade in private merchandise 
between 1925-26 and 1938-39.17 In these tables, the value of Burmese 
foreign trade has been omitted to allow a more accurate long-term 
assessment. (The official statistics included Burmese foreign trade 
in the totals for British India until and including the 1936-37 
season. Thereafter, with the separation of Burma from India, the 
official statistics excluded Burmese trade). The figures in Table 
1.2, both aggregate and in index form, establish the unstable nature 
of India’s trade even prior to the depression. The 1925-26 season 
marked the peak year in the value of trade with a sharp fall in the 
following season. By 1928-29, the value of Indian trade had nearly 
recovered to 1925-26 levels. However, in the two following seasons,
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India was hit by the depression. This resulted in the index number 
for Indian trade minus Burmese trade (1925-26 = 100) falling from 
99.32 in 1928-29 to 92.16 in 1929-30, followed by the major decline 
to 63.25 in 1930-31 and to 46.92 in 1931-32. There are signs of a 
recovery from 1934 but the recovery of trade values of the late 1930s 
is in terms of a return to the position of 1930-31, not the mid-1920s 
or even 1929-30.
These trends are illustrated further by the patterns of India’s 
export and import trades. Indian exports were declining in value 
more or less from 1925-26 onwards, a trend which was accelerated with 
the onset of the depression in 1929 (Table 1.2C). In 1929-30 the 
index number for the value of Indian exports minus Burmese exports 
(1925-26=100) was 82.71. This fell to 57.44 in 1930-31 and again to 
34.54 in 1931-32. The recovery in the value of Indian exports was 
very slow, again in terms of the level of 1930-31. It is noticeable 
that the most positive recovery comes after the separation of Burma 
which gave a vital boost to Indian exports of coal and cotton yam. 
Indian import values, on the other hand, (Tables 1.2E and 1.2F) 
showed a rising trend until the onset of the depression in 1929. 
Import values, however, never fell as far as those for exports, the 
index number falling to 52.47 in 1933-34 (1925-26=100), and recovery 
was more rapid. Again, import values increased after the separation 
of Burma. Thus, overall in the down-turn to 1932-33, the Indian 
position is only marginally altered by the removal of Burmese trade, 
but in the up-swing to 1938-39 Indian figures improve markedly minus 
Burma. This suggests that Indian foreign trade was more successful
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TABLE 1.2A: TOTAL SEA-BORNE MERCHANDISE TRADE OF BRITISH INDIA
(Rs 1,000)
Total Private Indian Merchandise
Merchandise Trade Minus Burma
1925-26 6,11,50,47 5,40,14,12
1926-27 5,40,66,64 4,77,54,41
1927-28 5,78,52,78 5,10,87,91
1928-29 5,91,26,72 5,36,51,51
1929-30 5,58,72,93 4,97,82,29
1930-31 3,90,43,03 3,41,69,03
1931-32 2,86,91,86 2,53,47,49
1932-33 2,67,97,57 2,38,05,43
1933-34 2,66,02,51 2,40,02,54
1934-35 2,87,50,19 2,60,24,78
1935-36 2,98,81,30 2,67,88,71
1936-37 3,27,50,59 2,95,47,48
1937-38 3,62,99,12 3,62,99,12
1938-39 3,21,64,27 3,21,64,27
TABLE 1.,2B: INDEX OF TOTAL TRADE OF BRITISH INDIA
Total Private Indian Merchandise Trade
Merchandise Minus Burma
(a) (b) (c) <d) (e)
1925-26 109.44 108.50 100.00
1926-27 96.76 95.92 88.41
1927-28 103.54 102.62 94.58
1928-29 105.82 107.77 99.32
1929-30 100.00 100.00 92.16
1930-31 69.87 67.76 68.63 63.25 66.66
1931-32 51.35 49.80 50.91 46.92 49.45
1932-33 47.96 46.51 47.81 44.07 46.44
1933-34 47.61 47.17 48.21 44.43 46.82
1934-35 51.45 49.90 52.27 48.18 50.77
1935-36 53.48 51.86 53.81 49.59 52.26
1936-37 58.61 56.84 59.35 54.70 57.64
1937-38 64.96 63.00 72.91 67.20 70.81
1938-39 57.56 55.82 64.60 59.54 62.74
* (a) 1929-30=100
(b) 1925-26/1929-30=100
(c) 1929-30=100
(d) 1925-26=100
(e) 1925-26/1929-30=100
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TABLE 1.2C: SEA-BORNE MERCHANDISE EXPORT TRADE OF BRITISH INDIA
(Rs 1,000)
Total Burmese Total Indian
Total Exports Exports Private Exports Less
Priv. Merch. Merchandise Burmese Trade
1925-26 3,85,32,69 48,70,28 3,36,62,39
1926-27 3,09,44,56 39,76,05 2,69,68,51
1927-28 3,28,69,13 41,57,81 2,87,11,82
1928-29 3,37,96,12 33,70,86 3,04,25,26
1929-30 3,17,93,24 39,49,26 2,78,43,98
1930-31 2,25,63,66 32,27,92 1,93,35,74
1931-32 1,60,54,72 22,93,62 1,37,61,10
1932-33 1,35,49,14 19,21,82 1,16,27,32
1933-34 1,50,66,81 17,43,45 1,33,23,36
1934-35 1,55,21,54 17,41,62 1,37,79,92
1935-36 1,64,38,92 20,05,50 1,44,33,42
1936-37 2,02,36,54 21,18,28 1,81,18,26
1937-38 1,89,20,55 1,89,20,55
1938-39 1,69,21,52 1,69,21,52
TABLE 1,.2D: INDEX OF SEA-BORNE MERCHANDISE EXPORT TRADE
Total Private Total Indian Exports
Merchandise Less Burma
(a) (b) (c) (d)
1925-26 121.19 120.89 100.00
1926-27 97.33 96.85 80.11
1927-28 103.38 103.11 85.52
1928-29 106.29 109.27 90.38
1929-30 100.00 100.00 82.71
1930-31 70.96 69.44 57.44 65.49
1931-32 50.49 49.42 40.87 46.61
1932-33 42.61 41.75 34.54 39.38
1933-34 47.38 47.85 39.57 45.12
1934-35 48.82 49.48 40.93 46.67
1935-36 51.70 51.83 42.87 48.88
1936-37 63.65 65.07 53.82 61.37
1937-38 59.51 67.95 56.20 64.08
1938-39 53.22 60.77 50.26 57.31
Source: Calculated from Statistical Abstracts
* (a) 1929-30=100
(b) 1929-30=100
(c) 1925-26=100
(d) Average 1925-26/1929-30=100
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TABLE 1.2E: SEA-BORNE MERCHANDISE IMPORT TRADE OF BRITISH INDIA
(Rs 1,000)
Total Burmese Total Indian
Total Private Private Imports Less
Merchandise Merchandise Burmese Trade
1925-26 2,26,17,78 22,66,07 2,03,51,71
1926-27 2,31,22,08 23,36,18 2,07,85,90
1927-28 2,49,83,65 26,07,56 2,23,76,09
1928-29 2,53,30,60 21,04,35 2,32,26,25
1929-30 2,40,79,69 21,41,38 2,19,38,31
1930-31 1,64,79,37 16,46,08 1,48,33,29
1931-32 1,26,37,14 10,50,45 1,15,88,69
1932-33 1,32,58,43 10,70,32 1,21,88,11
1933-34 1,15,35,70 8,56,52 1,06,79,18
1934-35 1,32,28,65 9,83,79 1,22,44,86
1935-36 1,34,42,32 10,87,09 1,23,55,23
1936-37 1,25,24,05 10,84,83 1,14,39,22
1937-38 1,73,78,57 1,73,78,57
1938-39 1,52,32,75 1,52,32,75
TABLE 1.2F: INDEX OF SEA-BORNE IMPORT TRADE
Total Private Total Indian Exports
Merchandise Less Burma
(a) (b) (c) (d)
1925-26 93.92 92.76 100.00
1926-27 96.02 94.62 102.13
1927-28 103.75 101.99 109.94
1928-29 105.19 105.87 114.12
1929-30 100.00 100.00 107.79
1930-31 68.43 67.61 72.88 68.24
1931-32 52.48 52.82 56.94 53.31
1932-33 55.06 55.55 59.88 56.07
1933-34 47.90 48.67 52.47 49.13
1934-35 54.93 55.81 60.16 56.33
1935-36 55.82 56.31 60.70 56.84
1936-37 52.01 52.14 56.20 52.62
1937-38 72.17 79.21 85.39 79.95
1938-39 63.25 69.43 74.84 70.08
Source: Calculated from figures in Statistical Abstracts, 1925-26 to
1938-39.
* (a) 1929-30=100
(b) 1929-30=100
(c) 1925-26=100
(d) Average 1925-26/1929-30=100
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than that of Burma in the 1930s.
The role of Indo-Burmese trade is an important, but much over­
looked, topic. Most historians have simply made use of official 
statistics without making allowances for the effect of the separation 
or the nature of Indian trade before 1936. Before the separation, 
Indo-Burmese trade was included in the statistics of coasting trade 
and classed, therefore, as internal trade. The major trade between 
India and Burma consisted of the exchange of manufactured cotton and 
jute goods for rice and petroleum products. India was the largest 
single market for Burmese goods and its share of total Burmese trade 
increased form 39 per cent in 1913 to some 60 per cent in 1940. 
India, however, provided Burma with a constant 50 per cent of 
imports, 7 per cent of which was classified as re-exports of foreign 
merchandise, mostly machinery and parts by the late 1930s.1 8 Table
1.3 (over) illustrates India*s constant deficit to Burma in the 
inter-war period, the deficit averaging Rs 17 crores.19 Between 1929 
and 1931-32 the deficit was reduced due to a larger decline in 
Burmese imports than Indian exports. However from 1932-33 the deficit 
reached new depths as India imported increasing quantities of Burmese 
rice. However, after the separation, when Burmese goods became 
liable to Indian import duties, Burmese exports declined as Indian 
imports rose and the Indian deficit was reduced once more to its pre­
depression level. These trends obviously had major implications for 
India’s balance of payments after separation, when Burma was classed 
as a foreign country for trade purposes.
2. Changes in Aggregate Trade by Volume
Having considered the changes in aggregate trade by value, it
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TABLE 1.3: INDO-BURMESE MERCHANDISE TRADE (Rs 1,000)
Exports to 
Burma
Imports 
from Burma Balance
1925-26 18,58,23 30,84,50 - 12,26,27
1928-29 17,36,74 34,38,41 - 17,01,67
1929-30 17,27,93 31,67,16 - 14,39,23
1930-31 14,12,69 24,40,17 - 10,27,48
1931-32 12,27,18 23,02,53 - 10,75,35
1932-33 9,58,94 27,07,10 - 17,48,16
1933-34 9,31,42 29,49,11 - 20,17,69
1934-35 10,60,64 33,31,53 - 22,70,89
1935-36 9,93,52 34,09,35 - 24,15,82
1936-37 10,93,28 34,91,75 - 23,98.47
1937-38 11,29,09 25,96,51 - 14,67,42
1938-39 11,10,22 24,34,91 - 13,24,69
Source: Calculated from Review of Trade of India (Calcutta,
Statistical Abstract for British India in the years 1929-30 
to 1938-39, BPP, Cmd 6333 of 1942, Table 252, pp.686-691.
is important to study the changes in volume. To what extent were 
Indian exports curtailed by falling demand or were levels of exports 
maintained despite falling prices? During the peak years of the 
depression, 1930-31, the volume of most of India’s exports were 
reduced with only a few exceptions.20 Oilcake exports, particularly 
from groundnuts, increased by 50 per cent, mostly for export to 
continental Europe where they were consumed in the drive towards 
agricultural self-sufficiency. Luxury exports such as seedlac and 
handwoven woollen carpets also increased, the latter by 100 per cent. 
The reduction in their price was obviously making them more
22
competitive in foreign markets. Other commodities which increased 
their volume during the depression included spices and basic grains 
exported to the many areas of Indian migration, and tin and wolfram 
ores which were exported to Germany and the Netherlands.
For other commodities, the years of the depression marked a
slump in foreign sales as can be seen in Table 1.4 (over). The jute 
trade, for example, had been facing difficulties already in the late 
1920s. Demand was being reduced through the use of grain elevators 
and bulk transportation of agricultural produce. More importantly, 
the purchasers of jute manufactures were increasingly disillusioned 
by the monopoly control of India jute manufacturers and the high 
prices they charged. This led to the search for substitutes in both 
synthetic materials and natural fibres such as sisal, and even
cotton, for use as sacking and cordage. The impact of the depression 
accelerated these trends. Since jute manufactures were used in the 
transportation of agricultural produce there was no time lag in the 
price falls as occurred with other manufactured goods. At the same 
time, although raw jute exports declined in the early years of the 
depression, they recovered in 1933 before exports of manufactured 
jute. While the two traditional major customers for raw jute, 
Britain and America, reduced their imports, new sources were 
discovered, as mills were established in South and Central America to 
substitute for imports of manufactured goods.
The volume of most Indian exports was reduced during the slump
because they were raw materials or agricultural produce. As the 
depression hit advanced countries they reduced their production
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Table 1 .4 : Volume of Principal Extorts from India
Coal 
& Coke 
(tons)
Coffee
(cwts)
1925-26 240,962 205,346
1926-27 645,020 149,775
,1927-28 634,507 276,668
1928-29 641,266 197,629
1929-30 685,259 184,220
1930-31 428,170 292,889
1931-32 515,117 155,600
1932-33 452,073 173,177
1933-34 372,894 185,995
1934-35 308,689 140,963
1935-36 198,025 215,951
1936-37 249,526 210,629
1937-38 1,005,899 135,142
1938-39 1,321,193 184,800
Cotton Cotton
Raw Twist Piece-
Cotton & Y a m goods
(tons) (lb 000) (yd 000)
747,334 31,873 164,833
572,038 41,513 197,401
482,336 24,696 168,623
664,718 24,319 149,219
726,864 24,570 133,426
701,069 23,473 97,715
423,080 22,043 104,636
364,852 15,108 66,442
503,720 16,388 56,461
623,276 12,789 57,693
606,536 9,668 71,250
762,133 12,137 101,636
487,764 40,124 241,255
482,658 37,960 176,992
Raw
Jute
(tons)
Jute
Gunny
Bags
(No. 000)
Jute 
Cloth 
(yd mill.)
Tea
(lb 000)
Pig
Iron
(tons)
1925-26 647,154 425,083 1,461 325,733 __
1926-27 707,782 449,089 1,503 349,264 309,505
1927-28 891,907 463,139 1,552 361,614 393,249
1928-29 897,863 497,685 1,568 359,602 448,946
1929-30 806,884 522,291 1,651 376,169 568,813
1930-31 619,705 434,046 1,271 355,301 439,135
1931-32 586,618 388,532 1,021 340,910 350,868
1932-33 563,063 415,085 1,012 378,837 218,384
1933-34 748,168 401,644 1,053 317,816 377,514
1934-35 152,474 422,949 1,063 324,833 417,059
1935-36 771,324 458,900 1,218 312,706 538,153
1936-37 820,591 567,422 1,708 301,838 574,310
1937-38 747,258 612,260 1,643 334,225 629,203
1938-39 690,439 598,436 1,550 348,050 514,427
1. Excludes Burma
Sources: Calculated from . * i_ T j■ m - m  on + 10 00 9 0
Statistical Abstract for British India, 1919-20 to 1928-29,
BPP, Cmd 3882,of 1931
Statistical Abstract, 1926-27 to 1935-36, BPP, Cmd 5804 of 
1938
Statistical Abstract, 1929-50 to 1938-39, BPP, Cmd 6333 of 
1942
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levels and consequently their demand for raw materials. Thus, there 
was a slight time lag between reduction in price and reduction in 
volume of exports which generally occurred from 1930-31. Hence, the 
decline in sales of undressed hides and skins, dyeing materials, raw 
cotton, rubber, unhusked rice which was sold to Germany for starch 
production, and most of India’s ore exports. Tea exports, a major 
component of India’s foreign trade, was in a different category. The 
various international agreements aimed at protecting the major tea 
producers helped to keep the volume of tea exports relatively stable, 
although they failed to maintain price levels.21
From 1936 to 1939, Indian exports recovered in volume. The 
major exceptions were dyeing substances which had been superceded by 
synthetic dye production in Europe and America, spices and oils and 
raw cotton hit by declining sales to Japan. Tea and rubber exports 
also failed to return to the 1929 volumes, being restricted to the 
quotas of their respective international agreements. For other 
commodities the late 1930s marked a recovery with increased sales 
above the 1929 volume. Even jute manufactures increased in volume as 
sacking was once again required for expanding world trade in 
agricultural produce. As we have seen, much of this increase in 
export trade was simply a result of changing categories of statistics 
after the separation of Burma.
The volume of Indian imports also decreased during the slump, 
although it is more difficult to ascertain the direct effects of the 
depression through the many factors influencing volume levels. The 
change in volume of India’s principal imports are contained in Table 
1.5 (over). The shrinking purchasing power of the Indian masses
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TABLE 1.5: VOLUME OF PRINCIPAL INDIAN IMPORTS
Raw
Cotton
tons
Cotton 
Twist& 
Yam 
lb.(000)
Cotton
goods
yds.
mill.
Sugar
tons
(000)
Cement
tons
Caustic
Soda
cwts
Wood
Pulp
cwts
1925-26 17,543 51,688 1,563 2,665 - - -
1926-27 45,676 49,424 1,787 2,256 99,349 160,834 307,172
1927-28 66,062 52,344 1,973 2,891 110,779 175,297 399,221
1928-29 28,882 43,766 1,936 2,092 125,988 173,643 445,558
1929-30 23,980 43,882 1,919 1,011 119,430 189,609 486,209
1930-31 58,464 29,140 890 1,003 109,740 231,901 454,316
1931-32 79,323 31,575 776 556 86,396 261,428 442,691
1932-33 84,758 45,103 1,225 402 80,342 284,529 312,819
1933-34 42,896 32,055 796 264 64,031 308,313 406,353
1934-35 60,564 34,022 944 223 65,966 377,633 390,123
1935-36 76,487 44,570 947 201 58,936 405,975 309,422
1936-37 64,988 28,520 764 23 47,696 424,013 220,944
1937-38 134,451 21,998 591 14 24,991 518,485 214,334
1938-39 96,374 36,459 647 36 15,913 501,134 276,862
Sources: Statistical Abstract for British India, 1919-20 to 1928-29
BPP, Cmd 3882 of 1931.
Statistical Abstract 1926-27 to 1935-36. BPP Cmd 5804 of 
1938 Table 262, pp. 838-859.
Statistical Abstract 1929-30 to 1938-39, BPP, Cmd 6333 of 
1942, Table 255, pp.698-719.
which resulted from the decline in export prices reduced demand for 
imports of consumer goods. Consumer goods of most varieties 
declined in volume - from staples such as cotton piecegoods, boots 
and shoes to more luxury items such as soaps, liquors and writing 
paper. At the same, time imports of certain capital goods also
decreased; including cement, coal, railway equipment and rolling
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stock, machinery for metal-working, oil-crushing, mining, rice and 
flour milling and for tea processing, metal goods and fuels. While 
the impact of the depression can be traced in the reduced imports of 
machinery and fuel, especially for agricultural processing 
industries, the effect on other commodities is more subtle. For 
instance, the causes of the changes in the volume of cotton 
piecegoods are highly complex. Imports from Lancashire had been 
declining steadily since before 1914, but received a slight boost in
1928-29 during the prolonged cotton strikes in Bombay. However, 
Lancashire imports were affected further in the early 1930s from the 
Swadeshi and boycott campaigns of the Nationalists.22 At the same 
time, the award of protection to the Indian mill industry was 
strengthening the position of the up-country mills in the domestic 
market against the Bombay enclave. Imports, however, began to creep 
up again after 1931 with the reduction in the price of Japanese 
exports because of the devaluation of the yen.2 3
To some extent, the volume of imports in the pre-depression 
period were being affected already by government policy. In 
particular, the mid-1920s marked a major change in the stores policy 
of the Government of India with the adoption of the notion that 
government contracts could be used to foster indigenous industrial 
development. From 1924, tenders were place increasingly with Indian 
rather than foreign or British firms. The impact of the depression 
in reducing government expenditure also would have diminished the 
number of tenders placed abroad. Through the early and mid-1930s, 
the proportion of Indian firms gaining contracts from the Government 
of India continued to increase. Equally, the policy of protection
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had been adopted before 1929, if in a restricted form. The effects 
of the depression seem to have increased the opportunities for Indian 
industries to receive protection under the stringent rules applied to 
its award. Currency depreciation and dwindling income levels played 
a major role in the reasons given for the award of protection during 
the depression years, for example, to the cotton and sugar 
industries. This spread of protection led to decreased imports of 
sugar, matches, soap and certain types of paper and iron and steel.
The impact of the depression can also be traced in the 
commodities whose imports rose. Currency depreciation made the price 
of Japanese rice cheaper then either Indian or Burmese rice and so 
imports increased, one factor in the demand for anti-exchange dumping 
legislation to be aimed at Japan.24 The increase in most imports can 
again be linked to the award of protection. In the cotton industry 
more firms, especially in up-country districts, were increasing 
production of finer counts of yarn which resulted in increased 
importation of longer-staple cotton from America and East Africa. 
Improvements in the finishing of Indian piecegoods raised the demand 
for imported dyestuffs.25 Imports of cotton machinery, especially 
weaving machinery increased, as manufacturers took the opportunities 
of reduced prices to re-equip, often with secondhand imported 
machinery. The increase in sugar machinery imports is also easily 
linked to the award of protection. Protection at a time of reduced 
cost of imported machinery was a double bonus to entrepreneurs, 
especially since imported machinery was not subject to the 25 per 
cent general increase in customs duties imposed in the Emergency 
Budget of 1931.
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3. Changes in the Composition of Indian Trade
We must now consider the implications of changes in the 
aggregate trade of India on the composition of trade. Tables 1.6 
and 1.7 provide evidence of whether or not the composition of Indian 
trade was altered by the impact of the depression. These tables are 
a revision of the work of Venkatasubbiah, the standard work on 
changes in Indian trade in the inter-war period.26 Unfortunately, 
Venkatasubbiah ’s original calculations on changes in the composition 
of Indian trade did not make allowances for Indo-Burmese trade. The 
conclusions drawn by Venkatasubbiah, based on official statistics, 
were that, at first glance, the composition of India*s export trade 
remained remarkably stable with raw cotton, raw and manufactured 
jute and tea remaining India’s principal exports. However, he 
argued that the depression had appeared to have accelerated the 
process whereby India exported more manufactured and semi­
manufactured goods and depended less on the export of raw materials 
and agricultural produce. He based this on the rising trend of his 
miscellaneous category which included processed oilseeds (in the 
form of oils and cattle fodder) and exports of iron and steel goods.
In the revision of Venkatasubbiah ’ s work on the composition of 
Indian exports, detailed in Table 1.6 (over), allowance has been made 
for the trade between India and Burma. Indian coasting trade to 
Burma has been included as exports from India, while Burmese foreign 
trade has been wholly excluded. The result of this revision is to 
re-emphasise the stability of Indian exports. While the proportion 
of raw cotton, raw and manufactured jute and tea to the value of 
total export trade is increased in the revised series, there is no
29
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increase in the miscellaneous category highlighted by 
Venkatasubbiah. There is actually a decrease on this miscellaneous 
category between its average share of total export trade of 18.9 per 
cent in 1919-20 to 1923-24 to only 15.4 per cent in the period 1935- 
36 to 1939-40. Thus, despite the depression there is little 
diversification of India’s export trade in the inter-war period. Of 
the three staple exports, raw cotton did experience a decline in 
sales to foreign markets, principally Japan, in the late 1930s, but 
it was still India’s single most valuable export. The experience of 
the depression, therefore, seems to have consolidated the traditional 
elements of India’s export trade. This has been a major criticism of 
the performance of Indian trade during the depression.27 Many 
economies sought to diversify their export base as a response to the 
slump. However, it must be remembered that this occurred most 
readily in those economies previously relying heavily on mono- 
cultural exports. By 1929, in comparision, indeed by the outbreak of 
World War One, the Indian export trade was already a highly 
diversified mixture of raw materials and manufactured goods by the 
standards of other primary producers.
Table 1.7 provides a similar revision to Venkatasubbiah ’ s 
original conclusions on the changes in the composition of India’s 
import trade. Again, without making allowance for Indo-Burmese 
trade, Venkatasubbiah concluded that the Indian import trade 
reflected the growing industrialisation during and after the slump. 
He stressed the decline of cotton manufactures and sugar imports as 
evidence of the rise of import-substitution industries within India. 
Also he emphasised the growing importation of industrial machinery
31
so that, by the end of the 1930s, the machinery category had 
overtaken that of cotton manufactures to form India’s single largest 
group of imports.
In the revision of Venkatasubbiah’s calculations, contained in 
Table 1.7 (over), allowance has been made once more for Indo-Burmese 
trade. In this table imports from Burma to India via the coasting 
trade have been included., as have India re-exports of foreign 
merchandise to Burma. Also, deducted have been direct sea-borne 
imports into Burma. With Burma removed from the statistics it is 
clear that the import of cotton piecegoods as a percentage of total 
Indian imports was far larger in the pre-war period than earlier 
assumed by Venkatasubbiah. This makes the reduction of cotton good 
imports during the depression and post-depression periods even more 
dramatic, and explains the near panic displayed by Manchester 
millowners and cotton exporters at the changing nature of the Indian 
market for their goods.28 Another major change is in the oils 
category, reflecting India’s purchase of kerosene and petroleum from 
Burma. Again, the greatest revision of Venkatasubbiah’s earlier work 
concerns his miscellaneous category. The revised figures are markedly 
higher than Venkatasubbiah’s in the last period, 1935-36 to 1939-40 
but lower in the other periods. Thus, the development in the Indian 
economy reflected by the increased demand for new categories of 
imports, is much more marked than Venkatasubbiah’s original work 
suggested. Venkatasubbiah argued that the greatest change in the 
structure of the Indian import trade occurred during the depression, 
but that demand for new products declined again during the late 
1930s. The revised figures, however, show a gradual long-term change
32
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in the structure of India’s import trade, a trend which accelerated 
during the slump but which was at an even greater pace in the late 
1930s. Between 1935-36 and 1939-40, the miscellaneous category 
amounted to 55 per cent of all imports. Thus, there was a continual 
increase in demand throughout the 1930s for new imports such as long 
staple raw cotton from East Africa, electrical appliances, chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals, motor vehicles and machinery and parts.
Overall, then, there were divergent trends in the composition 
of India’s export and import trade. The depression consolidated the 
traditional pattern of India’s export trade, reflecting the more 
diversified nature of Indian exports prior to the slump in 
comparision with other primary producers. In the import trade, 
however, there was a new demand for increased machinery and raw 
materials for domestic consumer industries, with a corresponding 
decline in the import of consumer goods such as cotton piecegoods 
and sugar. This provides a further explanation of the stability of 
India’s export trade. The development taking place during the 1930s 
was based on consumer industries for home demand rather than for 
export.
4. India’s Balance of Trade and Payments
Although, as we have seen, the volume of some of India’s 
principal exports began to recover after 1936, values failed to 
return to 1929 levels. For instance, in 1929-30 India exported 522.2 
million gunny bags valued at Rs 21.8 crores, whereas in 1938-39, 
598.4 million bags were exported at a value of Rs 12.4 crores. The 
position for raw material was similar. In 1929-30, 19,681 tons of raw
34
cow hide were exported valued at Rs 2.18 crores, but the 19,417 tons 
exported in 1936-37 earned only Rs 1.09 crores. Again, the 434,959 
tons of raw hemp sent abroad in 1929-30 was valued at Rs 68,33 lakhs, 
whereas the 816,312 tons exported in 1938-39 was valued at only Rs 
71,98 lakhs.29 This decline in value disrupted the traditional Indian 
pattern of large trade merchandise surplus. At first this was masked 
by the official figures for the total visible balance of trade which 
seemed to remain healthy despite the slump. However, a breakdown of 
the balance of trade, to be found in Table 1.8 (over), reveals the 
true picture. While India’s merchandise balance never went into 
deficit, the large surpluses dwindled away to only Rs 3,22 lakhs in 
1932-33 when only re-exports of foreign merchandise maintained the 
surplus. The merchandise surplus increased again from 1933 reaching 
Rs 77,76 lakhs in 1936-37, but this was still slightly below the 1929 
level and only half of the surpluses recorded in the mid-1920s.30 In 
the last two years before the war, the surplus declined again with 
rice and petroleum products being imported from the newly separated 
Burma.
These poor merchandise balances were masked by the large scale 
export of gold from 1931, again a reversal of the traditional Indian 
patterns of being an importer of treasure. The value and 
distribution of these exports is given in Table 1.9 (over). The gold 
exports were on private account, with the Government of India only 
being involved in one year (1929-30) when it sold Rs 4 lakhs. It was 
government silver reserves which were being exported in this period.
From 1931, gold bullion became India’s most important export 
commodity, accounting for some 30 per cent of total export value
35
between 1931-32 and 1934-35, although it declined after that date. 
Table 1.8
Balance of Trade (Rs lakh)
1929-30 1930-31 1931-32 1932-33 1933-34
Export of Indian 
Merchandise (P) +3,10,80 +2,20,49 +1,55,89 +1,32,27 +1,47,25
Re-export of Foreign 
Merchandise (P) +7,13 +5,15 +4,66 +3,22 +3,42
Imports of Foreign 
Merchandi se (P) -2,38,95 -1,63,58 -1,25,72 -1,32,27 -1,15,00
Balance of Trade in 
Merchandi se (P) +78,98 +62,06 +34,83 +3,22 +35,67
Gold (Private) -14,22 -12,75 +57,98 +65,52 +57,05
Silver (Private) -11,89 -11,65 -2,59 -73 -1
Currency Notes 
(Private) -9 -3 +26 +14 +19
Total Visible
Balance of Trade +52,78 +37,63 +90,48 +68,15 +92,90
Purchase of Sterling 
by Reserve Bank -20,39 -7,26 -53,04 -48,18 -59,97
Sales of Sterling 
by Reserve Bank - +7,75 +18,98 - -
Transfers of Govt. 
Securities -29 -8 +6 -13 -11
Interest Drafts on 
India in respect 
of Govt, of India 
Securities -33 -83 -32 -32 -36
Balance of Remit­
tances of Funds -21,01 +8 -34,32 -48,63 -60*44
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Table 1.8 (Contd.)
1934-35 1935-36 1936-37 1937-38a 1938-39a
Export of Indian 
Merchandise (P) +1,51,67 +1,60,52 +1,96,12 +1,80,93 +1,62,79
Re-export of Foreign 
Merchandi se (P) +3,55 +3,77 +6,24 +8,28 +6,42
Imports of Foreign 
Merchandi se (P) -1,31,80 -1,33,74 -1,24,60 -1,73,33 -1,51,79
Balance of Trade in 
Merchandi se (P) +23,42 +30,55 +77,76 +15,88 +17,42
Gold (Private) +52,54 +87,36 +27,85 +16,34 +13,06
Silver (Private) -37 -1,27 -13,59 -2,26 -1,75
Currency Notes 
(Private) +37 +29 +24 +28 +58
Total Visible 
Balance of Trade +75,96 +66,93 +92,26 +30,24 +29,31
Purchase of Sterling 
by Reserve Bank -42,82 -45,58»> -70,87 -29,51 -32,64
Sales of Sterling 
by Reserve Bank - _b - - -
Transfers of Govt. 
Securities +32 -56 -18 -11 -8
Interest Drafts on 
India in respect 
of Govt, of India 
Securities -28 -31 -29 -28 -28
Balance of Remit­
tances of Funds -49,98 -46,45 -41,34 -29,90 -33,00
Notes: + signifies net export and - signifies net import 
a excludes Burma
b Figures in previous columns relate to sterling purchases and 
transfers by Government.
Source: Statistical Abstract for British India from 1929-30 to
1938-39, BPP, Cmd 6333 of 1942, Table 164, p.758.
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Table 1.9
Value of Treasure Exported bv Sea
1929-30 1930-31 
Rs 1,000 Rs 1,000
1931-32 
Rs 1,000
1932-33 
Rs 1,000
1933-34 
Rs 1,000
Gold
United Kingdom 49,01 48,10,59 39,24,79 44,23,41
United States — — 7,36,19 22,88,61 9,10,43
Total Private 99 49,34 60,78,25 66,84,09 58,15,30
Total Government 4 - — - -
Total Value 1,03 49,34 60,78,25 66,84,09 58,15,30
Total Quantity 
(oz 000) 2 87 8,181 8,526 6,830
Silver
United Kingdom 
(Govt.) 
United Kingdom 
(Private) 
Hong Kong 
(Private)
3,32,34
79,78
1,39,68
18
1,68,22
3,01,89
36,58
1,00,82
2,74,23
75,04
3,37,24
69,18
Total Private 1,47,36 1,81,33 1,82,60 90,03 79,79
Total Government 3,32,43 1,57,37 3,02,21 2,74,23 6,87,65
Total Value 4,79,79 3,38,70 4,84,81 3,64,26 7,17,44
Total Quantity
(oz 000) 34,796 30,689 43,540 32,947 57,861
Total Value Gold
and Silver Exports 4,80,82 3,88,04 65,63,06 70,48,35 65,32,74
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Table 1.9 (Contd.)
1934-35 
Rs 1,000
1935-36 
Rs 1,000
1936-37 
Rs 1,000
1937-38 
Rs 1,000
1938-39 
Rs 1,000
Gold
United Kingdom 
United States
35,07,87
17,02,05
24,44,48
12,48,73
12,46,96
16,66,20
9,14,75
7,10,69
9,31,00
3,71,22
Total Private 
Total Government 
Total Value 
Total Quantity 
(oz 000)
53.25.68
53.25.68 
5,775
38.30.55
38.30.55 
4,123
29.45.49
29.45.49 
3,183
17.89.24
17.89.24 
1,938
13.80.77
13.80.77 
1,436
Silver
United Kingdom 
(Govt.) 
United Kingdom 
(Private) 
Hong Kong 
(Private)
5,77,84
1,49,19
2,40,00
3,84,25
1,81,56
28,37
23,50 57,59
45,66
21,35
Total Private 
Total Government 
Total Value 
Total Quantity 
(oz 000)
4,07,91
5,77,84
9,85,75
68,262
3,18,85
3,84,25
7,03,10
48,321
28.47
28.47 
2,144
74,49
80,77
1,55,19
8,365
28,31
49,61
77,92
6,006
Total Value Gold 
and Silver Exports 63,11,43 45,33,65 29,79,96 19,44,43 14,58,69
Source: Statistical Abstract for British India in the years
1929-30 to 1938-39, BPP, Cmd 6333 of 1942, Table 263, 
pp.754-57.
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The reasons why the gold outflow occurred will be dealt with in 
later chapters. At this point it is sufficient to say that large 
profits could be made by the export of gold from India.
The major question to be asked of the gold flows is how were 
the profits actually utilised? Between 1931 and 1939 the total value 
of gold exports amounted to Rs 338.49 crores, which Shirras estimated 
to be equivalent to 20 per cent of the internal stocks of gold.31 
Rothermund has argued that this was a disinvestment in India during 
the years of the depression largely for the benefit of Britain.32 
Indeed a League of Nations economist commented in 1932 that the gold 
flows from India "were of material help in enabling the Bank [of 
England] to pay off its foreign credit".33 In 1930 and 1931, 
the officials in both India and Britain feared a flight from the 
rupee. India’s credit was weakened through the conjunction of the 
international depression and a period of constitutional uncertainty. 
The gold exports restored the credit of India in international money 
markets and were material in aiding the Government of India to meet 
its remittances in London.34 Had the gold exports not occurred 
India’s balance of trade would not have been sufficient to meet these 
remittances, India would have been forced to default and a flight 
from the rupee would have been unavoidable.
Gold exports probably helped to maintain the level of total 
purchasing power available in India and could even have increased it. 
While the impact of this in the internal sector will be dealt with in 
later chapters, for our present purposes it should be noted that 
within the structure of Indian imports there was an increased 
proportion of machinery and parts. It is possible that some, at
least, of the profits from gold sales were being invested in Indian 
industry, particularly since the new Indian industrial class was 
evolving from the trading families, the Birlas and Thapars of the 
north and the Chettiar families of Madras. Birla certainly was 
involved in bullion export.
To concentrate solely on the visible balance of trade, however, 
would give only a partial view of the nature of India’s external 
financial relations. In many ways it is the patterns of the
invisible balances which are more enlightening. Information on these 
trends, however, is very slight, and at best, estimates. The most
comprehensive survey of India’s balance of payments is still
Banerji’s work concluded in the early 1960s.35 The most recent
Survey of India’s financial development by Goldsmith, a long-term 
study from 1860-1977, concludes, after the briefest of discussions, 
that there was a net outflow of capital of Rs l1 A  million between 
1930 and 1939 or 0.6 per cent of national product. Goldsmith,
however, provides little evidence for this conclusion.36
Banerji estimated that between 1921-22 to 1938-39 India had a
balance of payment deficit of Rs 217 crores, of which there was a
deficit of Rs 22,435 crores between 1921-22 and 1929-30 but a small
surplus of Rs 7.32 between 1930-31 to 1938-39. However, this does
not show the nature of the impact of the depression. Indian trade
balances were essential for the sterling remittances of the
Government of India and for the lubrication of the internal credit 
structure of the Indian economy through the purchase of sterling for 
the finance of trade. If the depression brought a sharp reduction in
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the amount of capital entering India, both the external finances of 
the Government of India and the internal credit structure would come 
under attack which could provide a mechanism of transmission of the 
world financial slump into the Indian economy. Both Tomlinson and 
Rothermund have suggested that this was what occurred providing an 
explanation for the deepening of the slump in the Indian economy in 
1931 before the rupee crisis, but neither have provided evidence to 
support such a suggestion.37
It is very difficult to obtain information on the flow of 
capital in and out of India. In evidence to the Central Banking 
Enquiry, the exchange banks which had the monopoly of the finance of 
foreign trade, submitted a consolidated balance sheet for the year 
ending 31st December 1929. Of total resources of Rs 88 crores, Rs 10 
crores were in bills of exchange in transit to London and overseas, 
Rs 26 crores in Government securities and Treasury Bills and Rs 46 
crores in loans, cash credit, overdrafts and hundis. The figure of 
Rs 10 crores is, as Banerji has put it, 'The only indication 
available of the magnitude of funds imported into India in the busy 
season to finance the trade of India’ and of the relationship between 
the funds the exchange banks put into overseas and internal trade.38 
However, even as early as December 1929, these figures could have 
been distorted by the depression. In particular, the Rs 26 crores 
invested in government securities and treasury bills could have 
contained a proportion previously used to finance trade. The 
Controller of Currency reported that in December 1929 the exchange 
banks were investing in treasury bills attracted by the higher rate 
of interest which was utilising some of the capital left free since
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it was no longer needed to finance trade.39
Contemporaries seemed to worry more about a withdrawal of funds 
from India between 1929 and 1931 than the general squeeze on 
international credit since between those dates Indian interest rates 
were higher than those in the advanced capital markets which should 
have attracted funds. Investors were being deterred both by the 
economic position of India and the political difficulties. Between 
1929 and 1931 there were widespread fears over the safety of foreign 
investments in India under a new nationalist government after Nehru’s 
call at the 1929 Congress for repudiation of debts and
nationalisation of foreign concerns.40 The importance of political 
difficulties holding back short-term investment is seen in the early 
part of 1931 during the lull created by the Gandhi-Irwin Pact. During 
this time, Taylor, the Controller of Currency, estimated that some Rs 
10 to Rs 15 crores were invested in short-term government treasury 
bills from outside India.41
The evidence for a withdrawal of funds is of a qualitative 
rather than a quantitative nature. In 1930, for instance, the Indian 
Trade Commissioner in London, H. Lindsay, reported to a meeting of 
the Board of Trade Advisory Council that there had been some
repatriation of funds, but in his estimation this ’was not
serious’.42 The Reports of the Controller of Currency also referred 
to repatriation of foreign investment between 1929 and 1931 as well 
as speculative foreign investment by Indians themselves, but again 
does not provide any estimates for these outflows.43 Kindersley, in 
his series of surveys of British overseas investment, argued that
repayments to Britain increased from 1931 and were larger than new
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investment. However, there is no breakdown of the source of the 
repayments so it is impossible to assess how much might have been 
repatriation of investment from India.44
The important factor was the credit problem at governmental 
level. Most of the sterling needed to meet the requirements of the 
Secretary of State was sold to the Government of India by the 
exchange banks during the busy season. However, as trade faltered, 
there was less demand for finance in the busy season and sales of 
sterling to the government stopped. Indeed the Government of India 
was forced to sell sterling from November 1930.45 The Government of 
India had to borrow on the London market at the high rates of 1929-31 
and to remit through its currency reserves which meant contracting 
currency within India. However, as we have seen, the contraction of 
currency was simply mopping up the excess money in circulation due to 
falling prices and reduced demand for Indian produce. Therefore, the 
credit squeeze in rural areas must have been the result of a failure 
of internal mechanisms for transferring money from urban to rural 
areas, a process which will be discussed in later chapters. Outwith 
the governmental sector, there is no adequate study of the financial 
linkages between India and the outside world, so that the suggestion 
that the depression was transmitted to India through a contraction of 
international credit must remain speculative, if attractive.
5. The Direction of Indian Trade
The trends already detailed resulted in alterations to the 
direction of Indian trade, figures for which can be found in 
Table 1.10.46 Trade with Britain and its imperial possessions
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increased for a few years under the impetus of imperial preference. 
Table 1.10
Percentage Shares in Indian Trade of Principal Countries (Value)
UK Germany USA Japan France
1919-20 32.2 0.2 11.6 10.5 3.0
1925-26 33.1 6.7 9.0 12.4 4.0
1928-29 31.2 8.2 9.7 8.9 3.9
1929-30 30.1 7.7 9.4 10.1 3.9
1930-31 29.3 6.9 9.3 12.0 3.6
1931-32 31.0 7.2 9.4 9.6 2.5
1932-33 32.3 7.2 3.9 13.0 3.8
1933-34 36.0 7.1 6.9 11.3 3.4
1935-36 34.8 7.4 8.5 14.8 2.9
1937-38 31.6 7.2 8.8 11.4 1.9
Belgium Nether­
lands
Canada Australia South
Africa
1919-20 1.6 0.4 0.3 1.0 0.3
1925-26 3.0 1.9 0.6 1.5 0.4
1928-29 3.5 2.3 0.9 2.7 0.5
1929-30 3.4 2.4 0.8 2.2 0.5
1930-31 3.2 2.6 0.8 1.8 0.6
1931-32 2.6 2.5 0.7 1.5 0.6
1932-33 2.8 2.2 0.7 1.9 0.5
1933-34 2.7 2.3 1.0 1.5 0.6
1935-36 2.7 1.7 0.9 1.4 0.6
1937-38 2.6 1.5 0.9 1.3 0.6
Source: Calculated from Table 264, pp.506-7 and Table 208, pp.518-
21 Statistical Abstract, 1919-20 to 1928-29, BPP Cmd, 
3882 of 1931 Table 254, pp.694-97, and Table 256, pp.720- 
25, Statistical Abstract 1929-30 to 1938-39, BPP, Cmd 6333 
of 1942.
However, British exports quickly began to decline once more while 
India increasingly sold more to Britain. Germany's share of the
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Indian export trade recovered quickly from the slump based on the 
export of dyestuffs for India’s cotton industry. India’s share of 
the German market declined though from 1933 under the impetus of the 
self-sufficiency campaign aimed at substituting foreign raw 
materials. The two new trade conventions with Japan initially 
increased Indian sales, particularly of raw cotton, to Japan but in 
the long term the conventions benefited Japan as the exporter of 
manufactured goods. Trade with India’s other major partner America, 
fluctuated. High tariff barriers in America reduced Indian imports, 
especially jute goods. At the same time, as India imported more long 
stapled cotton from East Africa and Egypt, America’s share of 
India’s import trade also declined.
These changes are seen in greater clarity when studied in terms 
of the balance of trade. The merchandise balances are recorded in 
Table 1.11 (over). The most striking changes are the reversal of the 
traditional relations with Britain, Japan and Germany. The massive 
gold flows dramatically changed the relationship with Britain ending 
Britain’s traditional large surpluses with India. From 1936 India’s 
balance with Britain became a surplus rather than a deficit as India 
exported more to Britain while India increasingly became a less 
attractive market for British goods. On the other hand, India’s 
traditional surpluses with Germany and Japan became deficits. There 
were similar patterns with the Strait Settlements and Egypt. 
Elsewhere India’s trade surpluses were greatly reduced through the 
slow recovery of export values. This had major implications for 
India’s traditional role in the settlement of multilateral payments. 
After the depression it was Britain’s surpluses with Malaya and
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Table 1.11:—Balance of Merchandise Trade of India with Major Partners
Rs (1,000)
1925-26 1928-29 1929-30 1931-32
United Kingdom -39,59,75 -44,20,11 -36,54,75 -1,93,85
Canada +81,92 -51,65 +49,46 +1,06,93
Australia +6,09,84 -1,07,92 +19,25 +1,36,74
Union of South Africa +2,39,95 +1,88,71 +1,64,34 +1,21,82
Ceylon +12,98,47 +11,66,28 +10,95,40 +6,27,10
Hong Kong +2,00,90 +1,62,40 +2,20,53 +1,27,11
Straits Settlements +4,15,43 +2,70,28 +1,74,01 +1,78,51
Kenya Colony -1,42,54 -1,32,28 -2,03,29 -2,81,00
Egypt +4,33,66 +2,91,97 +3,44,48 +43,56
USA +24,41,99 +21,75,05 +18,46,67 +1,02,71
Japan +38,46,80 +16,74,90 +8,68,17 +60,31
Germany +13,46,59 +16,48,73 +10,77,58 +8,05
France +17,87,10 +12,99,19 +12,23,77 +5,46,36
Italy +14,72,54 +7,72,81 +4,90,31 +1,91,64
USSR +19,24 -59,96 -1,40,87 -2,52,42
Java -9,27,64 -11,81,63 -7,46,12 -3,16,82
China +12,83,80 +5,12,07 +8,92,32 +5,01,10
Burma — _ _ —
1933-34
Rs (1,000) 
1935-36 1938-39
United Kingdom -37,81 -1,71,03 +9,02,28
Canada +1,19,43 +1,24,17 +2,23,10
Australia +1,96,64 +1,61,52 +56,02
Union of South Africa +95,67 +1,25,19 +1,14,47
Ceylon +4,61,88 +5,63,77 +3,91,59
Hong Kong +62,91 +7,94 +43,24
Straits Settlements +58,17 +75 -2,09,09
Kenya Colony -1,75,51 -2,82,55 -4,43,29
Egypt +47,66 -28,45 -96,39
USA +6,87,54 +7,98,03 +4,10,07
Japan -2,89,22 +4,39 -82,34
Germany +95,13 -2,83,86 -4,37,24
France +5,86,43 +5,85,84 +4,79,04
Italy +2,84,09 +1,51,66 -6,51
USSR -1,55,77 -1,25,81 +17,67
Java -1,94,02 -1,38,20 +21,78
China +2,30,84 +3,02 +73,54
Burma — -14,31,54
Sources: Statistical Abstract for British India from 1919-20 to
1928-29, BPP, Crad 3882 of 1931, Table 204, pp.506-7, and 
Table 208, pp.518-21.
Statistical Abstract for British India from 1929-30 to 
1938-39, BPP, Cmd 6333 of 1942, Table 254, pp.694-97, and 
Table 256, pp.720-25.
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Africa which helped to pay its deficits elsewhere, including India, 
rather than its surpluses with India as formerly. The implications 
of this will be considered more fully in the next chapter.
There were major changes in the structure of Indian foreign 
trade during the 1930s, many resulting directly from the short-term 
impact of the depression. The changes in both composition and 
direction of foreign trade resulted in India gradually disengaging 
from the international economy, a reversal of previous trends. As we 
have seen this was a long-term trend begun during the First World War 
and accelerated during the depression with the growing importance of 
the home market. To this extent, contemporary economists like Thomas 
and Anstey were correct to assert that Indian trade was less 
vulnerable to the slump than many other primary producers. While 
India shared the common experience of steep declines in export values 
and a worsening of the terms of trade, the Indian economy was not as 
dependent as some smaller countries upon the export sector or upon 
one major export commodity. Thus, the composition of India’s export 
trade remained relatively stable during the depression. Unlike other 
primary producers, India’s export trade offered fewer opportunities 
for diversification. Instead, diversification was occurring in the 
internal economy with the expansion of the industrial sector.
This does not mean to say that the foreign trade sector was 
unimportant and that the trade depression did not have serious 
implications for the domestic economy of India. The steep decline of 
export values resulted in a major reduction of income for both 
cultivators and trading houses and consequently reduced purchasing 
power. Was there, therefore, a shift in the patterns of investment
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from traditional channels of agriculture and trade into industry? 
Changes in the composition of Indian imports hint that this was 
occurring. The reduction of trade surpluses was of vital importance 
to the central government, which was heavily dependent upon customs 
duties and the maintenance of a favourable balance of trade to meet 
its remittance obligations. If government revenue was reduced, this 
would limit its abilities to make an effective response to the 
challenges of the depression.
Ultimately, India’s trade structure could be affected by 
changes in government policy. Many governments sought to manipulate 
their trade policies to mitigate the effect of the depression. 
Governments promoted tariffs, quota restrictions and new export crops 
and marketing schemes to try to increase domestic income levels. How 
far did the Government of India change its trade policies to protect 
the domestic economy or was its position as a colonial authority a 
constraint on its ability to respond? The nature of the government’s 
responses and their effectiveness in mitigating the effects of the 
slump in India’s trade will now be assessed.
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CHAPTER TWO
Trade and Tariff Policy in the 1930s
For many governments of developing nations, the depression was 
marked by a period of experimentation in trade policy in the effort 
to protect their economies from the worst impact of the slump. Such 
experiments ranged from use of the tariff structure to promote 
import-substitution industries to new marketing organisations and 
techniques aimed at securing as great a share as possible of the 
dwindling world markets in primary produce.1 In India, the link 
between the conditions of Indian trade and the health of the 
Government of India’s budgetary position was the major factor 
underlying policy decisions. The Central Government relied upon a 
favourable balance of trade with which to meet its sterling 
obligations in London. Thus trade policy during the depression was 
dominated by the issues of the exchange rate and tariff levels, 
including the question of imperial preference. There was no period 
of bold experimentation in India at this time with only sporadic 
attention to policies of quality control or the marketing of Iridian 
produce and proposals which might have necessitated large inputs of 
government capital were shelved quickly.
Contemporaries were sharply divided in support of, or opposition
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to government trade policies. The pro-government stance adopted by 
economists such as Coyajee, Anstey, Dey, Madan and Adarkar, 
maintained that the manipulation of exchange policy and the adoption 
of imperial preference had kept open India’s most important export 
market, the United Kingdom, at a time of proliferating trade barriers 
elsewhere in the world. They also argued that the Government of 
India was justified in refusing demands for an embargo on the export 
of gold from 1931 since such exports had re-established India’s 
credit by restoring a favourable balance of trade.2 On the other 
hand, opponents of the government such as Vakil, Gadgil amd Munshi 
demanded an end to the rupee-sterling link, allowing a full 
devaluation of the rupee and increasing the competitiveness of Indian 
exports. For them, Imperial preference invited retaliatory action by 
non-empire countries especially those of Continental Europe thus 
reducing both markets open to Indian goods and opportunities for the 
conclusion of favourable bilateral trade agreements.3 Balanced 
between these extremes of opinion were a few economists such as P. 
Ray and Thomas. Ray, for example, who criticised nationalists and 
Indian businessmen for their continued agitation in support of the Is 
4d exchange rate which prolonged the destablisation of business 
conditions, was equally critical of the adoption of imperial 
preference as harmful to long-term prospects for Indian trade.4 
Similarly, while Thomas supported much of the government’s trade 
policies, particularly the gold exports, he attacked fiercely the 
lack of integration of such policies into a coherent development 
strategy for the Indian economy.5
The views of Indian nationalists, that trade policy between the
wars was shaped by the United Kingdom for its own benefit rather than 
that of India, gained some broad acceptance over the years. However, 
it came under criticism from historians such as Tomlinson, Dewey and 
Charlesworth. They argued that the impact of the First World War had 
loosened the imperial bonds which tied India to Britain, culminating 
in the Fiscal Autonomy Convention of 1923, which supposedly gave the 
Government of India the right to regulate its own tariff policy, for 
instance, in the appointment of a Tariff Board.6 This view echoed 
the work of the Canadian historian, Drummond, that the imperial 
importance of India to Britain was eclipsed by that of the White 
Dominions in the inter-war period.7
Qualifications of these ideas have been expressed recently by 
Rothermund and Chatterji, who have suggested that while there was 
some diminution of imperial control in the war this was short-lived 
and that Indian fiscal autonomy did not shift the balance of power 
decisively.8 In the inter-war period, according to this argument, 
British authorities merely paid lip-service to fiscal autonomy while 
seeking new ways of preserving the British hegemony of the Indian 
market. For such critics, the Ottawa Agreement with its adoption of 
imperial preference was the successful climax to British attempts to
re-assert control over the Empire, and, within that, over India.
To some extent, these arguments can be tested by the use made
by the Government of India of its fiscal autonomy during the
depression. Did the Indian authorities join in the scramble to make 
bilateral trade agreements which seemed to affect governments 
throughout the world? The Canadian Government, for instance, seemed 
to enter an almost frenzied period of trade bargaining during the
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1930s, concluding new agreements with the majority of its trade 
partners from Great Britain and the United States to Paraguay and the 
Honduras.7 To what extent did the Government of India consider using 
tariff policy to shield the domestic economy from the worst ravages 
of the slump? Tariffs could have been used to block the importation 
of cheaper foreign agricultural produce or as a stimulus to import- 
substitution industries els occurred in Japan, Latin America and the 
Dutch East Indies.
Of course, the major consideration for the Government of India 
in determining its trade policy during the depression was the 
possible consequences upon its budgetary position. Under the 
constitution of 1920, the Government of India was forced to rely upon 
customs and excise duty for one-third of its total revenue needs.10 
Railway revenue provided the other major source for government funds, 
but during the depression the Indian Railway Department els a whole 
w e l s running at a loss.11 Nor during a depression would there be 
much scope for increased income tax or excess profit tax.12 Thus the 
Government of India wels forced back to customs increELses to meet its 
budgetary needs, but any dramatic reduction in imports would in turn 
increELse the serious constraints upon government resources.11
Policy decisions of the Government of India also hsui 
implications for areas outwith India’s national boundaries. The most 
obvious example is in India’s imperial relationships, but the 
disengagement by India from the international economy> noted in the 
previous chapter^ impinged on the fate of other developing economies. 
For instance, the adoption of protection for the sugar industry wiped
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out imports of Javanese sugar, deepening the impact of the slump in 
the Dutch East Indies.14 Naturally, this was a two-way process. 
Australia’s agreement to sell iron ore to Japan hit India’s pig iron 
exports. Did the policies of the Government of India invite 
retaliatory action by other authorities} as the nationalists 
suggested? If so, what were the implications for Indian trade in the 
longer-term?
The discussion of the trade and tariff policy of the Government 
of India during the slump, and the implication for long-term 
developments in India’s trade will focus on three key areas. The 
first two centre on aspects of tariff policy. Firstly, the 
relationship between Delhi and Whitehall will be studied. Clearly, 
the major discussion here will focus on the adoption of imperial 
preference, the impact this had on Delhi’s relations with the Indian 
business community, and the effects on Indian trade. Secondly, trade 
policy with the non-empire countries will be assessed;with emphasis 
on the problems with Japan. Thirdly, there will be an analysis of 
policies adopted by the Indian Government to improve the country’s 
trading position during the slump. Again, a crucial element in this 
discussion is the varying response of Delhi to different sectors of 
the Indian business and commercial communities.
Indian Tariff Policy Before 1929
To understand the changing structure of Indian tariffs which 
resulted from the depression, it is necessary to sketch a brief 
history of policy trends before 1929. Tariff policy had proved to be 
one of the most contentious facets of India’s colonial history,
5?
provoking conflict not only between the Government of India and 
nationalist groups, but also between Delhi and Whitehall. Broadly 
speaking, until the First World War, with Whitehall governing tariff 
policy, India was forced to accept a free trade doctrine not best 
suited to its developing needs. Cotton duties proved the focus of 
conflict. An increase in the cotton import duty seemed to provide a 
reliable and simple method of raising extra revenue for the Indian 
Government. However, such suggestions provoked protests from the 
powerful Lancashire mill lobby for which India was the principal 
market. Whitehall inevitably supported Lancashire, arguing that 
increased cotton duties would prove protectionist, not fiscal, and 
thus contrary to the free trade doctrine. By the mid-1890s, revenue 
needs made the imposition of a cotton duty a necessity, however 
London was able to impose a counterveiling excise duty on Indian 
cloth. Thus, it seemed clear to Indian nationalists that London would 
always place British needs before those of India, manipulating 
tariffs to maintain British hegemony of the Indian market.1 5 Even in 
1913, Britain supplied some 64 per cent of Indian imports.1 6
The First World War highlighted once more India’s strategic 
importance within the British Empire. Meanwhile its dislocating 
effect on trade reversed the traditional economic relations, pushing 
Britain into deficit with India. These trends provided the 
Government of India with greater political leverage against Whitehall 
than was usual. Therefore, in return for a gift of £100 million to 
the British Government, Delhi was able to increase cotton duties 
without a corresponding rise in the counterveiling excise, thus 
giving the Indian cotton industry an important measure of protection.
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During the war, Japan and America increased their share of the Indian 
market from 2 per cent each to 12 per cent and 8 per cent 
respectively.17 The war forced Britain officials to realise that 
British trade in India was now vulnerable. Thomas Ainscough, British 
Trade Commissioner to India, produced a gloomy long-term view of 
British trade prospects in India. He cited the dynamic practices of 
Japanese and American firms; direct shipping routes; branch offices 
in India; brighter advertising and packaging. Such firms had dealers 
up-country negotiating directly with local traders and Japanese 
cotton importers even had established their own ginning mills. 
Besides this, the attitudes of British firms seemed almost arrogantly 
conservative. Their only response was to demand government action 
against ' unfair competition’, and thus, in Ainscough’s words, 'to go 
on in the old, inefficient and haphazard way’.18
The impact of the war was to demonstrate that India’s tariff 
policy could no longer be regulated from London. The 1918 Industrial 
Commission recommended that India be given control over its own trade 
and tariff policy so that it could be used to promote economic 
growth.1 9 This was re-iterated in the Montagu-Chelmsford Report of 
1919,20 but was not embodied in the consequent constitutional 
reforms.
Fiscal autonomy was not finally recognised until 1923, although 
many British parliamentarians and business groups refused to accept 
this because it was not embodied in a parliamentary statute.21 The 
Secretary of State for India still retained the ultimate sanction of 
veto should any fiscal proposal of the Government of India appear too
controversial for Whitehall. However, from Montagu onwards, most 
officials regarded the fiscal autonomy convention as abrogating their 
right of interference. Thus, in 1930 the then Secretary of State, 
Wedgewood Benn, protested about the proposed increase in cotton 
duties in the forthcoming Indian Budget since he 'deplored* the 
effect on Lancashire, but concluded that he was defenceless to act 
against Indian fiscal autonomy.22
At the same time, there was some recognition of the potential 
use of tariff policy for the encouragement of industrial development. 
Legislation permitted the Government of India to establish a Tariff 
Board to consider applications by individual industries for tariff 
protection. Industries for which protection was recommended would 
have to fulfil a stringent set of criteria including 'natural 
advantages* over foreign imports and the ability in time to dispense 
with the need for government support.23 In itself, this was an 
important step away from a purely fiscal tariff. However, as usual 
in any advancement towards Indian control of its own affairs, there 
were qualifications. The recommendations of the Board were not 
binding on Government and could be rejected in part or completely. 
Above all, the Tariff Board was not a permanent body. Separate 
boards were convened to consider the case of individual industries. 
Thus industries had already gone through a selective governmental 
process even before reaching the Board. The absence of a permanent 
board as recommended by the Industrial Commission marked the absence 
of a full-blooded commitment to a policy of protection by the 
Government of India. Protection was merely another ad. hoc solution 
to individual pressures.24
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Probably a more important aid to development than the attempted 
use of tariff protection was the grant of free or lowered duty 'given 
regardless of revenue considerations on broad grounds of national 
policy*. Such goods affected included machinery, drugs and 
fertilisers.2 5
India’s tariff policy was adapted further in 1927 with the 
introduction of 'discriminating protection* in the case of iron and 
steel: that is the Tariff Board recommended lower duty on imported
British Steel than on 'foreign* steel. The Tariff Board reasoned
that Indian industry was suffering more from cheap imported 
continental steel than British imports. Although Wagle 1ms pointed
out that this was a true reflection of the evidence provided by the 
Tatas, India’s major steel producer, other Indian groups felt that 
it was merely a method of allowing British firms to circumvent 
India’s supposed fiscal autonomy. These suspicions were further 
fuelled by the application of 'discriminating protection* to cotton 
in 1930.27 Markovits has argued recently that the acceptance of 
'discriminating protection* was a major factor dividing the Bombay 
business community from its fellows elsewhere in India.28
Thus, at the beginning of the 1930s, the Government of India 
regarded its policy as 'a single-decker tariff consisting mainly of 
purely revenue duties but containing certain duties in pursuance of 
the policy of discriminating protection for Indian industry.’29 In 
other words financial considerations remained paramount in trade 
policy. Thus, for instance, for fiscal reasons, the Indian Government 
imposed higher tariffs on certain categories of raw materials and 
plant entering India than on the actual finished manufactures of the
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same kind.30
Changes In Tariff Structure During The Depression
During the early years of the depression, the Government of 
India was obsessed with its budgetary position and the impending 
financial crisis. D^windling trade surpluses created major 
difficulties for the Indian authorities both in meeting the 
remittance obligations and maintaining the exchange rate of the 
rupee. The tariff, therefore, was used in its traditional form, 
almost purely for revenue purposes, with duties increasing steadily 
from 1929, including the imposition of a 25 per cent surcharge in the 
Emergency Budget of September 1931. In this, Delhi was encouraged by 
Whitehall officials equally worried by the unsteady financial 
position of India. Whitehall, in its turn, was obsessed by the fear 
of a run on the rupee which might ultimately bring down sterling as 
well. Since the British Government was also facing financial 
difficulties, partly through the ever-dwindling surpluses with Africa 
and Asia, the fear that India might default on its obligations was 
very great.
The Government of India, therefore, was under constant 
pressure from Whitehall to balance its budget and the correspondence 
exchanged op budget proposals became increasingly voluminous and 
acrimonious.31 Once again, the traditional debates over India’s 
tariff policy re-emerged. While the Indian Government wanted to 
raise customs duties to protect i-t»> revenue position, London argued 
that it should be finding new sources of income. London constantly
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charged the Indian authorities with failing to take thfc budget
position seriously and favoured strengthening of Treasury control
over the Indian budget, particularly after promises in July 1931 that
Britain would support India’s credit.32 Such moves provoked a sharp
response from the Indian Government.
'While recognising that the Treasury are entitled to 
full information, and gratefully welcoming helpful
suggestions and advice from them as from you, we trust 
you will not press us to accept the declaration by His 
Majesty’s Government as giving the Treasury any right to 
dictate our policy for which we, with knowledge of local 
conditions, must remain responsible. Continuous
interference with the wide discretion which you have 
hitherto allowed us would create an impossible
situation.’33
One reason for this conflict was that while the duties were
imposed for revenue reasons, as the government struggled to meet its 
commitments, the tariffs did have a protective element. This was 
deplored by London, especially since it re-opened the controversy 
over cotton duties, 'which it was hoped had been disposed of by the 
decision of 1927’ as one India Office official put it.34 Thus while 
the Indian authorities proposed fresh customs duties, Whitehall 
officials recoiranended retrenchment and increased income taxes, even
for the low paid.35 Whitehall would approve only increased customs 
duties on luxury goods or on the raw materials and machinery of 
protected industries which they believed could meet the costs from
their 'substantial protection’.36
Generally, though, in recognition of the need for the Indian 
authorities to meet their remittances, Whitehall was forced to accept 
increased Indian custom duties. Beginning in 1929-30 duties were
increased on cotton piecegoods, silver, salt, sugar, liquors and
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spirits, spices, cigarettes, tobacco, fuels, motor vehicles, 
artificial silks and yams, cement and boots and shoes.37 In the 1931 
Budget there was also a series of surcharges ranging from 2.5 to 25 
per cent. Finally in the 1931 Emergency Budget there was a general 
surcharge of 25 per cent, even on some articles previously on the 
free list, such as drugs. The only exemptions were for raw cotton, 
machinery and dyestuffs.38 Whitehall disapproved of reliance on 
customs duties to balance the Indian budget since it was felt the 
burden was falling more on British producers than the Indian 
consumer. Thus, Sir Cecil Kisch, Financial Adviser to the India 
Office, complained late in 1931 that 'purely political considerations 
have, in my opinion, dominated the requirements of sound finance . .. 
The great mass of the Indian populace is not called upon to take 
their proper part in rehabilitation.’39
Such criticisms of the policy decisions of the Government of 
India by Whitehall were grossly unfair, since British officials were 
equally concerned with 'political considerations’. Lancashire mill- 
owners formed a formidable political lobby, the region accounting for 
some 60 members of Parliament. Also recently, Capie has argued that 
far from being the ad hoc response to the crisis that the 1932 Import 
Duties Act is normally regarded, it was the culmination of a decade 
of intense political pressure by the British iron and steel 
manufacturers and associated traders.4 0 More crucially, the 
British Government failed to appreciate the position of the 
Government of India as a colonial authority or chose to ignore it. 
If the British authorities imposed duties or increased taxes, it 
could declare that it had the mandate of the electorate to do so. The
Gk
Government of India had no such mandate. At a time of growing 
nationalist sentiment in India, every policy decision of the 
government was scrutinised closely and criticised vociferously.
Thus, in deciding upon commercial policy, the Government of 
India was caught between pressure from Whitehall and pressure from 
Indian nationalist opinion. Also, it had to contend with the force 
of Europeans domiciled in India. Placed in the middle of all this, 
it is easy to understand why government actions should be halting and 
lacking in co-ordination. In this light, customs duties seemed to 
be the simpler option. Customs duties increases, it was felt, would 
provoke no major criticisms from the Indian business community. 
However, during the depression,the Government of India did not simply 
manipulate tariff policy to raise revenue. Its tariff policy 
provoked controversy within India when it became embroiled in the 
question of imperial preference.
The Role of Imperial Preference in the 1930s
The impact of the depression in reducing world markets,, 
resulted in a resurgence of interest in the idea of imperial
preference. From the late nineteenth century, there had been
advocates for a greater extension of inter-imperial trade as a 
solution to growing competition to Britain in world markets. On the 
other side, there were demands for imperial protection by the
Dominions of Canada and Australia which wanted a protected market in
Britain. These forces were strengthened in the 1920s with the 
establishment of the Empire Industries Association and the Empire 
Economic Union.41 India remained aloof from this mood; as late as
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1930 the representative of the Government of India informed the 
Imperial Economic Conference that India had little or nothing to gain 
from imperial preference.42 Indeed, the Indian authorities insisted 
on its autonomy to pursue its own tariff policy and to 'reserve 
complete freedom to deal with each case as it arises ’.4 3 A change in 
British tariff policy, however, heralded a change in Indian policy 
and provoked a new campaign of agitation against Delhi.
By the end of 1931, the pressure of the depression and the 
consequent financial crisis, had forced Britain to abandon the gold 
standard and its traditional free trade policy. There had been a 
measure of informal preference for empire goods entering the British 
market since 1919. However, in the Imports Duties Act of 1932, 
Britain sought to formalise inter-imperial relations by demanding 
trade negotiations with India and the Dominions and by exempting the 
non-self governing colonies 'unconditionally from all duties under 
the Act*44 While the forthcoming Imperial Economic Conference was 
being forced on Britain by Canada, British authorities hoped that 
they could take the opportunity to secure agreements guaranteeing 
their empire markets during the crisis.
Britain’s position was relayed to India through the Secretary 
of State, Sir Samuel Hoare, who stated that 'continuance of exemption 
of Dominions and India from any or all duties in whole or in part 
will depend upon the character of benefits which Dominions and India 
are prepared to offer in return at Ottawa’. Hoare concluded, 'Your 
Government will at once recognise that this completely revolutionises 
the position as between India and the UK, and that it is now entirely 
incorrect to say as has always been said in the past, that India has
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little to gain from Imperial Preference. After Ottawa the position 
will be that India will stand to lose heavily if she does not come 
come into the scheme of imperial preference to be worked out 
there.’45 This is, of course, suggestive of Rothermund’s argument 
about the re-assertion of imperial control.
Indian officials became concerned about the implications of 
this change in British policy. Sir P. Ginwala, a past president of 
the Indian Tariff Board, explained the possible serious repercussions 
on India. Should Indian goods be liable to import duties in Britain, 
they would be replaced by purchases from the non-self government 
colonies, which 'scattered over all parts of the world and having all 
kinds of conditions and climates, ... are favourably situated for the 
production of those very commodities in which the agricultural 
population of India has a vital interest. ’4 6 As over-production among 
primary producers continued pushing down prices further and as world 
markets contracted more rapidly in the early 1930s, this appeared to 
be a serious threat.
If the conference at Ottawa was to be used only to provide a 
short-term answer to the crisis of the depression, such arguments 
would have been somewhat exaggerated. Had Britain turned to the 
non-self governing colonies for replacements for Indian goods, it 
would have added greatly to their price through increased production 
costs, freight and insurance charges and it would be unlikely to find 
a single producer on the same scale as India.47 Such were the 
criticisms levelled at the scheme by Indian National Chambers of 
Commerce, particularly those in Bombay and Calcutta.48 The leader 
of the Indian Delegation at Ottawa, the Indian Trade Commissioner in
of the Indian Delegation at Ottawa, the Indian Trade Commissioner in 
London, Sir Atul Chat ter jee, declared in his opening address that 
'the development of Indian foreign trade generally is one of the 
primary interests.’49 Indian nationalists, though, believed that 
this dimension had been forgotten.50
However, the Government of India could have been concerned more 
by the long-term implications of the change in British trade policy. 
Ad hoc trade agreements could establish principles for long-term 
trade policy. If Britain was to turn permanently to the non-self 
governing colonies, import duties on Indian goods would make them 
progressively less competitive in the British market. As Ginwala, 
also an Indian delegate at Ottawa, pointed out, there were enough 
non-self governing colonies producing goods sufficiently similar to 
those of India eventually to squeeze India out of the British 
market.51
The Conference at Ottawa marked the first occasion on which 
India was not represented by the Secretary of State, therefore the 
composition of the delegation was vital to its eventual success. 
Recently, Chatterji has argued that Hoare originally wished to invite 
two of India’s leading businessmen, G.D. Birla and Sir P. Thakurdas, 
to join the delegation.52 According to Markovits, Hoare hoped that 
this could be an olive branch to the Indian business community and 
help to wean their support away from Congress, support which had 
seemed to have been diminishing by the end of the 1930 Civil 
Disobedience Campaign.53 However, Hoare was forced to back down by 
Willingdon who refused to accept Indian businessmen so closely 
identified with the nationalist cause.54 Instead Indians regarded as
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loyal to the Indian authorities were chosen, such as Ginwala,
Chatter jee and Chetty as well as government officials such as 
Schuster and Sir George Rainy, the Commerce Member. Naturally, this 
was seen as a direct snub to the Indian business community and 
criticism began before the Conference had been convened. In the 
first instance, Indian business associations refused to co-operate 
with fact-finding missions before the conference.55
Criticism of government policy was also ensured by the manner 
in which the Assembly was informed of the Conference. While several 
more enlightened members of the Indian Executive wished to allow the 
Assembly the right to vote on attendance and so gain acceptance of 
any forthcoming agreement, Willingdom argued it was not a good idea 
to place such a resolution 'at the fag end of the session *.
Eventually the Assembly was informed, in reply to a question, that 
the Executive had agreed both on attendance and on composition of 
the delegation. The placebo was that any agreement would be 'duly be 
placed before the Legislature for its approval ’.5 6 Thus any 
possible economic gains to be received from imperial preference were 
drowned in the wave of protest from Indian businessmen and 
nationalist politicians.
As Birla explained to Sir Walter Layton, a reciprocal agreement
between Britain and India could have worked:
'... but the Ottawa Conference is foredoomed as far as 
India is concerned. The Government have ignored to take 
the Indian mercantile community with them. The result is 
that the latter has created such a tremendous opposition 
against the Ottawa Conference throughout the country that 
whatever its conclusion, India is going to consider the 
same. The mischief is already done ... I write this as
an Indian who has got a large stake in the country and
who wants to see permanent peace between the two
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countries established.’57
The Government of India could have made its task easier by 
explaining that few of the countries represented at the conference 
expected to make massive gains from imperial preference, nor were 
they expecting to be bound to inter-empire trade. The delegations 
were merely looking for some guaranteed markets to tide their 
countries through the worst of the depression and form a basis for 
negotiating most-favoured nation agreements with their non-empire 
partners on more favourable lines. This was made clear by the 
opening remarks of the various delegations. Thus, Havenga for the 
Union of South Africa declared:
'South Africa does not subscribe to the theory of a 
self-contained and isolated British Empire. None of its 
members, least of all the United Kingdom, can exist by 
trade within the Commonwealth alone.’5 8
Drummond has argued that the negotations with the Indian 
delegation were very low-key affairs, involving only minor British 
officials,59 which he regards as a sign of the diminished importance 
of India to Britain. However, prior to the conference, a British 
representative had visited the Dominions gathering information on the 
various topics for discussion. India had not been included in this 
itinerary, but an invitation was sent to the Indian delegation to 
come to London for 'informal discussions’ and to travel to Canada 
with the British delegation.60 This raised protests from the Board 
of Trade and the Dominions Office, insisting that this would be seen 
by Dominion Governments as evidence that Britain and India had 
concluded an agreement pre-empting the discussions at Ottawa.61 The 
protests were duly ignored and the Indian delegation arrived in
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London in July 1932, to be joined by the representatives from the 
India Office. Britain was only too anxious to conclude an agreement 
with India in the light of its increased tariff levels. The Indian 
delegation had several meetings with Baldwin, Chamberlain and 
Runciman and other leading British officials, as well as holding 
discussions with representatives of several British industries.62 For 
instance, members of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce proposed to 
the delegation that India and Lancashire could divide the piecegood 
trade in West Africa in an attempt to keep out Japanese 
competition.63 The Indian delegation was equally willing to reach an 
agreement with Britain to guarantee free entry for the majority of 
Indian exports into the British market. There is no evidence to 
support Drummond’s claims. Indeed, the pre-Conference bargaining 
reflected how important India still was to Britain. Thus, the real 
bargaining between India and Britain was concluded in London, leaving 
the Indian delegation at Ottawa free to meet the representatives of 
the other Dominions, an opportunity Indian delegates wanted to take 
to the fullest.
During the Conference, the Indian delegation met 
representatives from Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Irish Free 
State and Southern Rhodesia. Indirect negotiations were also 
conducted with the Union of South Africa, a member of the New Zealand 
delegation acting as mediator.64 Mostly these negotiations took the 
form of an exchange of schedules and short discussions on a few major 
commodities. The Indian delegation had been unprepared for the 
intra—Dominion negotiations which took place but were not slow to 
take advantage of them to develop Indian trade •6 5 At the same time
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they made it clear that these discussions were in no way binding, 
they were just establishing a basis for future negotiations.
The agreement which the Indian and British delegations
concluded followed the lines discussed in London. India secured 
free entry into Britain for raw jute, lac, myrabolams, broken rice, 
mica and hemp and gained preferential treatment for 22 other goods 
including tea, cotton and jute manufactures, leather, tobacco and 
groundnuts. Britain also promised to secure for India any 
preference which might be granted to the non-self governing colonies 
and Protectorates. Further, an undertaking was made to attempt to 
promote the use of Indian raw cotton by British manufacturers and 
hence increase imports. In return, India guaranteed a ten per cent 
margin of preference on 163 British imports including chemicals,
cement, drugs, electrical appliances and certain types of iron and 
steel.6 6
Although this agreement was ratified subsequently by the Indian 
legislature, the vote was close enough for the Viceroy to warn the 
India Office that the motion could be defeated.67 By then Indian 
businessmen had joined with nationalist politicians in creating a 
formidable opposition to the agreement. The Indian Government was
forced to appoint a Select Committee to study the agreement.68 Twelve 
out of the 15 members of the committee accepted the provisions of the 
agreement on condition that the Government should monitor any effect 
on prices, make an annual report on the working of the agreement and 
prepare a detailed report at the end of the first three years when 
the Assembly could vote to terminate the agreement.69 Under these 
conditions the Assembly ratified the treaty. However, Indian
72
Nationalists remained firmly opposed to the policy of imperial 
preference and claimed that the agreement was only ratified by the 
votes of the government lobby,70 although as Markovits has 
demonstrated, the Government won by gaining support of some moderate 
Bombay businessmen> such els Mody and Jehangir who were already in 
dispute with the Indian business community outwith Bombay over their 
support in 1930 for discriminating protection.71
Such criticisms were widespread among the Indian business 
communities. The Committee of the Indian Merchants * Chamber wrote to 
the Government to complain that, 'the agreement owes its origins not 
to India*s needs and wishes but to those of the British ... it will 
be forced on an unwilling people and it is not therefore likely to 
promote any cordial relations between the two countries. ’7 2 Indian 
merchants stressed their fears of retaliation by non-Empire trading 
partners and the effects of British imports on nascent Indian 
industries.7 3 The agreement was regarded as the culmination of 
British efforts to subvert Indian fiscal autonomy, an attempt to 
increase British imports when they could not be increased on their 
own merits^ even at a time of lower prices.7 4
As suggested earlier, the composition of the delegation and the 
way in which the Assembly was informed of the decision, made any 
agreement unacceptable to nationalist opinion. It was no surprise, 
therefore, that the agreement was terminated at the earliest possible 
moment in 1936. Although the annual reports were generally 
favourable regarding the working of the agreement, Indian opinion 
remained critical.75 The vote to terminate the agreement was made
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ever more likely when the constitutional reforms of 1935 gave 
Congress the majority in the Assembly. The motion called upon the 
Government of India to reach bilateral agreements 'wherever and 
whenever possible to bring about the expansion of the export trade of 
India in those markets.*7 6
Many historians, most recently Rothermund, have concluded the 
agreement at Ottawa and the principle of imperial preference were 
fundamentally detrimental to Indian trade.77 British officials 
believed that the agreement with India was 'one of the outstanding 
features of the Ottawa Conference*.78 Before the conference even 
the Indian Commerce Member, Sir George Rainy, believed that Britain 
would have more to gain from preference than India.79 Such evidence 
has led Rothermund to conclude that imperial preference was an 
instrument of imperial policy designed to subjugate the trade of 
India for the benefit of Britain. Whether this proved to be true, 
shall now be considered.
A superficial glance at the Ottawa Agreement might certainly 
lead to the conclusion that the agreement favoured Britain. On the 
Indian side there was one page of preferences, while for Britain there 
were some five pages of detailed preferences on 163 different goods. 
However, on closer study it is revealed that while over 80 per cent 
of India*s exports to Britain received preference, most of which 
enjoyed free entry, preferences to Britain covered only 65 per cent 
of its exports to India, none of which received free entry.80 Thus, 
in terms of toted trade between the two countries, Ottawa provided 
more benefit for India. This was implicit in the nature of the trade 
between Britain and India. India *s exports to Britain were
7M
predominantly raw materials or semi-manufcultures and so the British 
Government, although it threatened to do so, could not impose customs 
duties against such imports without incurring criticism from British 
manufacturers.
By 1932, the Government of India had increased most of the 
customs duties on British imports for revenue reasons, and in London 
and Ottawa, the Indian delegation had persuaded the British 
representatives that these duties could not be lowered. Preferences 
granted to the United Kingdom came in the form of increased duties on 
foreign goods, which was why critics feared the retaliation of non- 
Empire trade partners. Since the main trading nations maintained 
their share of the Indian import trade, the Government of India 
received the benefit of existing duties on British goods and 
increased duties on foreign goods, which generally maintained the 
level of customs revenue despite falling volume of imports. In the 
first full year of preferences, 1934, customs revenue increased by 5 
lakhs.81
British preferred goods rose only slowly in proportion to its 
total export trade to India, reaching 72 per cent by 1936. As 
manufactured goods, a rise in general income and investment levels 
was needed before such imports could have increased. In the first 
year of the agreement, the rise in British exports receiving 
preference in India was only 5.74 per cent. Indian goods receiving 
preferences increased more rapidly than its general trade. As raw 
materials essential to many British industries, the lowered prices 
brought about by the depression, allied to free entry, made Indian
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products more competitive than their foreign rivals. Thus, Indian 
linseed was able to supplant the Argentinian product from the British 
market.82 In the first year, preferred goods from India rose by 
15.76 per cent and between 1935 and 1936 increased by 35.2 per 
cent.8 3
Any hopes of British officials that Ottawa would change the 
structure of trade with India were not fulfilled. From 1935 
Britain's share of Indian imports was declining again, until by 1938 
it had declined to only 29.9 per cent or half of its share in 1913.84 
The fundamental reason for this was that the agreements did not 
include cotton or iron and steel. Both were omitted pending reports 
by the Indian Tariff Board.
Iron and steel exports were covered by a Supplementary 
Agreement concluded in 1934. Again this agreement appeared to 
provide greater benefit to India, thus being much criticised by 
British manufacturers. To gain concessions, the Indian delegates 
threatened to establish a new finishing mill in India which would add 
to world over-production and finally eliminate British iron and steel 
in the Indian market. This threat appalled British manufacturers and 
the Board of Trade.85 Indian critics were amazed by this argument 
since they were pressing for increased industrial capacity in all 
sectors.86 However, the Tatas, India's major iron and steel 
producers, would have been as appalled as their British counterparts 
for precisely the same reasons. It is perhaps surprising why 
Britain was prepared to give so much away to India under the 
Supplementary Agreement. The small preference for British iron and 
steel goods did not compare with the guaranteed free entry for Indian
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pig iron into the British market. Of course, the involvement of 
preference made the agreement open to criticism by Indian 
nationalists. India Office personnel were quick to warn Sir Horace 
Wilson to conclude the agreement before the new constitution changed 
the complexion of the Assembly.87 The most probable explanation for 
British generosity was the hope that India would prove equally 
generous to British cotton piecegood exports. The Supplementary 
Agreement brought immediate relief to the Tata Iron and Steel Company 
and helped to offset the cuts in government purchases particularly of 
rails. Indian exports of iron and steel doubled between 1934 and 
1936 and continued to increase to the end of the decade.88
The most prolonged and contentious negotiations concerned 
British piecegood exports to India. Article 8 of the Ottawa 
Agreement conferred upon the British Government the duty of promoting 
the use of Indian raw cotton but no preference for piecegood exports 
had been secured. Instead British manufacturers had faced steady 
increases in customs duties on cotton, and while the 75 per cent duty 
on non-Empire cotton goods afforded Britain a de facto preference 
under the policy of 'discriminating protection *, British piecegoods 
could still not compete successfully against the markedly cheaper 
Japanese goods flooding the Indian market. The Economic Advisory 
Council had warned Lancashire cotton manufacturers of the Japanese 
threat and that British traders had lost touch with the Indian 
market.88 They did not heed such warnings and Blackett, a former 
Indian Finance Member, commented that, 'While Lancashire has been cut 
into time and time again by Indian production and by protective 
duties, Japan has managed all the time to compete successfully in
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spite of protection in India.’90
Although the British Government always promoted the interests 
of Lancashire, it remained curiously reluctant to negotiate a pact on 
cotton duties with India. Despite much lobbying by Lancashire 
before the Conference, cotton piecegoods were omitted. The dismay of 
Lancashire was summed up by the British Home Secretary, Lord Samuel, 
who declared that 'the Indian agreement conferred some advantages, 
but our cotton trade, the greatest British commercial interest in 
India gained no advantage; Lancashire’s troubles are due largely to 
India’s tariffs but their position was not helped at Ottawa.’91
The Indian Government was equally as reluctant to become 
embroiled further in the cotton controversy and preferred to leave 
negotiations to the industrialists themselves. Consequently, a trade 
mission from Lancashire, headed by Sir William Clare-Lees, arrived in 
India in early 1933 for discussions with representatives of the 
Bombay Millowners* Association, headed by Sir H.P. Mody. Originally 
the Indian delegation had included representatives of millowners from 
outwith Bombay but they refused to sign the agreement. An agreement 
was reached whereby Lancashire admitted the right of the Indian mill 
industry to protection and that serious efforts would be made to 
increase the use of Indian cotton in British mills. In return, 
Bombay millowners recognised that they needed less protection against 
British imports than Japanese goods and guaranteed not to protest if 
the Government of India removed the 25 per cent surcharge on British 
goods, as soon as revenue considerations permitted.92
Back in Lancashire an Indian Cotton Conradttee was formed which
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succeded to some extent in removing the traditional prejudices 
against Indian cotton. Imports of Indian cotton did increase, as 
can be seen from Table 2.1 below:
Table 2.1: Imports of Indian Raw Cotton into Britain (million lb)
1928-29 72 1930-31 98 1932-33 49 1934-35 133
1929-30 73 1931-32 72 1933-34 92 1935-36 150
Source: Annual Reports of the Lancashire Indian Cotton Committee,
1934, 1935, 1936 in IOL, L/E/9/166, Colin. 16-126.
The Committee complained increasingly that India was not 
keeping its side of the bargain.93 While Lancashire continued to 
receive a preference, the surcharge remained in force until 1937. 
Despite the often virulent protests by the Lancashire lobby, 
including numerous threats to use its political power to wreck the 
tentative moves towards Indian constitutional reform,94 the British 
Government accepted Indian demands that the surcharge should remain 
for revenue reasons. As the Secretary of State for India reminded 
the Cabinet, the Indian Government had raised its tariff levels, 
including those on cotton goods, 'as a result of pressure from here 
which we exerted because we took the view that it was of paramount 
importance to maintain Indian credit by a balanced budget. ’9 5 Much 
of the opposition from Lancashire was rooted in its growing 
frustration of* the realisation that its political lobby was losing 
its force on Whitehall at the moment that Bombay’s political power 
was growing. Before Ottawa, the Manchester Chamber of Commerce had
I
complained,... the millowners of India have exploited the political
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situation for their own private ends and that such a tendency is an
>
unhealthy element in the life of any state.96
Markovits has argued that this acquiesance of Bombay 
manufacturers, including the Tatas, to the tariff policy of the 
Government of India aggravated the split in the ranks of Indian 
businessmen in the early 1930s. As will be seen later, Bombay 
manufacturers were affected more seriously by the slump than their 
counterparts elsewhere in India. Therefore, they were willing to
enter into such arrangements as the Supplementary Agreement and the 
Lees-Mody Pact in an effort to secure short-term gains. Markovits 
believed that Bombay industrialists, therefore, played into the hands 
of the Government of India who was only too willing to support a 
breakaway from the ranks of the Indian business community. Bombay 
businessmen such as Mody and Jehangir continued to vote on the 
government side in the Assembly throughout the depression and stopped 
contributing to the funds of Congress, two major victories for
Willingdon. Indeed, the actions of Mody are in marked contrast to
Birla who resigned his seat at the Assembly to lead the vehement 
criticisms of government tariff policy through such bodies as the 
Federated Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry.97
It is clear from the tone of the trade negotiations between
India and Britain from 1936 until the signing of a new treaty in 
1939, that Britain was unhappy with the previous agreement worked out 
at Ottawa. The draft proposals for a new agreement asked for a 
greatly increased range of goods to be covered by preference.98 The 
Indian position proved more equivocal. While the Ottawa Agreement 
had remained in force with the approval of the Legislature, the
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Indian Government had maintained that it was beneficial to Indian
trade. Willingdon slammed the termination vote as a purely political
measure with no economic basis," yet once new negotiations were
under way, the Indian Government declared that it too was
dissatisfied with the Ottawa Agreement. It maintained:
*... we have come to the conclusion that the advantage to 
India as a result of preferences available has not been 
as great as was anticipated ... Since the Ottawa. 
Agreement was made, certain arrangements have been 
entered into by the United Kingdom with foreign countries 
which directly or indirectly have adversely effected the 
value of preferences given to India and the effect of 
such agreements will require the most constant and 
careful attention of the Government of India in the 
future.M 00
In these negotiations the tone adopted by the Government of 
India proved far more forceful. Two aspects of British policy had 
angered the Indian Government. Firstly, Britain no longer
automatically included India as a colony in any agreement it reached 
with a non-Empire country. However, this was not made explicit 
until 1935 by which time the British Government had made several 
treaties which the Indian authorities believed had damaged Indian 
trade to Britain.101 Secondly, while the Supplementary Agreement had 
accorded the right of British industrialists to put their case before 
the Indian Tariff Board, the British Government refused to grant 
India reciprocal rights before the British Import Duties Advisory 
Council.1 02
The Government of India also had the experience of protracted 
negotiations with the other Dominions as a result of the Ottawa 
Conference. In these negotiations, Indian representatives made it 
very clear that 'we are not prepared to admit specifically to the
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indirect benefit of preference, Empire countries which themselves do 
not give preference to India.’103 This was aimed specifically at 
Australia and the Union of South Africa, since already in the 1920s 
India had been granted non-reciprocal peferences by Canada, New 
Zealand, the Irish Free State and Southern Rhodesia. These one­
sided preferences are ignored largely in the literature and throw a 
different emphasis on India’s role in the Empire. All these 
countries were in deficit to India, so the one-sided nature of the 
preferences must be regarded as an attempt to find favour with the 
Government of India. At Ottawa, the Indian delegation believed 
that the time had come to make these preferences reciprocal. However, 
just as the Government of India made it clear that it was not 
prepared to grant preferences without reciprocity, it was equally 
evident that it was quite prepared to be a beneficiary from such a 
state of affairs.
The nature of the relations between the Dominion Governments 
and Delhi can be seen in the negotiations with Canada. 
The Indian delegation at Ottawa had emphasised specifically the 
benefits of reciprocal arrangements with Canada, India’s largest 
Dominion trade partner. The Government of India declared itself 
'most deeply interested’ in reaching agreement with Canada but 
negotiations proved long and tedious.104 The excuses offered for 
delay by the Government of India appeared endless - ratification of 
the United Kingdom agreement by the Assembly; trade negotiations 
with Britain and Japan,* budget discussions in the Assembly; changing 
administrations, and so on.105
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The negotiations with the three other countries giving India 
preference followed a similar pattern. Having already been given 
preference, the Government of India negotiated from a position of 
strength, secure in the knowledge that for the Dominions, gaining 
entry to the Indian market was more important than for India to be in 
Dominion markets. The Indian prevarications and delays incensed the 
Dominion governments. They all threatened to end preference and 
impose punitive duties on Indian goods, but none did so.1 06 These 
negotiations were carried on mainly by cable, again showing the low 
priority given to these negotiations by the Government of India. The 
eagerness of the Dominions to seek new markets in India can be seen 
clearly in an example from the negotiations with New Zealand. During 
the negotiations in London in August 1933, the Indian delegate 
pointed out that the range of New Zealand imports to India was so 
limited that there wel s very little scope for preference. However, 
he did suggest that there was a large market for ghee in India and 
there was a possibility that New Zealand could profitably turn its 
surplus butter into ghee for export. Within two days a New Zealand 
representative had called at the Indian Trade Commission for 
information on the production of ghee.107
From this it can be seen that India, although having adopted a 
measure of imperial preference, did not consider itself bound to 
trade within the 'imperial bloc’. Initially between 1933 and 1935 
India did trade more with the Dominions, but this never covered more 
than two or three per cent of its total trade.108 The negotiations 
conducted with the Dominions, however, did provide the Government of 
India with the opportunities to learn skills of negotiation,
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previously denied. It is then no surprise that in the negotiations 
with Britain which were prolonged for three years, that the 
Government of India provided much stronger opposition. There is much 
truth in Drummond’s assertion that it would be difficult to assess 
from the 1939 Indian British Trade Agreement which party was the 
colonial underdog.1 09
The Indian nationalists„ though; reserved their strongest 
criticisms of imperial preference for its effects on non-empire trade 
relations. They argued that Ottawa was followed by a period of more 
rapid moves towards the restriction of world trade and that while 
Britain was renewing trade relations with its non-empire partners on 
bilateral lines, the Indian Government had remained 'indifferent’ to 
restrictions placed on Indian exports.110 In its 1935 Report, the 
Committee of the Indian Merchants’ Chamber, Bombay, recorded 23 
countries which had imposed quota or other licensing restrictions on 
Indian imports.111 How far was India’s trade relations with non­
empire countries damaged by the adoption of preference or were other 
factors at work?
India’s Relations with Non-Empire Countries
After the United Kingdom, Japan was the second most important 
trade partner of India. Indo-Japanese trade had been increasing 
since the early twentieth century. For Japan, the depression and the 
consequent devaluation of the yen provided an increased impetus for 
imports into India of cheap cotton and artificial silk goods. Prior 
to the depression, India had exported raw cotton and pig iron to 
Japan. However, as a result of the continued link with sterling
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after the 1931 financial crisis, the rupee was not devalued to its 
true level and so Indian raw cotton exports became less competitive 
from 1933 when the dollar was devalued. Also, Japanese moves 
towards the establishment of its own iron and steel industry led to 
an agreement with Australia for the purchase of iron ore which 
consequently decreased imports of Indian pig iron.
Thus, the Indian Government was placed in a difficult position 
regarding negotiations with Japan. It was under pressure from the 
Bombay Millowners1 Association to protect its members* establishments 
from 'unfair* Japanese competition, claims defended in the 
recommendations of the 1932 Special Tariff Enquiry.11 2 Yet, the 
government was also aware of the need to protect exports to Japan of 
raw cotton and so help the Indian cultivator.11 3 As a result of the 
tariff enquiry, the duty on non-empire cotton goods was raised to 75 
per cent but Japanese textiles still flooded Indian markets. At 
this point, the Indian authorities sought advice from Whitehall, 
after all Lancashire also felt threatened by Japanese competition. 
Despite opposition from the Foreign Office, other British Government 
departments advised abrogating the 1904 Indo-Japanese Trade 
Convention, the most-favoured nation clause of which was preventing 
effective anti-dumping legislation against Japan. This resulted in a 
boycott of Indian cotton by the Osaka Spinners which proved so 
serious for a while that the British Cabinet even considered 
guaranteeing purchase of Indian cotton during the 1933 season, a move 
which the Government of India would not sanction.114 However, the 
boycott did not prove to be a long-term threat. More serious was 
the devaluation of the dollar, which reduced the price of American
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cotton which was of better quality than Indian. Japanese spinners 
turned to higher counts, and American cotton increasingly displaced 
Indian imports.
Negotiations with Japan were begun at the same time as the 
Lees-Mody discussions in early 1933.115 After much stalling on both 
sides, agreements were reached in the autumn of 1933. A quota of 
Japanese piecegoods and Indian raw cotton was fixed on a sliding 
scale. To some extent the new agreement helped to cushion Indian 
raw cotton exports against American cotton in the Japanese market. 
During the depression the Japanese market became increasingly 
important for India. The percentage of Indian exports to Japan 
against total exports increased from 10.2 per cent in 1930 to 15.7 
per cent in 1937.116 Japan*s share of Indian imports doubled to 17 
per cent in the same period. In the long term, these moves resulted 
in the Indian merchandise surplus with Japan being converted into a 
deficit, especially after the separation of Burma ended the inclusion 
of rice exports to Japan. Thus, while the agreement proved 
advantageous in the short term in aiding India* s recovery from the 
depression, in the longer run it failed to halt the decline of 
India*s exports into Japan. Of course, partly this was for political 
and not economic motives as Japan turned into its ever increasing 
empire. If there had been no agreement, however, it is entirely 
possible that the deficit with Japan would have been even greater 
since American cotton would probably have forced Indian cotton out of 
the Japanese market altogether.
With its other non-empire trade partners, the Government of 
India did not make new treaties. Partly, this is because until the
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mid-1930s the position of India vis-a-vis British trade treaties with 
non-empire countries was unclear.117 The Fiscal Autonomy Convention 
of 1923 was Supposed to give the Government of India control over its 
t a r i f f  structure but it also left the Indian authorities unprotected 
and unprepared to face the changing international trade conditions. 
The British Government demanded that fiscal autonomy meant that India 
would also be responsible for concluding its own trade treaties. No 
longer would India be included automatically in agreements reached by 
London on behalf of the colonies. However, since any agreement 
concluded by India had to be signed in London, thus emphasising its 
colonial status, the Indian authorities remained confused about the 
use of British bargaining power and did not join in the wave of trade 
treaties concluded during the 1920s, believing that India was still 
covered by British agreements.118 India was left vulnerable, 
therefore, to the wave of restrictive trade practices which 
accompanied the onset of the crisis. For instance, in 1928 the 
Japanese Government imposed a ban on the import of Indian rice while
maintaining imports from Siam under the schedules of the 1924
Japanese-Siamese Trade Convention. The Indian authorities protested, 
believing that Japan was prevented from the direct prohibition of 
Indian goods under the most-favoured nation clauses of the 1904
Indian Japanese Convention. However, it discovered that the non-
prohibition clauses referred solely to Indian nationals not Indian 
products.119
Although publicly the Government of India maintained the 
benefits imperial preference was bringing to Indian trade, privately 
government officials were as worried as Indian Nationalists about
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possible retaliation. Sir Joseph Bhore, the Commerce Member, wrote!
1.. . The most disturbing feature of our differential and 
preferential arrangements with the United Kingdom is the 
effect they have had on certain foreign countries, 
notably Italy, Belgium and Germany, which have very 
definitely held out the threat that unless the diversion 
of their trade to the United Kingdom which has resulted 
from these arrangements is stopped, they will take 
retaliatory action on our raw materials hitherto imported 
by them. This is of course going to lead to a great deal 
of difficulty with public opinion and the Legislature in 
this country, apart from the actual effect on Indian 
trade.*120
In terms of diverting India’s import trade to the United 
Kingdom, the Ottawa Agreement proved short-lived. Most continental
countries recovered and increased their shares of the Indian import 
trade. Germany’s share alone increased from 6.6 per cent in 1929 to 
9.7 per cent in 1937. The only country with actual cause for 
retaliation was the United States which did not recover its share of 
the Indian market.121
More important for India were changes in its export markets. 
That there were restrictions placed against Indian goods is not 
disputed. These ranged from prohibitions on manufactured jute goods 
by Argentina and America to restrictions on imported Indian broken 
rice by Austria and Italy.122 However, the impact of such 
restrictions was very varied and the reasons for their imposition had 
roots deeper than mere retaliation for Ottawa. India’s biggest loss 
w e i s in foodstuff exports to Continental Europe, particularly to 
Germany, France and Italy. This can be accounted for by the 
agricultural self-sufficiency plans of the two Fascist nations. The 
position of France is more closely linked to the Ottawa agreements.
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The French Government viewed imperial preference as a coherent plan 
to promote imperial trading for the benefit of the metropolis. As 
such, the French Government introduced the principle in its own 
imperial trade relations. Imperial preference benefitted France 
more than Britain in its trading relations with the Dominions and 
India, since French colonies were far less developed and so in a more 
strongly marked core-periphery relationship with France.1 23
Indian raw material exports to the Continent fared better than 
its foodstuff exports. Although the Four Year Plan of 1936 was 
geared to reduce German dependence upon imported raw materials, it 
imported more hides and ores from India. Meanwhile, India increased 
its share of the Belgian and Dutch markets based on exports of ores 
and oilseeds.124 While there may have been some scope for bilateral 
agreements with European countries in the early 1930s, the political 
uncertainty on the Continent from the mid-1930s increased moves 
towards self-sufficiency established during the depression, and made 
bilateral agreements increasingly difficult to negotiate. In this 
light it is wrong to criticise the Indian Government for 
concentrating its trade policy towards securing India's two most 
important markets, Britain and Japan. The Ottawa Agreement and the 
1934 Indo-Japanese Convention succeeded in increasing India’s share 
of these markets at a time of a general restriction of world trade.
Trade Policy in the 1930s
If there was justification for the use of tariff policy in terms of 
imperial preference and treaty negotiations, there is little to 
justify the halting attempts to use trade policy to protect Indian
producers from the worst effects of the depression. Indian trade was 
left to face the slump with little help from the restrictive or 
supportive measures applied by other governments. Outwith the
limited application of tariff protection to aid certain industries,
the Government only reluctantly used customs duties to protect Indian 
authorities, and intervened only where, as in industry, there was a 
strong political lobby.
This is clearly illustrated in the contrasting fortunes of 
Punjab wheat growers and Madras rice cultivators. The wheat 
producing regions of India were the first to experience the sharp 
price reductions which marked the onset of the depression. The bulk 
of Indian wheat was produced in the Punjab, an area traditionally 
loyal to the Government and, as such, in receipt of many benefits of 
government expenditure particularly irrigation schemes and railways. 
Thus, the Punjab wheat traders were in a good position to force the 
Indian authorities to place duties on the cheap Australian wheat
imports which were depressing the local price. Within one year the
Government had responded with the required duty.1 25 In contrast, the 
Madras rice growers were facing competition from cheap imports of 
Burmese rice. For five years the Government of India refused to 
provide a protective duty arguing that Burma was still administered 
from Delhi and so a duty would count as an internal tariff. In this, 
the Indian authorities ignored the internal duties levied by local 
municipalities and boards. It was only in 1934 when the situation in 
Madras grew more serious with imports of Siamese rice and as the 
Government of India became worried by the declining position of the 
loyalist Justice Party that Madras rice cultivators finally received
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protection.1 26
In general, the Government of India’s trade policies were 
halting and inadequate. Despite major agitation by both Indian and 
European businessmen, there were no anti-dumping restrictions to 
protect the home market. Nor did the Indian authorities use export 
bounties to promote trade. There was no purchase of export crops or 
government subsidised schemes for the warehousing of such crops to 
maintain income levels for Indian cultivators. Despite pleas from 
nationalists there was no government aid to build up an Indian 
merchant marine. The Government of India resorted to direct 
negotiations between Indian shipping owners like Walchand Hirachand 
and the British companies for small concessions.
Instead of a broad programme for the support of Indian trade, 
the Indian authorities placed their reliance on improved marketing of 
Indian produce under the 'Agmark’ symbol. However, this was not 
attempted until 1935 when India was already pulling out of the 
depression. During the worst years of the slump, apart from the 
appointment of new Trade Commissioners in Hamburg, Rome, Mombassa and 
Tokyo, little was done with the Government of India pleading 
poverty. Credit should be given though to the late efforts to 
promote more efficient marketing and to deter the adulteration 
of Indian exports. Unfortunately once more, the Government of India 
was doing too little, too late. It was not until 1939 that there was 
a Weights and Measures Act to standardise units of measurement 
throughout India and on the outbreak of the Second World War, India 
only had 139 marketing stations throughout its length and breadth.1 27
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Conclusion
The impact of the depression must be set against the long-term 
evolution of Indian trade and governmental tariff policy. Did the 
depression loosen the imperial bond over Indian trade or was the 
pretext of the slump used to tighten the imperial control by Britain? 
Both these trends were at work in the early 1930s. Imperial 
preference as such might have been regarded as an instrument for 
regaining control over Indian trade for the benefit of Britain, a 
method of circumventing India’s fiscal autonomy. However, it proved 
to be a weak instrument. Preferential arrangements only temporarily 
altered the pattern of Indian trade. The impact of the depression 
itself proved more long-lasting than preference. India shared in the 
pattern of primary producing countries, which experienced worsening 
terms of trade against those for advanced economies. Its trade 
with the nations of Continental Europe suffered less from retaliation 
for Ottawa than from the self-sufficiency solutions which these 
economies followed to escape from the depression.
The most crucial omission was in terms of negotiations with 
other nations. The Government of India maintained the attitude that 
it alone could not help Indian trade to recover from the depression. 
The depression was a factor outwith its control and only 
international co-operation would provide a solution to the problems 
created by the slump.128 Nationalist opinion believed that the 
Indian Government could have negotiated bilateral trade treaties to 
maintain its share of world markets. The Indian authorities were 
unused to such negotiations. They did not realise that fiscal 
autonomy gave them the responsibility for securing trade treaties. It
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was not until the depression that this question of responsibility was 
faced. Possibly the refusal of the British Government in the 1930s 
to use its bargaining power on behalf of India was the final attempt 
to bring Indian trade back into inter-imperial lines. Did the 
British authorities gamble on the naivety of the Government of India 
to force it to renounce fiscal autonomy and so return to the shelter 
of the metropolis? Instead the Government of India stumbled forward 
and concentrated on maintaining its links with the two major Indian 
export markets, Britain and Japan. The Government of India retained 
its fiscal autonomy and continued to allow the development of Indian 
trade beyond imperial limitations. Indian trade was too developed 
for the British authorities to retain control over it, although they 
tried to do so by demanding the right to veto any Indian trade 
agreements and insisting that agreements should be signed in London. 
Ultimately, of course, Whitehall was able to preserve the rupee- 
sterling link which exposed Indian exports to a greater impact of the 
depression. However, Indian trade could not be controlled from 
Whitehall. In the long-term, by 1939 India had progressed away 
from a simple core-periphery relationship and the depression helped 
in the evolution of this new relationship.
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CHAPTER THREE
Public Finance and Currency Issues
For the Government of India, the most pressing consequence of 
the slump was the deepening financial crisis which it faced. The 
origins of the problem pre-dated the depression of 1929, with the 
first half of the 1920s having been spent searching for an effective 
financial and currency policy. These efforts culminated in the 
Report of the Royal Commission on Indian Currency and Finance in 1926 
which recommended a Is 6d rupee exchange rate against sterling. 
However, as the agricultural prices upon which India depended so 
heavily began to decline, this exchange rate proved difficult to 
maintain and from 1927-28 the Government of India was forced to adopt 
a policy of contracting the note issue, which had a deflationary 
effect on the Indian economy.
Such was the situation when the events of the international 
crisis further impinged on the Indian economy. Between 1929 and 
1931, the budgetary position of the Government of India worsened, as 
trade problems reduced customs revenue and railway receipts slumped 
and the strain of maintaining a Is 6d rupee exchange rate became ever 
more acute.
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The Government of India had several policy options open to it 
to tackle the crisis and ease its burden. Customs revenue could be 
bolstered by higher import duties which, if carefully imposed, could 
have protective effects for domestic production. This would allow 
the emergence of import substituting industries and a growing 
domestic market for agricultural produce. Alternatively, currency 
devaluation could make Indian exports cheaper and more competitive in 
foreign markets, at least in the short-term, which would allow the 
same volume of imports to be maintained and hence the existing level 
of customs revenue from pre-depression duties. More radically, the 
Indian authorities could have abandoned the tenets of orthodox 
finance and used its budgetary powers to boost the economy through 
deficit financing of public works paid by increased borrowing. The 
latter two policies, for example, were followed by the Japanese 
Government under its Finance Minister, Takahashi, enabling Japan to 
make a full economic recovery by 1936. Takahashi’s increased 
borrowing raised the internal national debt of Japan from 4,480 
million yen in March 1931 to 8,520 million yen in March 1936.1 This 
compares with India, as can be seen in Table 3.1 below.
Table 3.1
Indian State Debt (Rs million)
1918-19 6837.8
1926-27 9409.2
1927-28 8873.4
1928-29 9214.2
1929-30 9715.2
1930-31 10120.4
1931-32
1932-33
1933-34
1934-35
1935-36
1936-37
10510.5 
10274.2 
10216.1
10203.5 
9667.3 
9515.5
Source: N.R.F. Charlesworth, 'Government Finance in British India1
Modem Asian Studies 19, 3, 1985, p 531, Table 3.
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While the Government of India did increase its borrowing levels 
until 1931-32, this was only to meet the shortfall in ordinary 
revenues and was used to maintain the rupee exchange rate. 
Thereafter, as the Government’s budgetary position improved, 
borrowing was reduced once again. Therefore, throughout the 1930s, 
the Indian authorities adhered to strict financial orthodoxy and so 
lost the opportunity to reflate the economy.
This policy decision has been declared conservative both by 
contemporary and modem historians. The Indian economist, 
P.J. Thomas, constantly attacked the central authorities for failing 
to implement broad public work schemes to raise purchasing power and, 
hence, internal demand.2 Kumar has argued that it was the 
inelasticity of sources of public finance which restricted the 
Government of India’s policy options.3 Most commentators, however, 
focus upon the role of the British Government in influencing the 
policy decisions of the Indian authorities. Rothermund argued that 
Whitehall forced an unnecessarily high exchange rate upon India for 
British needs which pushed the Government of India into a 
deflationary policy which exacerbated the effects of the depression.4 
Both Drummond and Tomlinson accept the aggressiveness of the 
imposition of the rupee-sterling link on India in 1931 and that 
fiscal autonomy had not deprived Britain of the ultimate control over 
the Government of India’s policies. However, they stress the role of 
India within the imperial economy, and British fears that India and 
other colonial authorities might default on their obligations, 
leaving the British taxpayer to bear the burden.5 What is clear is 
that the exchange rate was a focal point for the relationship between
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India and Britain and that, therefore, the rupee crisis of 1931 was a 
pivotal point in the development of official policy in response to 
the depression.
This chapter will discuss the reasons why the policy options of 
the Government of India during the slump were limited to orthodox 
measures. To what extent was India prevented from fdllowing the 
Japanese response of competitive devaluation and deficit finance, 
through its continuing relations with, and governance by, the United 
Kingdom? The key to this relationship was the issue of the sterling- 
rupee exchange rate, the main focus in the first part of the chapter. 
The constraints which the defence of the sterling-rupee exchange 
imposed on Central Government policy during the 1930s will then be 
discussed. Finally, the limitations placed on Provincial Governments 
to respond to the depression will also be assessed.
The issue of the sterling-rupee exchange rate, particularly 
during the 1931 crisis, aroused considerable debate in the late 
1970s. Unfortunately, since then many of the original papers in 
India which provided the evidence for the protaginists in the debate, 
have been destroyed.6 Therefore, this discussion on the exchange 
rate controversy does not pretend to provide a full analysis of 
earlier theories. It is, however, important to re-iterate briefly 
the main arguments to illustrate the nature, of the contemporary 
political controversy aroused by Whitehall's intervention in Indian 
currency policy.
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Central Public Finance and Currency Issues
The financial pressures upon the Government of India pre-dated 
the 1929 slump, as had the rupee ratio controversy. In 1927, the Is 
6d exchange rate was accepted as a statutory obligation by the 
Government of India. The majority report of the Hilton-Young 
Commission had recommended this rate as the one the exchange had 
stabilised at, thus minimalising the necessity of government 
interference. However, a Minority Report by the eminent Indian 
businessman, Sir P. Thakurdas, had favoured a lower exchange rate of 
Is 4d, echoing the demands of his fellow business associates.7 It 
was argued that a devaluation of the rupee would increase the 
competitiveness of Indian exports and that the anticipated increase 
in trade related earnings would raise demand in the internal economy. 
The Is 6d exchange rate was regarded as favouring the interests of 
Britain, making British imports cheaper in the Indian market and 
giving a premium to remittances to London by European managing 
agencies. Thus, the rupee exchange rate was the focus for political 
controversy between the Government of India and Indian businessmen, a 
controversy which had not disappeared by 1929 and the first impact of 
the slump.
Between 1927 and 1929 it seemed that the Is 6d exchange rate 
could be maintained but there were many signs of stress. The 
exchange had been fixed on the assumption of a continued balance of 
payments surplus, but by 1929 this was dwindling and the Government of 
India was finding it difficult to purchase sufficient sterling to 
meet the current expenditure of the Secretary of State for India in
London. In 1930-31, these obligations amounted to £22 million, but 
the Indian Government was able to purchase only £5.4 million to meet 
remittances.8 The other options open to the Government, then, were 
to ship gold or silver from its reserves in India for sale in 
London, remit through the currency reserves or raise short-term loans 
in India through the sale of government stocks. The latter course 
meant that the Government of India was competing in the Indian money 
market against the business community, thus limiting investment 
opportunities in other sectors of the economy. To remit through the 
currency reserves also had a deflationary effect since the Government 
either had to draw on its balances in the Imperial Bank which cut the 
credit available for other concerns or through the sale of Treasury 
Bills which tended to increase the interest rates. The Government of 
India was certain only that it did not want to ship gold, although 
it did send some silver for sale in London.9
It was clear by 1931 that the continued decline in India’s 
export values was becoming a serious constraint upon its ability to 
meet its international obligations. In 1931 the Government of India 
h«H to find £32 million to meet the current expenses of the Secretary 
of State for India. There was also the burden of sterling loans due 
to mature in 1932, one of £15 million and one of £7 million. In the 
early part of 1931 the Government of India further reduced the 
currency in circulation and tried to secure a sterling loan on the 
London market. The loan failed, further damaging Indian credit and 
increasing the withdrawal of capital from India. The Government of 
India was forced, therefore, back to using its reserves to make 
sterling remittances to London. It had two currency reserves - the
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Paper Currency Reserve (PCR) which held coin and bullion to back 
paper money in India and the Gold Standard Reserve (GSR), the 
function of which was to hold gold or sterling securities to support 
the ratio. The GSR consisted of £2 million in gold and £38 million 
in sterling securities held in London. Before 1931, the PCR also 
held some sterling securities in London. When sufficient foreign 
exchange could not be purchased on the open market to make sterling 
remittances, currency would be contracted in India to allow sterling 
in the PCR to be transferred to the Treasury. However, in early 1931 
the London securities of the PCR were exhausted so the GSR was used, 
the level of the reserve being maintained by transferring gold from 
the PCR to the GSR in India. By September 1931, £23 million of gold 
had been transferred so that the total gold reserves in India 
amounted to £31 million, while in London, the GSR contained £2 
million in gold and £9 million in sterling securities.10
The key areas of debate concerning the currency policy of the 
Government of India in the 1930s are the level of the exchange rate 
itself and the reasons for the manipulation of the Indian exchange 
rate: whether or not Whitehall authorities were aware that such
intervention would result in the gold exports which followed. In 
1930, the controversy over the rate of the rupee-sterling exchange 
which had been continuing since 1926 was renewed with the conjunction 
of the economic crisis of the slump and the pblitical crisis of 
India’s constitutional future. Indian businessmen united with the 
Congress Party to call for the devaluation of the rupee to Is 4d.lx 
In this they were now joined by many expatriate businessmen and the 
Governors of the Imperial Bank including Osborne Smith.1 2
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By 1930 there was also a ground swell of official support for 
devaluation to reduce Indian export prices and make exports more 
competitive in world markets. Official pressure was led by the 
Finance Member himself, Sir George Schuster. Schuster had been 
appointed in September 1928 after a career sis Financial Secretary to 
the Government of Sudan, between 1922 and 1927, and financial advisor 
to the Colonial Office. He had also acted as Chairman of the 
Advisory Committee on East African Loans in 1926. Thus, Schuster 
came to India with an impressive financial background and was a fresh 
face on the Indian scene, coming neither from the ranks of the Indian 
Civil Service nor the British Treasury, as had his predecessor, Sir
Basil Blackett. Schuster’s willingness to seek new solutions to
India’s economic problems gained him many friends and enormous 
respect among the Indian business community.1 3 Apart from these 
links with the Indian community, there was another potential source
of conflict between Schuster and Whitehall. The territory of the
Sudan was under the control of the Foreign Office which had been
content to give Schuster comparative freedom of action as Financial 
Secretary.14 Therefore, Sir George must have felt seriously 
constrained by the tedious process of government in India, with the 
ever-present need to have policies vetted by the India Office. In 
September 1930, for instance, Schuster had written to London that,
while he recognised that maintenance of the exchange rate was
important, ’’our responsibilities as Government of India are not
confined to this one end and we must keep our sense of proportion, 
India must come first and the Treasury last”.15 Schuster’s 
relationship with Sir Samuel Hoare, Secretary of State for India in
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the National Government of 1931, was particularly strained. On more 
than one occasion, Hoare felt the need to remind Sir George, "It is 
HMG.. .who are responsible to Parliament for the government of India" 
and that he, Schuster, was "responsible to HMG".16
Schuster first proposed the devaluation of the rupee during the 
Round Table Conference in November, 1930. In this he had the support 
of Sir Malcolm Hailey, the Governor of the United Provinces, and 
Denning, a leading official of the Office of the Controller of 
Currency.1 7 Such an idea, however, was unthinkable for the financial 
experts of the India Office and the British Treasury, who believed 
that it would be impossible to hold a devalued rupee at Is 4d and 
that it would fall to its bullion value of 8d. This would be a 
disastrous blow not only to Indian credit but also to Britain, which 
was held responsible in international eyes for India’s finances. 
Thus, it was believed, the fall of the rupee would bring sterling 
down also.1 8 The financial experts sternly warned Schuster that "the 
only expedient course is to use every means in our power to maintain 
the existing ratio, that is, we should use the resources to the 
extent required, borrow in London as needed to strengthen the 
position and apply in India a vigorous policy of currency control."1 9 
No one in London was willing to allow India to stray from the path of 
financial orthodoxy.
The fear in Whitehall that a devaluation of the rupee would 
bring down sterling was the key to its intervention in the currency 
policy of the Government of India in September 1931. For two years 
as the Indian exchange position weakened and private capital was
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remitted from India, Whitehall attempted to influence the Indian 
authorities to pursue rigidly orthodox financial solutions of 
balancing the budget, raising taxes, reducing expenditure, 
contracting currency and raising the bank rate.20
However, the Government of India’s currency policy, in 
operation since 1927, had reached its limits by the summer of 1931. 
The maintenance of the rupee exchange at Is 6d necessitated heavy 
contractions of currency amounting to some Rs 10 crores by the end of 
1928. To contract- the currency, the Government of India had 
increased heavily its short term borrowing through the issue of 
Treasury Bills, which in turn had raised interest rates in India to a 
high level. The interest rate of the Imperial Bank had risen from 
5.67 at the beginning of 1928 to 8 per cent by mid-1931 in contrast 
to the Bank of England rate of 41 A  per cent.21 The Government of 
India was also forced to reduce its balance with the Imperial Bank 
which, allied to the high interest rates, caused further deflationary 
pressures during the depth of the depression. In addition, the 
lowered prices of the depression years meant that larger sums of 
surplus gold were coming on to the market. Despite withdrawing Rs 40 
crores in 1929-30, notes in circulation only fell by Rs 6 crores. 
Similarly, between March 1930 and August 1931 a further Rs 58 crores 
were withdrawn, but circulation declined by only Rs 17 crores. In 
effect, during the period 1929-1931 the reduction of currency in 
circulation by the Government of India was only a holding operation - 
not a vigorous policy to improve the remittance position. The sale 
of Treasury Bills also raised the interest rates at which the 
Government of India could borrow. The public debt of the government
rose from Rs 9,214.2 million in 1928-29 to Rs 10,510.5 million in 
1931—32, mostly through short-term borrowing at high rates.22 On 
the positive side, the Government of India hoped a higher basic rate 
might attract short term foreign capital and stem its remittance. 
Taylor, the Controller of Currency estimated that high rates had 
attracted between Rs 10 to 15 crores of short term foreign investment 
in Treasury Bills since 1927 but the rate of investment fluctuated 
and such capital was quickly repatriated if rates fell.23 Such 
short term investment, therefore, could not provide a long-term basis 
for meeting remittances to London.
As the financial position of the Government of India weakened 
further in 1931, Schuster embarked on an even more radical proposal. 
If Whitehall insisted upon the maintenance of a Is 6d exchange it 
should be prepared to provide credit of £50 million or even £100 
million for the Government of India.24 In this proposal, Schuster 
was aware of the political repercussions in India if the Government 
of India was seen to exhaust its reserves propping up an unpopular 
exchange rate. Instead of the drawing credit, India received a vague 
promise that the British Government was prepared to help the 
Government of India meet its financial obligations during the period 
of uncertainty over India’s constitutional future.25 This pleased no 
one, creating political storms in both Britain and India. Lancashire 
led the protests in Britain.26 The statement did not renew the 
confidence of businessmen and investors in the ability of the 
Government of India to control its finances and it did not silence 
the rumours about imminent devaluation. Far from alleviating the 
situation the statement was regarded as fresh evidence of the
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weakness of the Indian authorities. In British eyes this economic 
weakness further compounded what had been regarded as the political 
weakness of the Gandhi-Irwin pact of the spring.27
The fears that a devaluation of the rupee could endanger
sterling were not groundless since sterling itself was decidedly weak 
in September 1931, despite several credits from the United States and 
France. Suspicion of international investors of the abilities of a 
Labour Administration to balance its budget were fuelled by the
forecast of the May Committee in early August of a deficit of some 
£120 million.28 Not even the vigorous retrenchment of the first
budget of the new National Government allayed fears of British 
investors. Thus, there was a rush to remit investment back to France 
after reports in the French press on the Invergordon unrest over pay 
cuts.2 9
It was against this background of instability of sterling that 
Whitehall ensured that there could be no competitive devaluation of 
the rupee. The fear that an uncontrolled devaluation of the rupee 
would lead to an equally precipate decline in sterling provides the 
only explanation for the abrupt and heavy-handed intervention by
Whitehall in Indian currency policy in September 1931. Thus, while 
the decision to abandon the gold standard had been made on the 18th 
September, no prior warning was given to the Indian authorities.30 
Instead, it was through Reuters rather than the India Office that the 
Government of India were made aware of the decision on the morning of 
the 21st September.31 This led to a very public difference of 
opinion on currency policy between Delhi and Whitehall, raising 
protests in India against a re—imposition of imperial control on
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India s policy. While Schuster ended the Government’s obligations to 
convert rupees into gold or sterling, thereby devaluing the rupee, 
Hoare was announcing in London that the rupee would remain linked to 
sterling at the former rate of Is 6d.32 Despite three days of 
acrimonious debate, including a second threat of resignation by the 
Viceroy and the Executive Council (the first on the 12th September 
had been on the issue of army pay cuts), Schuster was unable to 
persuade Whitehall to sever the rupee-sterling link and initiate a 
bold new era of Indian finance and currency policy by devaluing the 
rupee.33 It was only a secret assurance that the British Government 
would not allow the Indian reserves to be exhausted in the 
maintenance of the Is 6d rupee exchange, that allowed Schuster to 
accept Whitehall policy.34
The devaluation controversy was still acute when a second 
political storm arose in India over the massive export of 
gold which followed. Between 1932 and 1937 gold worth some Rs 3,000 
million was exported. Shenoy argued at the time that the British 
Government had engineered the situation to produce the gold exports 
which it then used to meet its external obligations.35 This claim 
was repeated in the late 1970s, by Bridge, while Rothermund modified 
it to argue that* while the British authorities did not deliberately 
engineer the gold exports, it gladly accepted the benefits and failed 
to end the exports of gold which should have remained in India for 
productive investment.36
There is no evidence for the nationalist view that the British 
Government deliberately engineered the gold exports. From mid-1931,
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the India Office had been exerting pressure on the Government of 
India to ship some £4 or £5 million worth of gold to bolster the gold 
standard reserve in London, but this was vigorously resisted.37 The 
rupee was linked to sterling to prevent a precipitous devaluation 
which might have affected sterling. Both Indian and British 
officials were surprised at the amount of gold coming on to the 
market after September 1931 and few believed that it could continue 
at such a rate for long. In November 1931, Schuster reported that 
the rupee-sterling exchange had strengthened and enough sterling had 
been purchased to meet current remittances. However this was 'based 
almost entirely on exceptionally large gold exports, and it is too 
early yet to say the position is firmly restored with assured 
prospects of regular remittances’.38 Treasury officials remained 
concerned about India’s financial position until the end of the year. 
With the prospect of meeting the loans which matured in 1932, they 
felt no confidence in Schuster’s ability to maintain remittances. 
Even if there were new surplus balances created by the gold exports, 
the Treasury feared that Schuster, unless carefully controlled, 
might be tempted to expand the currency or devalue the 
rupee further.39
The gold exports did help to solve the problem of maintaining 
the rupee at Is 6d. By restoring the balance of trade surpluses, the 
gold exports allowed the Government of India to resume sterling 
purchases and so meet remittances in the traditional manner. The 
Government of India was able to replenish its reserves; £13.7 
million was added to the Gold Standard Reserve in London.40 The 
credit of India was restored in the city and the Government of India
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was able to convert its loans to lower interest rates. One sign of 
the improvement was that the value of Government of India 3.5 per 
cent sterling stock which had fallen to 48.5 in September 1931 had
risen again to 89 by March 1933.41
However, while the sterling-rupee link put a premium on Indian
gold it over-valued the rupee in world terms, thus delaying the
recovery of Indian exports. While the rupee was devalued, it was only 
to the level of sterling. The needs of Britain as an industrial 
economy, though, were different to primary-producing India which 
required a greater level of depreciation to raise agricultural prices 
and so the income level of the bulk of its population. Initially, 
Indian exports received a short-term boost in economies remaining on 
the gold standard, but as market forces pushed more and more
countries off gold, Indian exports became less competitive in price. 
The most obvious comparison is with Japan whose currency was devalued 
three months after the rupee. The most serious blow, however, was
the devaluation of the American dollar in 1933. Prices of the better
quality American cotton fell, pushing Indian cotton from its major 
market, Japan, despite a new trade convention. India had been 
prevented from devaluing its currency because of its colonial
relationship. The rupee remained linked to sterling at the old rate 
of Is 6d, firstly to ease the devaluation of sterling and secondly, to 
allow continued sterling remittances to London.
The Central Budget. 1929-36: The Maintenance of Financial Orthodoxy
in the rupee crisis was the issue of the maintenance 
of the balanced budget. Orthodox finance demanded that cuts in
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revenue had to be balanced by cuts in expenditure. However, this 
would reduce the ability of a government to respond to the crisis. 
Having given way over the rupee-sterling link, to what extent did the 
Government of India follow orthodox financing,as pushed by Whitehall) 
in its budget?
From Table 3.2 (over) it is clear that the budgetary position 
of the Government of India was under stress from the mid-1920s, even 
before the depression struck. As revenue decreased, expenditure was 
increasing until 1930-31. One cause of the reduction in revenue came 
in 1927 when Sir Basil Blackett abolished the payments by the 
provincial governments to the central authorities. This payment had 
been imposed under the Meston Award to compensate the Government of 
India for some of its revenue now 'transferred1 to the local 
authorities, notably land revenue receipts. However, by 1927, Blackett 
believed that the revenue position of the central authorities was 
sufficiently strong to help its provincial counterparts by abolishing 
the payments. At a time of falling world prices for agricultural 
prices, though, the anticipated long-term security of central 
authority finances did not materialise and the blow to trade during 
the depression further weakened the financial position of the 
Government of India. In both 1930-31 and 1931-32,the budget was 
running at a deficit of some Rs 11 crores, and Schuster had to 
persuade the Whitehall authorities to consider the Indian budgets as 
a single unit until 1933, when he predicted the budget would be 
balanced again.42 This did occur and the position gradually 
strengthened until the end of the decade, but the massive surpluses 
of the pre-war years were over.
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Table 3.2
Central Government Revenue and Expenditure (Rs 000)
Total Revenue Total Expenditure Charged 
Against Revenue
Surplus or 
Deficit
1925-26 1,33,17,30 1,29,86,12 +3,31,18
1926-27 1,31,65,45 1,31,65,47 -2
1927-28 1,27,22,78 1,27,22,78 -
1928-29 1,28,97,02 1,29,28,56 -31,54
1929-30 1,32,68,55 1,32,41,71 +26,84
1930-31 1,24,59,58 1,36,18,01 -11,58,43
1931-32 1,21,64,66 1,33,39,39 -11,74,73
1932-33 1,25,43,70 1,23,58,51 +1,85,19
1933-34 1,19,37,30 1,19,37,31 -1
1934-35 1,22,12,40 1,21,76,40 +36,00
1935-36 1,21,07,26 1,21,07,26 -
Source: Statistical Abstract, 1919-20 to 1928-29, BPP, 
Cmd 3882 of 1931, Table 62, pp.139-150.
Statistical Abstract. 1929-30 to 1938-39, BPP,
Cmd 6333 of 1942, Table 113, pp.296-311.
A breakdown of the principal sources of revenue can be found in 
Table 3.3 (over) with a proportional breakdown in Table 3.4 (over). 
Between 1929-30 and 1935-36, the total revenue of the Government of 
India declined by Rs 11.61 crores or just over 10 per cent. Customs 
rsvcnuG fell in the short-term by Rs 5 crores in the 1930 31 season 
alone, but rose once more from 1932-33, after the Emergency Budget of 
September 1931 imposed a surcharge of 25 per cent on all customs 
duties• Specific duties were also raised, duties on artificial silk
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imports rose from 20 per cent to 40 per cent; on silk yam from 10 to 
15 per cent and on sugar from Rs 6-12-0 per cwt to Rs 7-4-0. 
Increased duties were imposed on boots and shoes, camphor and 
electric bulbs. At the same time, the earlier government policy of 
free entry for goods required by industry was altered to include 
duties of 10 per cent on machinery and chemical dyes and of 5 annas 
per lb on raw cotton. These measures ensured the rise in importance 
of customs duties.43 By 1932-33 customs duties accounted for over 40 
per cent of total revenues, compared to 29 per cent in 1921-22.
The increase in customs duties, however, was offset by a 
decline in railway receipts of Rs 7 crores between 1930-31 and 1935- 
36. The inelasticity of sources of revenue open to the Government 
of India is illustrated by the relatively moderate increase in 
revenue from income tax of only Rs 2 crores between 1927-28 and 1935- 
36, brought about by reducing the threshold for payment from Rs 2,000 
per annum to Rs 1,000.44 In an agrarian economy with such a low 
national income as India, the scope for the levy of income tax was 
limited. Even in those sections of the Indian community who might 
have been called upon to face increased taxes, the Government of 
India proceeded only cautiously in the early 1930s, not wishing to 
provide any further grievance which might push the propertied classes 
into the arms of Congress.45 Meanwhile, for middle income groups, 
increased taxes simply reduced their purchasing power. This affected 
government officials,particularly on top of their salary reductions. 
In Bihar, Captain Hall, Superintendent Engineer at Ranchi, believed: 
did not believe even in our most depressed moments that the 
Government of India would not be able to pay their permanent servants
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their contracted salaries, and their announcement of a 10 per cent 
cut concurrently with increased income tax was a severe and
unexpected blow. We were still expected to maintain our normal
standard of living and with no say in the matter of accommodation, we 
had no means of economising and no alternative but to run further 
into debt.’4 6
The most interesting aspect illustrated in Table 3.4 is that
the major change in the structure of Government of India revenue came
in the pre-depression period. In 1921-22 customs and excise, railway 
receipts and income tax provided 59.8 per cent of total revenue, a 
proportion which had risen to 80.4 per cent in 1928-29. The changes 
in revenue levels during the depression are set against a period of 
long-term structural change in which the revenue base of the 
Government of India was becoming increasingly restricted. During 
the slump, there were few new opportunities for the raising of 
revenue so that by 1935-36 customs and excise, railway receipts and 
income tax provided 85.5 per cent of total revenue. Thus, the crisis 
of the depression intensified the difficulties of the Government of 
India of finding new sources of revenue in a predominantly agrarian 
economy.
Thus, the depression occurred against a background of long-term 
financial weakness in the revenues of the Government of India. The 
battle to balance the Indian budget placed enormous strains on 
relations between Delhi and Whitehall. Unlike its Labour 
predecessor, the National Government of 1931 never felt constrained 
by the fiscal autonomy convention. The new Secretary of State for 
India, Sir Samuel Hoare, believed that the nature of the crisis
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invested final control of the Indian budget in Whitehall. As such, 
he felt justified in criticising almost every budgetary proposal 
between 1931 and 1934, when Schuster was replaced by Sir James Grigg 
whose orthodox view found favour in London.47
Table 3.4
Proportional Breakdown of Government of India Revenue
1921-22 1925-26 1928-29 1929-30 1930-31
Customs 29.86 35.87 38.21 38.64 37.56
Excise 0.46 0.31 0.23 0.41 0.37
Customs/Excise 30.33 36.18 38.44 39.05 31.91
Railways 13.19 25.83 29.06 28.00 31.41
Income Tax 16.26 11.90 12.95 12.59 12.84
Land Revenue 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.28 0.27
1931-32 1932-33 1933-34 1934-35 1935-36
Customs 38.17 41.41 39.50 43.13 44.69
Excise 0.42 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.32
Customs/Excise 38.59 41.74 39.83 43.46 45.01
Railways 27.63 26.60 27.67 26.50 26.41
Income Tax 14.37 14.32 14.34 14.36 14.10
Land Revenue 0.27 0.14 0.14 0.17 0.21
Source: Calculated from
Statistical Abstract 1919-20 to 1928-29, BPP,
Cmd 3882 of 1931, Table 61, pp.131-135. 
stntistinal Abstract 1929-30 to 1938-39, BPP,
Cmd 6333 of 1942, Table 112, pp.284-287.
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One of Schuster s principal financial headaches, apart from the
ever-constant strain of meeting the home charges, was the cost of
nation—building projects begun in the early 1920s such as the Sind
Barrage irrigation scheme, new railway construction and the new
capital at Dehli. He summarised the position clearly in 1930:
*...a great many irrigation and other projects were 
started, and carried out at a capital expenditure based on 
high post war prices and on the strength of calculations 
as regards profits and taxable capacity also based on 
high post war prices. The economic foundation of many of 
those projects may be knocked away.’48
In this he was proved correct; with irrigation and railway 
receipts declining in the 1930s, many projects were classed as 
* unproductive ’.4 9
Administration costs continued to rise despite the slump, partly 
the consequence of the series of enquiries instigated by the Labour 
Administration in London. Therefore, the Government of India had to 
finance the Royal Commission on Labour, the Central Banking Inquiry 
Commission and the endless committees considering India’s 
constitutional future. In addition,there was the cost of the Tariff 
Board inquiries and new commitments such as the Indian Central Cotton 
Committee and the Indian Council for Agricultural Research. Measures 
to aid the Indian economy needed finance, which could not be met under 
the rigid tenets of orthodox budgeting. Financial pressures were 
exacerbated by the need to combat the civil disobedience movements, 
although the greatest costs here were borne by Provincial 
Governments.
The principal items of central expenditure are contained m
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Table 3.5 (below). In the first two years of the slump total 
expenditure rose by some Rs 3 crores, mostly accounted for by tha
Table 3.5
Principal Items of Expenditure (Rs crores)
Defence Police Law & 
Justice
General
Admin.
Educ. Public
Health
Civil
Works
Agric. Debt
Charges
1926 56.0 12.4 8.3 12.8 12.1 7.1 13.8 2.4 19.7
1927 54.8 12.2 8.5 12.9 12.7 6.3 14.1 2.6 18.5
1928 55.1 12.7 8.6 13.1 13.2 6.7 13.4 2.8 18.5
1929 55.1 13.1 8.8 13.9 13.6 7.2 13.0 3.1 19.4
1930 54.3 13.6 9.0 14.1 13.8 6.7 12.9 3.1 20.2
1931 51.8 13.4 8.1 13.7 12.8 6.3 8.7 2.7 23.0
1932 46.7 12.9 7.6 12.6 11.8 5.4 7.6 2.4 22.3
1933 44.2 12.9 7.8 12.0 12.0 5.5 7.7 2.5 16.1
1934 44.3 12.7 7.7 12.1 12.1 5.6 10.0 2.6 16.4
1935 45.0 12.9 7.9 12.5 12.3 5.7 10.4 2.8 17.1
1936 45.5 13.0 8.0 13.1 12.6 6.2 8.8 3.1 15.5
Source: P.J. Thomas, The Growth of Federal Finance, (Madras, 1939),
Table 6, p.502.
increase in general administration, police and justice and rising 
debt charges. Thereafter, at Whitehall s insistence, the Government 
of India pruned its expenditure drastically, some Rs 27 crores were 
cut between 1931 and 1933 as a result of recommendations of 
Retrenchment Committees. The major costs came in defence 
expenditure, primarily through salary cuts, and the reduction in 
interest rates helped to reduce the burden of debt charges. A
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further reduction of Rs 5 crores came in cuts in civil works 
expenditure, with increases in 1934 and 1935 the response to the 
natural disasters of the earthquakes in Bihar. Other retrenchment 
measures included I.C.S. salary cuts, from the Viceroy downwards, the 
shelving of development projects, reduction of railway expenditure to 
basic maintenance of existing stock, staff cuts and a reduction in 
government contracts. Since the government was the largest single 
employer of labour and many firms, including the Tata Iron and Steel 
Company, had depended upon Government orders, these cuts had serious 
depressing effects on the domestic economy.
Thus the Government of India pursued orthodox responses to the
financial crisis. Even when the crisis eased with the massive gold
exports after devaluation, there was little change in policy. The 
merchandise balance surplus created by the gold flows was used to 
reduce the public debt through loan conversions to lower rates of 
interest. By 1936, the Government of India had only one loan above 
4.5 per cent compared to 4 in 1930 and servicing of the debt had been 
reduced by Rs 7.5 crores in the same period.50 The continued gold 
flows from 1931 were criticised regularly by Indian nationalists who 
argued that the gold should be purchased by the Government of India 
to provide reserves enabling the creation of a central bank. The 
Government only briefly considered banning gold exports in October
1931 when it was feared that exports were deflecting investment from 
Treasury Bills, another sign that no-one realised the extent to which 
the gold exports would ease the remittance situation. However, 
despite impassioned pleas by such prominent elder statesmen of 
Congress as M.M. Malaviya, bullion dealers continued to export gold
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refusing to miss the opportunity of quick profits. Such were the 
double standards that while FICCI did not fail to pass a resolution 
condemning the Indian authorities for allowing gold exports, the 
Committee would not permit a resolution to be tabled at its general 
meeting condemning Indian bullion traders who participated in the 
trade.5 2 In short, the gold exports became yet one more weapon in the 
propaganda war between nationalists and government, but while the 
trade was legal, who could refuse the profit even for the good of 
Swaraj. It is interesting to speculate how many of such bullion 
dealers still contributed funds to Congress during the second Civil 
Disobedience Campaign.
The Government of India, then, did not spend its way out of the 
crisis, unlike, for example, the Governments of Brazil or Japan. 
There was no investment in large scale public works or even 
widespread small local schemes for agricultural improvement such as 
tube-well construction, as suggested by Thomas.5 3 Interest rates 
were cut from November 1931 until they reached 3.5 per cent in 1933, 
despite protests from Whitehall which feared Schuster was courting 
inflation.54 This certainly helped to encourage investment in India 
but even here there was criticism of government action, that cheap 
money was encouraging speculation.55 The Government of India pursued 
such orthodox financial policies partly as a result of pressure from 
Whitehall, but also because it had no alternative policy. Certainly 
It is difficult to imagine Whitehall allowing a colonial underling to 
pursue deficit financing, but even Sir George Schuster failed to 
provide a coherent alternative to orthodoxy. From his experiences in 
northern Africa he knew only too well of the dangers of restriction
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schemes and he was too good a financier to want to fritter away 
government resources on unsound schemes. Above all, he was vitally 
aware of India s background of underdevelopment. Hence his desire to 
initiate an economic survey which would recommend a coherent 
development strategy at an All-India level. Faced with the 
indifference of his ministerial colleagues and outright suspicion by
i
provincial officials, Schuster’s plans came to naught.56 He was 
forced to respond in an ad hoc way to the most pressing problems as 
they emerged. However, by voicing unorthodox proposals, no matter 
how tentatively, he aroused a violent distrust in Whitehall. Drummond 
has suggested that Schuster’s views helped to crystalise Treasury 
belief that not even British officials could be entrusted to control 
Indian finance and, thus, strengthened the demand for financial 
safeguards in the new constitution:'Sir George had embraced all the 
heresies - unbalanced budgets, floating exchange rates, deliberate 
depreciation, management of the price level and the money supply. He 
had been willing to gamble Indian credit and to risk a sterling 
default by unbalancing the budget and floating the rupee.’57
London officials were determined that Schuster’s replacement 
should be someone they could trust. Hoare originally suggested Sir 
Cecil Kisch, Financial Advisor to the India Office, one of Schuster s 
critics.5 6 Willingdon declared such an appointment would 
be a 'colossal mistake’ and insisted on retaining Schuster at least 
long enough to guide the Reserve Bank Bill through the Assembly. 
Willingdon told Hoare, 'whatever may be the opinion of him at home, 
[Schuster] has the confidence of the Indian people to a very marked 
degree ’.5 9 This was probably the most damming recommendation that
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could have been made to Whitehall about the abilities of an Indian 
Finance Member. In his last budget, armed now with a small surplus, 
Schuster made a small beginning in renewing development expenditure. 
Half the revenue from jute export duties was awarded to the jute 
producing provinces and small sums were granted for a rural 
development fund and the development of broadcasting and civil 
aviation.6 0
While London failed to gain the appointment of Kisch as 
successor to Schuster, no fault could be found with the orthodoxy of 
Sir James Grigg. Under Grigg the Indian authorities continued to 
prune the budget and while he did continue to fund development 
projects, the sums involved were meagre: Rs 1,00 lakh for
agricultural development in 1935-36 and Rs 2,81 lakhs in the 
following year. Members of the government found it difficult to 
persuade Grigg to finance development projects: Fazl-i-Hussain
declared him to be 'terribly stingy and miserly. . . he absolutely 
refuses to increase any capital expenditure’.61 Instead, Grigg’s 
main policy objective was to replenish the Indian reserves in London 
and to reduce the public debt. With Grigg in control of Indian 
finances, tension, in this area at least, was relieved between India 
and Whitehall at a critical stage in the progress of the 
constitutional reforms. Suddenly the acrimonious debates over 
financial safeguards were at an end: remittance policy and British
investments in India were in safe hands.6 2
Provincial Finance During The Crisis
The financial problems facing the Provincial Governments 
during the depression have attracted relatively little attention in
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the literature. Apart from two major contemporary works by Thomas, 
in recent years there have been studies of the United Provinces by 
Mishra and two general surveys by Kumar and Charlesworth.6 3 Yet it 
was the Provincial Governments which were entrusted with the 
responsibility for the development of the economy. Probably studies 
into provincial finance have been curtailed by difficulties in 
obtaining access to official p>apers.64 So once again research is
thrown back on an over-reliance of official publications of
individual local governments. It is vital, though, to survey their 
financial difficulties. For the bulk of the population of India, it
would be remission or suspension of land revenue and water rates by
the local authorities which would provide the most immediate relief.
When the depression struck, the provincial governments of India 
were still in their infancy - having been created only in 1920. 
Under the principle of dyarchy, the responsibilities for local 
agricultural, industrial and infrastructural development were 
'transferred' to the provincial authorities. The reasons for the 
adoption of dyarchy have been much debated^ but the general conclusion 
seems to be that it was a format designed to control the level of 
power devolved to Indians.65 In this, Charlesworth has highlighted 
the control of central authorities over the ability of provincial 
government to contract loans.66 The finances of the new provincial 
governments were based on the awards of the Meston Committee, which 
basically allocated to them the proceeds of land and water revenue, 
forest revenue, local excise and stamp duties. Thus, the burden of 
providing revenue for local government fell upon the rural population 
rather than the urban dwellers, as reflected in Table 3.6 over.
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The Meston awards, therefore, left the Provincial Governments 
dependent upon agricultural incomes. The effect of the Permanent 
Settlement is clear on the revenues of Bengal and Bihar and Orissa. 
The former depended heavily on stamp duty and the latter on liquor 
licenses to replace their inelastic land revenue receipts. The 
Government of the Punjab gained over a third of its revenue from 
water duties, reflecting the provinces premier role in irrigation 
development. The Government of the United Provinces was most 
dependent solely upon land revenue, over 50 per cent in this case. It 
w°uld seem, then, that the revenue needs of the Provincial 
Governments were based on sources most likely to be reduced in a 
depression.
Table 3.6
Relative Importance of Principal Heads of Revenue to Total Revenue
Total 
Revenue 
Av.1925-35 
(Rs 000)
Percent­
age Land 
Revenue 
to Total 
Revenue
Irri­
gation
Excise Stamps Regis­
tration
Forest
Madras 16,81,57.8 34.9 10.2 29.3 13.7 2.1 3.1
Bombay 14,77,01.7 31.6 3.38 25.1 11.0 0.9 4.4
Bengal 10,32,74.9 28.3 - 17.2 30.9 2.7 2.3
United
Provinces 12,00,76.8 52.8 8.85 10.6 14.4 1.1 4.6
Central
Provinces 4,89,32.9 46.1 0.15 20.1 12.6 1.2 17.5
Assam 2,50,75.3 45.8 - 22.6 8.1 0.8 9.9
Punjab 10,98,85.0 25.2 35.89 10.0 10.3 0.8 2.6
Bihar & 
Orissa 5,49,34.6 31.9 3.93 21.3 19.8 3.0 1.5
Source: B.K. Misra, Indian Provincial Finance, 1919-39 t
(Mysore, 1942), Table VII, p.104.
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Table 3.7 (below) shows the budgetary position of the 
Provincial Governments in the first half of the 1930s.
It is clear that for most of the depression, the Provincial 
Governments were trying to function with budgetary deficits, a 
position which would not be regarded with much favour by London. It 
is very interesting to note the position of the Central Provinces. 
Within India, the Governor of the Central Provinces, Butler, was one 
of Schuster’s fiercest critics, arguing that he was not retrenching 
Table 3.7
Provincial Government Budgets, 1930-31 to 1935-36 (Rs lakhs)
1930-31 1931-32 1932-33 1933-34 1934-35 1935-36
Budget
Madras -1,06 +5 +77 +6 -19 +5
Bombay -1,81 -47 +26 +17 -17 -2
Bengal -1,75 -1,99 -1,30 -1,76 -27 -68
United
Provinces -91 -62 +15 -3 -9 -30
Punjab -43 -42 +18 +63 +43 +9
Bihar and 
Orissa -79 -23 +5 +8 +6 -17
Central
Provinces -44 -38 - -39 -11 -
Assam -35 -8 -17 -25 -42 -56
Northwest 
Frontier Prov. - - +2 +5 -6 -12
Aggregate
Surpluses - +5 +1,43 +91 +49 +14
Aggregate
Deficits -7,54 -4,19 -1,47
frnt TT*
-2,61 -1,31 -1,85
„  T __ 3 • _  >Source: Memorandum by G.H. Baxter, 'The Financial Outlook in India’,
6 January, 1936, in IOL, L/F/5/90.
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expenditure enough. Butler declared that the Central Provinces were 
in the forefront for tackling the depression along orthodox lines, 
retrenching expenditure, even continuing land revenue assessments to 
raise land revenue levels. Yet,even this government had difficulty 
balancing its budget.67 The Government of Bengal faced the most 
severe budgetary problems, as was to be expected of the province most 
badly hit by the fall in prices and its policing problems during the 
very violent civil disobedience campaigns of the early 1930s.
Given the reliance upon land revenue, it is helpful to consider 
the level of collections during the slump. Few remittances were 
granted in the Province of Bihar and Orissa which reported to the 
Neimeyer Committee that 'recovery (of revenue) has been practically 
complete'.68 However, between 1930 and 1935 the Governments of the 
Central Provinces and the Punjab granted remissions of Rs 44.34 lakhs 
and Rs 62.2 lakhs respectively, while on a much larger scale, 
remissions in Madras and the United Provinces amounted to Rs 205.2 
lakhs and Rs 490.57 lakhs respectively.69 These figures are 
reflected in Table 3.8 (over).
Madras, Bombay and the Punjab appear to have been most affected 
by falls in land revenue, amounting to one-third in the worst years. 
Bengal and Bihar and Orissa suffered least from a decline in land 
revenue; which is not surprising since in these permanently settled 
areas the burden of land revenue had been becoming progressively 
lighter, although the real burden would have increased during the 
depression. This was the position in other provinces where land 
settlement revisions had been conducted during the 1920s at a time of 
high agricultural prices and so slightly inflating the assessments.
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This helped to explain the heavy falls in land revenue collections in 
these provinces. The table does not give a true reflection of the 
problems of the Punjab since it does not include remissions of water 
duties. One interesting feature from the table is that the poorest 
year for collections in the United Provinces came in 1933-34, not at
Table 3.8
Land Revenue Collections (Rs Lakhs)
1921-22
Maximum
Amount Year
Slump Minimum 
Amount Year
Budget
1935-36
Madras 608 640 1925-26 489 1931-32 483
Bombay & Sind 547 559 1922-23 378 1934-35 382
Bengal 302 335 1934-35 300 1932-33 326
United
Provinces 681 692 1923-24 558 1933-34 581
Punjab 246 364 1923-24 223 1931-32 272
Bihar & Orissa 164 181 1932-33 176 1931-32 178
Central
Provinces 265 265 1921-22 205 1929-30 259
N.W.F.P. 16 24 1926-27 18 1930-31 20
Assam 96 121 1931-32 111 1933-34 114
Source* Provincial Memoranda for Neimeyer Committee, Table 1, p.l, 
in NAI, Government of India, FD, F 17{60)F, 1935.
the peak of the non-payment campaigns of Congress in 1931-32. By 
1935 few provinces were forecasting collections at pre-depression 
rates and the Neimeyer Committee predicted that full recovery of
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provincial finances would not be possible until 1942-43 because of 
the cancellation of settlement operations • 7 ®
Problems in collection of land revenue were only one part of 
the growing financial difficulties of the provincial governments. 
Other sources of revenue were affected as well, especially liquor 
excise, stamp duties and registration fees. However, as with the 
central authorities there was little attempt to find new sources of 
taxable revenue. Indeed, this was even more of a restriction on 
provincial governments since at least the Government of India could 
increase customs and excise duties. There were few attempts made to 
transfer the burden of taxation from the agricultural classes to the 
large landholders or business communities within the provinces.71 
Instead the emphasis was on retrenchment.
Again, as with the central authorities, the budgetary position 
of the provinces was shaky, already before 1929, even after the 
ending of provisional contributions to the Government of India in 
1927. Most of the provincial governments had heavy capital 
expenditure in the 1920s from the cost of new government buildings to 
the grand schemes of the Bombay Government such as the Back Bay 
Scheme in Bombay and the Sind Barrage. In addition the provincial 
governments had become responsible for meeting much of the cost of 
irrigation schemes established within their boundaries. The 
Governments of Madras and the Punjab had invested in hydro-electric 
schemes to compensate for the deficiency of their coal reserves, 
investing Rs 3.6 crores and Rs 7•0 crores respectively.7 2
London urged the Provincial Governments to pursue rigorous
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retrenchment policies including the suspension of public works.73 
The Bombay Government appointed a Finance Committee under 
Sir F. Gauntlett to recommend means of rationalising the general 
administration of the province. Two new taxes were embraced which 
proved very unpopular: a tax on electric current for domestic
purposes and a tax on tobacco entering the city of Bombay. Mostly, 
however, the province relied upon retrenchment and salary cuts.74
In the United Provinces the government was faced with the cost 
of policing the civil disobedience campaigns, much of which was 
financed from the Loan Fund which should have been spent on 
development projects.75 The incidence of land revenue per acre was 
highest in the United Provinces which seems to have been the basis 
for the concentration of Congress efforts in this province. The 
government was forced into temporary remissions in 1930, but to meet 
the Congress disturbances, the whole land revenue system in the 
province was re-assessed on the basis of pre-war prices which was the 
extent to which prices had fallen during the slump.76 However, to 
some extent these operations were mitigated by the maintenance of the 
existing water rates in the canal colonies to the extent that the 
provincial Irrigation Department continued to produce a surplus 
throughout the depression. To gain additional revenue the government 
raised registration and court fees, stamp duties and an annual motor 
vehicle license. However, the main thrust of provincial financial 
policy was retrenchment j the budget of development departments 
falling from Rs2,99 lakhs in 1929—30 to Rs 2,12 lakhs in 1932—33, the 
largest cuts coming from the Public Health Department.78 Even the 
Police Department expenditure was cut from 1932 once the disobedience
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campaign had reached its peak. One retrenchment measure which may 
have proved beneficial was the grant of taquavi loans in kind instead 
of in cash so certain areas benefited from an injection of new 
improved seeds, bullocks and agricultural implements. Between 1930- 
31 and 1933-34 the overall reduction in expenditure was Rs 1.6 
crores.79 From 1934-35 the position began to improve once more and 
the government established a small loan fund for improved marketing 
facilities and the development of tube-well irrigation* 8 0 There 
was, however, no recovery in the amount set aside for industrial 
loans, due to the failure during the depression of every venture for 
which the Government of the United Provinces had provided financial 
backing.81 The developments in the revenue structure of the United 
Provinces was summed up by one of its officials'.
'The attempts made at new taxation were spasmodic and 
sometimes abortive, though it must be admitted that the 
poor economic conditions of the people hardly warranted 
further burdens. The efforts at retrenchment were more 
forceful and more successful, but even so, the net result 
has been that there was little or no margin for expansion 
in the beneficient departments or in the various social 
services.*8 2
In the Punjab, the government had also appointed a Retrenchment 
Committee which had recommended the merging of the Department of 
Public Health and Medical Department and the downgrading of the 
Public Works Department to an inspectorate. These proposals were 
rejected by the Punjab Government which sought its retrenchment in a
blanket cut of 13 per cent in the expenditure of each department.83
It also resorted to increased borrowing from the Provincial Loans 
Fund to the extent of Rs 1 crore by the end of 1933.84 These loans
offset the reduction in land revenue and water rates income. The
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Government of the Punjab believed that 'the effects of the disaster 
were confined within comparatively narrow limits due^not only to the 
exercise of every practical form of economy and the ruthless 
excision of all superfluities, but also to the curtailment of 
expenditure on essential services such as the maintenance and repair 
of canals, buildings and communications, on which the ultimate 
prosperity of the province largely depends, to the barest minimum 
compatible with safety’.85
Appendices 1-4 contain the principal heads of revenue and 
expenditure of the Governments of Bihar and Orissa, Bengal, the 
Central Provinces and Madras. These have been chosen to represent 
two provinces of restricted means (Bihar and Central Provinces) and 
two large provinces (Madras and Bengal) with different financial 
problems,to study the extent to which the local authorities approved 
differing solutions, including the level of provincial borrowing, 
taxation measures and the pursuit of retrenchment.
The province of Bihar and Orissa suffered from having the 
lowest per capita local government revenue in India. It had an 
annual revenue of only Rs 5 to 6 crores because of the relatively 
inelastic land revenue assessment under the Permanent Settlement. In 
comparision, for instance, with Bombay Presidency, the population of 
Bihar was 75 per cent greater yet government revenue was over 50 per 
cent less. Prior to the depression the Government of Bihar had 
depended upon excise revenue to offset the limited land revenue 
resources. The Government prided itself on its ability to survive on 
its meagre budget:
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it can fairly be claimed that Bihar and Orissa has made 
the most of its resources. . . the province has managed its 
finances on the utmost conservative lines and has 
refrained from incurring debt. It has preferred to 
forego much of the development possible in richer 
provinces rather than place itself in an unsound 
financial position.'86
Against this background of financial stringency the depression 
affected Bihar and Orissa severely. Provincial revenues fell by Rs 
90 lakhs between 1929-30 and 1933-34. The Provincial Government's 
difficulties were exacerbated by the cost of subduing the Civil 
Disobedience campaigns and its offshoot the Kisan Sabha or peasant 
movement. Thus expenditure on police and jails had to remain at a 
high level. While land revenue collection in Bihar was maintained, 
excise revenue declined sharply. In line with its traditional 
policy, the Bihari authorities slashed expenditure, by Rs 1.29 crores 
between 1929-30 and 1932-33. The Public Works Department bore the 
brunt of the cuts, losing half its budget. This halted many civil 
works including the half completed trunk road to Orissa, and repair 
and maintenance of roads, railways and irrigation canals was reduced. 
Part-time government employees were made redundant and salaries cut 
for those that remained. The post of Chief Inspector , of 
Factories was abolished. In his budget speech of 1933, the Finance 
Member mused on the retrenchment measures:
'The sacrifices which we have made to attain a balanced 
budget are great indeed — we have not made as much fuss 
as some other Governments over retrenchment: we are a
poor province and chronic poverty has left very little 
margin to sacrifice in a time of crisis. A reduction of 
Rs 1 crore - one sixth of the expenditure - is no mean 
result.’8 8
The result of such drastic pruning was to increase the problems of
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underdevelopment in Bihar. Canals became clogged with silt, roads 
washed away in floods. A curtailment of the vaccination programme 
resulted in an increase in infant mortality.89 Despite the fall in 
revenue, however, the local authorities clung to their decision not 
to borrow until the natural disaster of the 1934 earthquake forced 
them to turn to the Central Government for aid. There were no bold 
policy experiments in Bihar and it remained the most backward region 
in India led by a singularly conservative government. Even the 
Congress ministry from 1937 lacked the dynamism of its counterparts 
elsewhere in India, reflecting the strong links between Congress and 
Zamindari class in Bihar. Thus Bihar was the only province which had 
failed to appoint a Marketing Officer by 1939. Instead, the Director 
of Agriculture found marketing added to his already burdensome list 
of duties.90
The Government of. the Central Provinces and Berar also had a 
reputation for financial orthodoxy. Its Governor, Butler, was one of 
Sir George Schuster’s fiercest critics. Butler, though, argued that 
increased taxation was politically unacceptable as a response to 
financial stringency in a colonial setting since it would arouse 
nationalist opposition.91 However, Butler’s definition of taxation 
was limited to income tax and excise. For the bulk of the population 
of Central Provinces taxation was represented by land revenue and its 
payment was enforced rigidly during the depression in comparision to 
other provinces. Possibly this reflects the relative weakness in 
rural areas of the local Congress Party. In Central Provinces 
Congress was basically an urban movement and the local authorities 
did not face a prolonged anti-revenue movement during the Civil
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Disobedience campaign. Government revenue in the Central Provinces 
was usually around Rs 6 crores for a population less than half that 
of Bihar. Revenue fell by Rs 1 crore during the slump. Butler 
refused to allow increased income tax or excise duty. Instead he 
attempted 'to prune mercilessly’, through staff cuts, heavy 
reductions in departmental budgets - particularly Public Works, 
education and health - and a cut in the number and size of official 
economic reports.92 However, Butler did not get all his own way: 
Council Members frequently restored reduction in expenditure and 
resorted to borrowing from the Provincial Loan Fund to cover its 
deficits.93 This reached a peak of Rs 1 crore in 1930-31. Such 
borrowing was not used to reflate the local economy through public 
works schemes or price support schemes, but was used to cover the 
shortfall in excise and stamp revenue. Thus, despite Butler’s 
criticism of central government financial policy, the policy of his 
own government was equally suspect. Again, as in Bihar, the 
financial stringency helped to prolong the effects of the depression 
in the province.
The Government finances in Madras are in marked contrast to 
those of Bihar. In a predominantly ryotwari province, annual revenue 
prior to the slump amounted to some Rs 20 crores. With larger 
financial resources the Government of Madras had been able to 
launch several development initiatives including the combined 
irrigation and hydro-electric power scheme at Mettur. During the 
slump, annual revenue declined by Rs 4 crores between 1929—30 and 
1933-34. However, it is difficult to disentangle the impact of the 
depression affecting revenues from the political events in Madras.
During the depression the Government of Madras faced an increasingly 
strong Congress Party led by Rajagopalachari at a time when splits in 
the loyalist Justice Party were widening.9 * While the Civil
Disobedience campaigns affected land revenue collections in some 
areas, the most immediate impact was an excise duty reduction with 
Rajaji*s Gandhian inspired attack on liquor stores, rather than on 
cloth shops. Excise revenue above declined by over Rs 1.5 crores. 
Land revenue declined again during the Second Civil Disobedience 
campaign for 1932 but this time it was due partly to a deliberate 
policy of remission and suspension by the Government of Madras to 
provide support for the faltering Justice Party.95 In other words, 
the political difficulties of the period had just as much impact on 
government revenue in Madras as the economic consequence of the 
slump. The Madras authorities also responded with 'drastic 
economies’ including staff redundancies and pay cuts, co-operative 
societies being charged registration fees for the first time, and 
cuts in departmental budgets96 In Madras, though, there was not such 
a drastic reduction in the Public Works Department budget since the 
local Government borrowed from the Provincial Loans Fund to meet the 
capital expenditure on the new projects such as Mettur. These loans 
averaged Rs 1 crore per annum between 1928 and 1933 and ended when 
the Mettur project came into operation. Thus, the Madras Government 
pj^eferred to run budgetary deficits to maintain what it regarded as 
important development projects in marked contrast to the attitude of 
the Government of Bihar and Orissa.
In Bengal, too, it is difficult to differentiate between the 
impact of the depression and the political crisis of the period. In
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Bengal, which had the largest population in India at some 50 million 
in 1931, the government’s annual budget amounted to only Rs 12 
crores, so that the Bengal authorities relied heavily upon loans from 
the central government. The major source of revenue for the 
Government of Bengal was stamp duty which was reduced by Rs 1 crore 
during the slump. Since Bengal was predominantly a permanently 
settled area, the heavy fall in prices in the province did not affect 
land revenue collection. However, during the depression the local 
government was faced with an almost continuous rise in expenditure on 
police and prisons to control the political situation. In Bengal the 
split in the local Congress Party led to a wave of terrorism so that 
any retrenchment in other departments was offset by the increased 
expenditure on police. From 1930-31 the province depended upon large 
loans from the Central Government to keep its deficits within reason. 
In 1931-32 alone over Rs 2 crores was borrowed, while repayments of 
such loans amounted to only an average of Rs 6 lakhs between 1929-30 
and 1933-34. The problems of the depression were alleviated only by 
the award of half of the proceeds of the jute export duty in 1934, a 
measure which the Governor, Sir John Anderson, had demanded 
strenuously from the beginning of his term in office in 1931.97
Conclusion
As we have seen from these brief case studies, the depression 
highlighted the defects of the system of dyarchy. The provincial 
governments had been allocated the responsibilities of the economic 
development of their areas without the necessary finance to pursue 
such development. During the depression the squeeze on agricultural
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incomes hit the provincial revenues. The major source of relief, 
remissions and suspensions of land revenue, reduced further the 
abilities of provincial governments to provide any long term relief 
in the form of public works. Nor did they borrow to finance such 
works outwith Madras. Technically the provincial governments could 
arrange loans on the open market, but most lacked the creditworthy 
status required^so borrowed through the central authorities.9 8 During 
the slump the central revenues were also in great difficulty 
restricting its ability to grant loans to provincial governments. 
Whitehall also made it clear that provincial governments should cut 
their expenditure by abandoning public works projects already 
begun.99 However, the Government of India did accept the
responsibility of allowing local governments to borrow enough to keep 
their budgetary deficits within reason, otherwise the deflationary 
effects of the depression and the political problems of the period 
would have been far worse.
During the depression, public finance at both central and
provincial levels came under severe strain. Revenue sources were 
squeezed and borrowing capacity limited. The central government had 
no clear plan for pulling India out of the depression. The Finance 
Member, Sir George Schuster, had become dissatisfied with the tenets 
of orthodox finance, but had no coherent alternative. He
corresponded with Keynes and this, added to his experience of the
depression, convinced him of the need for government planning of the 
economy and the use of deficit budgeting to alleviate the crisis.* 00 
However, to pursue either course, Schuster would have required the 
support both of his colleagues and Whitehall. While his executive
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colleagues were willing to support his stand on the exchange rate of 
the rupee, few believed in Government intervention in other areas of 
the economy.1 01 At a provincial level even fewer were willing to 
gamble with their weak finances or to allow any invasion of central 
authority control over their responsibilities. Thus, in 1934, 
Schuster tentatively proposed at an inter-provincial conference that 
the central government should grant interest-free loans to the 
provincial authorities to enable them to establish broad based co­
operative projects in marketing, local sanitation, road building, and 
so on. However, not only was this rejected by his executive 
colleagues, it was also rejected by the provincial governments 
themselves.102 Schuster could not even get provincial co-operation 
for an economic survey of India upon which future plans could be 
based.
Schuster was even less likely to get support from Whitehall and 
in the end his persistent arguing helped to strain relations between 
London and Delhi throughout the years of the depression. Ultimately, 
this insured that his successor would be a rigorous orthodox 
financier who would have none of Schuster’s 'irresponsible’ flights 
of fancy. Grigg was scathing about most of Schuster’s policies such 
as protection and argued that the theories of government planning 
were 'over-rated’.103 Thus, no one in government was prepared to 
challenge orthodox economic policies for India for the rest of the 
decade.
Schuster’s main consolation for his years in office was the 
creation of the Reserve Bank of India in 1934 • Willingdon had 
insisted on Schuster remaining in office until the Bill was ratified
as being the only government official in India who could get the Bill 
through the Assembly. The Executive Council feared that the Bill 
would be voted out and the bank would have to be established through 
certification by the Viceroy.104 This was because the government was 
proposing a shareholders bank, half of whose directors and chairman 
would be appointed by the government, and that the Is 6d rupee- 
sterling exchange would become a statutory obligation once more. Nor 
was criticism confined to India. Officials of both the India Office 
and the Treasury criticised Schuster for pressing for a Reserve Bank 
before a full economic recovery and before constitutional reforms 
which would ensure the safeguarding of British financial interests in 
India.105 It was argued that before a Reserve Bank could be 
established, Indian reserves would have to be above £100 million, 
higher than its pre-depression reserves, there must be internal 
tranquility and prosperity and that the Government of India must 
ensure the bank would be free from political control 'and run by men 
irrespective of their nationality (that is, for a long time to come, 
men other than Indians)’ .106 In Whitehall minds all Indians were to 
be suspect as 'political’ or easily swayed by the Legislative 
Assembly.10 7 When it came into being the Reserve Bank was given 
control of currency and credit policy, managing the internal and 
external debt and supplying remittances to the Secretary of State. 
Ultimate control, however, remained with the Secretary of State 
through the Viceroy. Clearly, Whitehall only accepted the Reserve 
Bank to prevent any future native Finance Member influencing future 
monetary policy.
In general, then, the years of the depression represented an
H5
opportunity lost to the Government of India, largely in 
Schuster s period as Finance Member, through the rigid control of 
Whitehall. There were no new initiatives on financial or currency 
policy, no deficit budgeting or expansion of borrowing to reflate 
the economy. The Government of India did not react to the crisis in 
the way in which other independent governments could, such as Brazil 
or Japan (although it must be remembered that before Takahashi came 
into office there had been a period of severe deflation which, some 
have argued, laid the foundation for Japan’s rapid recovery from 
1932).108 However, the comparison is still valid, since the 
Government of India did not change its policies once finances showed 
signs of improvement. Nor did the Government of India react as other 
Dominions’ governments did. Australia, for instance, abandoned the 
gold standard in 1930 allowing its pound to devalue and helping to 
boost its exports.109 However, this is a reflection on the colonial 
relationship between India and Whitehall. London never allowed the 
Indian Government to pursue bold new initiatives.
The policies of the Government of India helped to prolong the 
effects of the depression in India through their impact on domestic 
credit. While both the number of banks and their branches and the 
level of savings within India grew from 1931-32, as shown in 
Table 3.9 (over) the growth was at best steady. This would have 
benefited larger industrial ventures which had come to rely 
increasingly upon the westernized bank sector for investment capital • 
However, most of the credit structures of India lay outwith the 
westernized sector. Even in the 1930s most investment for medium to 
small scale industrial ventures was met by indigenous bankers, as was
1/+6
the bulk of the cost of transporting and marketing agricultural 
produce.110 In the early 1930s the Government of India was competing 
in the market for loans thus reducing the amount available to the 
westernized banks through the Imperial Bank and through them to the 
indigenous bankers. At the other end of the credit network, by 
insisting on as full payment of land revenue as possible and by 
raising local taxes, provincial governments were helping to reduce 
agricultural incomes further. This meant that cultivators could not 
Table 3.9
Growth of Savings in India. 1928-1938 (Deposits Rs Lakhs)
Imperial Bank 
of India (a)
Indian Joint 
Stock Banks
Indian Co-op. 
Banks
Post Office 
Savings Banks
1928 71,30,44 62,85,36 9,01,49 27,21,69
1929 71,64,31 62,72,03 10,90,16 27,27,88
1930 76,60,06 63,25,51 12,57,38 25,40,86
1931 63,85,64 62,26,44 15,01,60 28,47,19
1932 68,36,35 72,34,00 18,09,77 32,11,95
1933 74,12,77 71,67,43 17,11,99 38,15,72
1934 74,27,95 76,77,26 17,93,94 40,01,06
1935 79,09,17 84,44,61 19,89,56 47,83,19
1936 78,79,50 98,14,26 20,56,71 44,97,53
1937 81,08,07 1.00,26,50 19,79,05 44,72,14
1938 81,50,95 98,08,27 22,92,48 46,01,79
(a) Private deposits only.
Source: Statistical Abstract, 1919-20 to 1928-29, BPP,
Cmd 3682 of 1931, Table 130, pp.310-11 and Table 280, p.642.
Statistical Abstract, 1929-30 to 1938—3.9, BPP,
Cmd 6333 of 1941, Table 165, pp.453-44 and Table 237, p.670.
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meet interest on their loans thus reducing the amount available to 
the local money lenders for new loans. One result of this was that 
large landowners and money lenders switched their investments from 
rural to urban areas.111 While this may have helped the small Indian 
industrial sector, it contributed in the long term stagnation of the 
rural economy.
In 1931 Whitehall was able to force a currency and financial 
policy upon India aided by conservative demands within the Indian 
Government itself. It seems clear that this was a final attempt by 
the British Government to impose its will upon India. The British 
Government were concerned about the maintenance of remittance from 
India to London and the future of the financial status of Britons in 
India. Tomlinson and Drummond are correct to assert that the British 
authorities had not anticipated the size of the gold outflows from 
India. However* the gold exports did ease the British financial 
position as well and the British Government did nothing to stem the 
flow. In 1934 it stopped Schuster from putting an export duty on 
gold in case the exports should dry up.11 2 In the long run, the 
financial policies imposed by Whitehall upon the Government of India 
proved detrimental. Moreover, the policies hardened the feeling of 
Indian nationalists against both London and Delhi. This further 
impeded recovery by ruling out any joint action by Government and 
Indian business. The extent to which recovery was impeded by the 
over—cautious financial and currency policies of the Government of 
India will be made more clear in the sectoral discussions of the 
Indian economy which follow.
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CHAPTER POUR
Agriculture and the Depression: A Case Study of Bihar and Orissa
Within India, the role of agriculture cannot be over-estimated. In 
1931, over 70 per cent of the population depended upon the agricultural 
sector for its livelihood. As we have seen in the previous chapter, the 
health of government revenues also depended largely upon the health of 
the agricultural sector. For provincial governments, land revenue 
provided the largest source of finance and even Central Government 
through its dependence upon customs revenue, felt the impact of 
changing agricultural fortunes. In the depression, els imports declined, 
the Government of India began to seek new or enhanced excise duties on 
agricultural exports, for instance the Rs 5 crores from jute export 
duties. A decline in agricultural incomes would also place a 
limitation on the demand for Indian industrial products. Thus, the 
impact of the slump on the agricultural sector would have had far- 
reaching implications for the Indian economy in general.
Over the years, several major studies have concluded that by 
1921, Indian agriculture was facing an impending crisis with output 
failing to keep pace with population increases. Before considering the 
specific impact of the depression, we need to assess these studies of 
the long-term sector trends in Indian agriculture.
156
Population Pressure and Trends in Productivity
Arguably, the most significant influence on the agricultural 
sector in India was the pattern of population growth. In the 
nineteenth century overall population density was low, and population 
growth was small in comparison with other Asian countries due to 
periodic mortality crises.1 During the inter-war period, however, 
there were no major famines or epidemics, although these continued to 
occur regularly in localised areas. Death rates correspondingly began 
to decline, particularly for infant mortality, and population growth 
increased dramatically.2 Between 1921 and 1931 and 1931 to 1941, 
population in India grew by 10.6 per cent and 15 per cent
respectively.3 This was a phenomenal increase in absolute terms: 34
million between 1921-31 alone.4 With over 70 per cent of the Indian 
population dependent upon agriculture this rapid upsurge in population 
placed a fundamental strain upon agricultural resources.
Before the outbreak of the First World War, at the all-India
level, both acreages and output seem to have at least kept pace with 
population growth, although doubts have been cast about the performance 
of agriculture in Bombay and Bengal from 1900.5 Since there was 
little development of new techniques or technology before 1914 outwith 
a few areas such as Northern Punjab, it seems likely that any increase 
in agricultural productivity was through the extension of acreage 
rather than the intensification of cultivation. American agricultural 
economists have argued recently that, outwith areas in which 
improvements in irrigation were made during the early twentieth
century, the optimum geographical limit to the extension of Indian
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agriculture had been reached by the turn of the century. Land that was 
coming into use in the inter-war period was marginal land or the 
cultivation of former grazing areas, a sign of growing population 
pressure.6
Most commentators have argued that, in the inter-war period, this 
rapid population growth was not matched by increased productivity. 
Indeed, it is argued, that pressure on land resources was resulting in 
declining productivity. Thus, in the early 1960s, Sivasubramonian 
estimated that per capita agricultural productivity in India was 
declining by 0.5 per cent per annum between 1900 and 1945. Meanwhile 
Blyn calculated that the turning point was 1911, after which per capita 
agricultural productivity began to decline by 0.72 per cent per 
annum down to 1946-47.7
Discussion on levels of agricultura 1 productivity are fraught with 
difficulties. For the last three decades much research into Indian 
agriculture has been bogged down in the debate over the accuracy of 
calculations based on official statistics.8 In particular, serious 
doubts have been raised about the accuracy and reliability of output 
figures. Firstly, the final outturn figure of any one year for any one 
crop was based primarily on the estimated deviation from an estimated 
standard crop for each province. This was usually the outcome of at 
least four interim reports on the condition of the crop during the 
season. The results were calculated in percentages of annas. 16 annas 
generally being regarded as the * normal * or standard yield. Thus, a 
fifty per cent yield would be described as an 8 annas crop • Such a 
system was obviously open to inaccuracy due to the rounding up or down 
of figures to percentages of annas. The accuracy of the Standard
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yield is also open to question. Even if it was measured by a crop- 
cutting experiment, it would be conducted on a government experimental 
farm or research stations under conditions far removed from those in 
the village. Even more fundamentally, yield figures were used as a 
basis for calculation of land revenue and thus offered much scope for 
deliberate inaccuracies both for the increase or evasion of tax. 
Another doubt concerns the ability of the village and lesser district 
officials to actually- carry out the duties of estimating the crops 
accurately.
Thus discussion of productivity in Indian agriculture is 
problematical and rich in controversy. Blyn’s seminal work, for 
instance, was criticised for its reliance upon official yield 
statistics, for the reasons above. Mishra recently attempted to 
rehabilitate Blyn’s calculations by arguing that in a long-term 
analysis the standard deviation would be balanced over time. Islam
also has concluded this in his work on the Punjab and on Bengal. Both
Heston and Carl Pray, however, have re-iterated the arguments about the 
inaccuracy of government statistics. Both argue that official figures 
were under-estimates of actual growth, but they reach ; different 
conclusions. Heston argues for a stability between population increase 
and agricultural output, but Pray concludes that there was a small 
annual per capita rise in output.9 Pray is alone in such a conclusion. 
Both contemporary estimates by Thomas and Mukerjee, and modern 
calculations concur in a trend of declining per capita agricultural
productivity during the inter-war period.1 0
Of course, discussion of changes over time in the level of
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productivity of Indian agriculture remains generalised. For instance,
productivity, it is argued, was declining because of the decreased size
and fragmentation of agricultural holdings created by a rapidly rising
population. It is difficult, however, to assess accurately important
variables such as man-land ratios or number of man-hours spent on
agricultural pursuits in a country for which there are neither accurate 
11
statistics of land-holding, nor of the number of agricultural 
labourers.11 In Bihar, for instance, District Officers insisted that 
not even the managers of the largest zamindars such as the Maharaja of 
Darbhanga knew exactly how much land and which land was owned by their
estates. Equally when conducting census operations in India, British
standards were applied. Thus, normally only males were registered as
agricultural labourers or cultivators of the soil despite numerous
reports of District Officers on the importance of female and child 
labour as part of the family unit.12 Nor have we any accurate 
assessment of the levels of under-employment in rural districts. Both 
contemporary officials and historians have concurred that the level of 
under-employment must have been substantial without quantifying such 
levels.
Thus, we are left with the general conclusion that given the 
stability of total cultivated acreage in India from the early 
twentieth century and the rapid rise in population from 1921, increased 
agricultural productivity could only have occurred through substantial 
investment in new technology and new techniques of production to 
increase yields. There is no evidence that substantial amounts were 
invested in Indian agriculture prior to the depression. It is generally 
agreed that the landlord class of India failed to invest substantially
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in their lands. Such development as took place, for Instance the 
supply of irrigation to tenants in Bihar and Bengal or the distribution 
of seed, was geared towards strengthening the position of the landlord 
vis-a-vis his tenants, e-hiphasisinq the economic weakness of the 
p>easantry.13 Thus it fell to the government to invest in new 
techniques to improve agriculture in India. The Government of India 
invested heavily in large scale irrigation projects which in the 1920s 
reclaimed some 2.5 million acres of former desert in the Punjab and in 
the United Provinces.14 However, such schemes as the Sutlej Valley 
and Sardar Canal Systems and the later Sukkur Barrage in Sind, were 
constructed during the period of high prices in the early 1920s, 
draining the resources of both local and central government. Many 
local officials felt that it would have been more cost-effective to 
concentrate on the supply of tube-wells and the maintenance of 
inundation canals, which still provided over half the total supply of 
irrigated water in 1931.15
Equally, government investment in agricultural research was not 
always adaptable to Indian conditions. While there were some successes 
with new seed varieties, in general much of the research remained 
inapplicable. Experiments remained rooted in the research station, 
apart from some pioneering village demonstrations by Harold Mann in 
Gujarat, so even the improved varieties of seed failed to produce the 
desired results under normal village conditions.16 The improved seeds 
drained nitrogen from the soil more quickly and so yields declined 
after the first two years of use.17 Often new techniques were 
promoted where indigenous techniques were better adapted to local 
conditions, such as the use of iron ploughs which proved too heavy for
161
the ill fed oxen to plough and which had too deep a draught for the 
thin Indian soils. Too often, Indian agricultural officials had been 
trained in Britain with no previous experience of Indian conditions 
whils Indian officials found the path to promotion blocked by these
incomers, as happened even in the Punjab, supposedly the most
enlightened Provincial Agricultural Department.18 When a new
irrigation scheme was opened, there was little effective demonstration 
of new techniques for the cultivators. Islam has argued that the
failure to follow up the settlement of the canal colonies in the Punjab 
with effective propaganda led to a poor crop-mix, for instance the 
continued use of indigenous cotton seed which did not require heavy 
watering.19 As with the general discussion of productivity, estimates 
of investment in Indian agriculture cannot be precise. We can only
talk of the relationship between population, output and investment. It 
seems clear, though, that government investment was not as effective as 
it should have been due to the basic failure to understand Indian 
conditions.
The Onset of the Depression
The depression of 1929, therefore occurred during a period of 
long-term decline in the Indian agricultural sector. Acreage, output
and investment levels were now lagging behind population growth. The 
slump, then, would have been expected to exacerbate the long-term 
decline with investment opportunities being reduced at a time of even 
more rapid population growth. To assess the trend in productivity in 
Indian agriculture during the depression, acreage figures will be 
utilised to overcome the major difficulties in using output figures.
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The problems of under-estimation of crops mentioned earlier were 
exacerbated during the depression since it occurred during a period of 
major political disturbance. Some have argued, for instance, that 
under pressure from Congress, many district officials deliberately 
under-estimated crop yield, to force down revenue demands.20 It is 
acknowledged that the acreage figures also are open to inaccuracy, but 
it is believed that acreage figures were less open to manipulation for 
political purposes than the statistics of crop yields.
The initial impact of the depression was the rapid fall in prices 
of agricultural produce in western India in 1929, although prices 
had been declining slowly since 1925, in common with most primary 
producers. From 1929, however, the slump in prices became 
catastrophic, reducing income levels by 50 per cent and raising the 
real burden of fixed charges. Wheat prices were the first to 
experience major declines in 1929 and this affected other prices in the 
Western districts. In the Punjab, for instance, wheat prices fell by 
one rupee per maund, cotton and oilseeds by two rupees per maund in 
1929-30.21 From late 1929 prices began to fall also in Bombay. 
Meanwhile price levels in the east and south did not fall sharply until 
late 1930 and early 1931. Rice prices in Bihar and Madras and jute 
prices in Bengal fell from late 1930.22 In Bengal, for instance, the 
average harvest price of jute fell by Rs 4-8 per maund in 1930-31, a 
fifty per cent reduction in a single season.23 There was some recovery 
in prices from 1934-35, but it was fitful and only sugar and tea prices 
had reached 1914 levels by 1939.
In most primary producing economies, the cultivators response to 
the pressure of falling prices was to increase productivity in an
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attempt to maintain income levels.24 In India, however, during the 
peak years of the slump, between 1930 and 1935, the all-India net 
cropped area decreased by 0.93 per cent, the figures for which are 
contained in Table 4.1 (over). The quinquennial trend in acreages of 
both foodgrains and commercial crops was downwards, by 1.02 per cent 
and 1.08 per cent respectively. However, these figures have been
distorted by the poorness of the 1934-35 season. Throughout Northern
India the rains were poor: the Punjab Chief Agricultural Officer
reported that there was insufficient water for irrigation even in the 
canal zones. Poor monsoon rain and early frosts restricted winter 
sowings. The figures are also distorted through the impact of the 
earthquake and floods in Bihar during this season.25 Until this 
season, the general trend in foodgrain acreage was upwards, by about 
3.5 per cent. The all-India commercial crop acreage declined between 
1929-30 and 1932-33 because of reduced sowing of jute and cotton. Thus 
cultivators appeared to be switching from commercial crops to foodgrain 
production during the slump.
This switch in crop-mix is borne out if provincial data is
studied. In Bengal, the very sharp price reduction in 1930-31 was 
followed immediately by a halving of land under jute. In its place 
there were increased sowings of autumn rice, grain, wheat, barley and 
jowar. In this Islam is correct to challenge Goswami ’ s assertion that 
there was no change in crop-mix in Bengal during the slump. By 
concentrating only on alternative cash crops, Goswami under—estimated 
the ability of cultivators to switch to other foodgrains when jute 
prices were low.25 While it is true that the acreage of winter rice 
remained stable, the increased acreage of other foodgrains shows price
16A
Table 4LJj. All India Acreages. 1914-1939
Net Cropped 
Area
Fallow Total
Foodgrains
Total 
Cash Crops
1914-15 204,504,550 51,702,722
1917-18 207,436,586 63,143,807
1920-21 212,259,506 61,346,523 186,890,043 50,143,807
1924-25 226,980,248 47,178,964 • 200,827,618 57,268,563
1925-26 225,849,051 49,305,848 196,069,074 58,773,700
1928-29 228,166,096 48,432,503 200,268,668 59,942,180
1929-30 228,160,853 49,113,921 200,018,488 58,407,674
1930-31 229,115,236 49,617,618 202,735,765 57,257,911
1931-32 228,835,924 49,041,627 205,013,960 56,087,629
1932-33 228,057,963 50,692,794 201,462,887 57,096,445
1933-34 232,245,900 47,639,276 206,223,158 59,272,015
1934-35 226,981,194 52,297,242 200,664,931 56,653,270
1935-36a 209,708,385 47,130,560 185,595,449 39,515,985
a
1938-39 209,399,977 48,301,652 186,257,482 60,185,460
Quinquennial percentage change in area
Net cropped 
Area Fallow
Total
Foodgrains
Total 
Cash Crops
1914-15/1917-18b 1.43 2.78
1920-21/1924-25 6.93 -23.09 7.13 14.16
1925-26/1929-30 1.02 0.82 2.01 -0.62
1930-31/1934-35 -0.93 5.40 -1.02 -1.08
1935-36/1938-39 0.02 2.38 0.48 1.12
Notes: a: excludes Burma
b: Season 1918-19 not included because of distorting effects 
of influenza outbreak and monsoon failure coinciding. 
Sources: Statistical Abstract.x. .1918-19 to .1927^ 29> GBPP,
........ Qiri'3610" of "1929-30, Table 180.    “
statistical Abstract.. .1929-3Q tc 1938-39, GBPP,
CMd 6333 of 1941-42, Table 187, pp.498-9.
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responsiveness since wheat and barley prices did not fall as far as 
rice prices and recovered more swiftly. Prices for raw jute began to
rise again after 1933 and cultivators switched back to jute. It was
this response that led the Indian Jute Mills Association to bring 
pressure upon the Government of Bengal to promote restriction of the 
jute crop and a switch to rice cultivation.27
Similar trends are observable in the Punjab. As wheat prices 
declined cultivators switched to lesser foodgrains like jowar and bajra 
and pulses. However, a slight improvement in the price of wheat in
1932-33 after the imposition of an import duty on Australian wheat,
encouraged larger sowings in the following season. Acreage levels were 
maintained as the effect of the import duty stabilised the price of 
Indian wheat. The province’s other major cash crop was cotton. Acreages 
declined steadily until 1932-33 when they were halved, despite a slight 
increase in the domestic price of cotton. The larger decrease in 
acreage was in the new American varieties in the canal zones which 
required heavier irrigation than the indigenous desai variety. While 
the price for American cotton was double that of indigenous varieties, 
the rate of water duties offset the price differential. Some 
cultivators switched to desai cotton, but most switched to maize or 
grain. It was only after a reduction in water rates, recommended by 
the Punjab Abiana Committee in 1933, that cultivation of American 
varieties increased once more.28
In Bombay Presidency cotton acreage declined steadily from 1929 to 
1931. Initially, it seemed that cultivators were changing to
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foodgrains, especially jowar, bajra, gram and pulses.29 However, in 
certain areas cultivators also had alternative cash crops. In Gujarat 
and the Deccan, cultivators switched between cotton and groundnuts. 
Groundnut acreage was increased until 1934, when cotton prices showed 
signs of revival. However two years later when cotton prices began to 
falter, groundnuts again replaced cotton.3 0 Meanwhile around the 
Ahmnedagar sugar factories, sugar cane acreage expanded and in Karia 
cultivators turned to tobacco.31
In the latter half of the 1930s, the all-Indian net cropped area 
recovered only slightly from 226.3 million acres in 1935-36 to 226.7
million acres in 1938-39.32 The acreage left fallow also increased
but this is probably a reflection of growing patterns of land revenue 
collection in the late 1930s. There seems to have been a feeling 
prevalent that the new provincial Congress ministries would not tax
agrarian areas heavily and there seems to have been an increase in
under-reporting by officials.33 Within this, foodgrain acreage 
increased slightly but did not recover to 1929 levels. Wheat acreage 
continued to expand as protection was re-imposed, as did rice acreage 
whenever climate permitted. The acreages of jowar and bajra, however 
remained depressed.
Cash crop production did recover to 1929 levels. Despite the
problems of the jute industry, the acreage of jute crops recovered to 
new record levels and the new oilseed crops continued to expand. Cotton 
acreages grew with the opening of new lands under the Lloyd Barrage 
Scheme which allowed more regular irrigation, thus decreasing the 
likelihood of crop failures. As tobacco prices rose sharply, so did 
acreage especially in Bombay presidency. In general, the increased
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acreage of cash crops reflects the more rapid return to pre-depression 
prices for commercial produce than foodgrain prices which remained 
unstable generally.
The general stability of acreage figures during the depression 
cannot be explained in terms of changes in the pattern of double 
cropping. Although these figures are not given on an all-India level, 
those for four provinces studied, Punjab, Bihar and Orissa, Bombay, and 
Bengal, do not show any marked difference. In each of these provinces, 
the area double-cropped remained about one-sixth of the total cropped 
area throughout the period. By and large any changes are balanced out 
within the same season and are caused by climatic factors, such as low 
rainfall at time of sowing or transplanting, reducing the total acreage 
sown.
Acreage levels during the early 1930s were clearly failing to keep 
pace with population growth. Much of the increase was provided by new 
irrigation schemes in the Punjab, Sind and Madras. Outwith these 
areas, however, it is likely that marginal land brought into 
cultivation in the early 1920s, during the period of high prices, was 
now being left fallow. In the Punjab, for instance, although the 
acreage of total matured crops rose between 1928 and 1934, the acreage 
of failed crops increased also because of a prolonged drought in the 
largely unirrigated Rhotak region.34 In Rhotak, the actual cultivated 
acreage was also decreasing since cultivators did not have the 
technology or techniques to maintain crops on marginal lands at a time 
of drought and the fall in prices made any effort to do so futile. 
Again, the stability of acreage of fodder crops hints at marginal lands
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going out of cultivation. With the increase of livestock it seems 
clear that marginal lands were reverting to grazing areas.
Thus, it seems that the conclusions of Sivasubramonian amd Blyn 
are borne out. To have met the needs of the growing population without 
a corresponding increase in acreage, agricultural productivity would 
have had to be raised substantially, which would have necessitated 
investment in the means of production. This did not occur. Thus the 
long-term structural trends apparent during the 1920s of declining per 
capita agricultural productivity continued into the 1930s, altered 
little by the short-term down-turn of the slump. When the price falls 
were most marked there was a short-term switch from the cultivation of 
commercial crops back to foodgrains, which was the traditional response 
under such conditions. These changes, however, remained part of the 
long-term structural pattern of agriculture decline in India with 
overall stability of total cultivated acreage despite the rapid 
increase in population. The depression did not provide an opportunity 
to break this long-term pattern since the reduction in income brought 
about by falling prices mitigated against sufficient fresh investment 
in agricultural technology and techniques of production needed to 
decisively increase productivity of Indian agriculture. Indeed the 
difficulties faced by cultivators in paying their rent and revenue 
demands led to the alienation of land and an increase in share-cropping 
which further reduced incentives for the investment in new 
techniques.3 5
However, while the depression did not mark a watershed in terms of 
the structural development of Indian agriculture, it had a pronounced 
impact on agrarian society. There is a new stress in several recent
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studies on the depression acting as a catalyst ending traditional
relationships in rural areas and even paving the way for
decolonisation. Thus, Baker, in his study of Madras, declared, 'the 
depression of the 1930s was not simply a dramatic drop of price and 
demand. Rather it signalled on the one hand the beginning of the end 
for the colonial economy, and on the other the collapse of the rural 
pillars supporting the colonial state. ’3 6
In such studies the depression is said to have acted as a catalyst 
in two key ways. Firstly, increased land alienation weakened the
position of tenants vis-a-vis their landlords and thus contributed to a 
rise in rural agitation during the 1930s, not least rural support for 
the Congress Party. Secondly, and inter-related with the causes of 
land alienation, there was a contraction of cash credit in rural areas 
as the traditional agencies for the transmission of money from urban 
to rural areas broke down. Conclusions such as these have been reached 
in work on Bengal, the Punjab, Madras and Bombay.37 As such, the
conclusions have emerged from studies of those provinces most tightly 
integrated into the international economy through trade in agricultural 
cash crops such as jute, cotton and wheat, and therefore those most at 
the mercy of external dislocations such as the slump of 1929. In the 
next section, therefore it is proposed to test these conclusions in a 
study of Bihar and Orissa, one of the poorest areas in India and not so 
highly integrated into the export sector • The discussion of Bihar and 
Orissa relies heavily on the model of the agrarian economy and society 
adopted by Bose in his major study of Bengal. Firstly, this reflects 
the length of time Bihar and Orissa had been incorporated into the 
Bengal Presidency and the extent to which they shared common features
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such as the Permanent Settlement and rural legislation. More 
importantly, Bose ’ s study of Bengal provides one of the best
expositions of the agrarian economy and the process of rural 
commercialisation. It does not rely simply on a typology of crop
production but includes ecological, social and demographic factors to 
analyse the regional variations within the Bengal Presidency. Thus, 
for instance, Bose differentiates between two main systems of tenancy- 
holding within the jute-growing districts which were affected by the 
depression in different ways. Of course, the following discussion does
not purport to be as in-depth an analysis of Bihar and Orissa as that
of Bose. Nor will it attempt an analysis of the 'dynamics of small- 
peasant production’ as Shahid Amin has supplied for the sugarcane 
districts of Eastern United Provinces.38 The study, instead, focusses 
on three key areas of the agrarian economy of Bihar and Orissa, the 
landlord-tenant relationship, the market structure and mechanisms for 
credit transmission and discusses the process of commercialisation in 
the province and the impact of the depression on these factors.
Bihar and Orissa: The Land and People
The province of Bihar and Orissa was created in 1923 when it was 
separated from Bengal, and existed for a mere 13 years before Orissa 
itself was separated in 1936. In 1931, Bihar and Orissa contained the 
second largest provincial population in India, amounting to just under 
38 million, of whom over 80 per cent were dependent upon agriculture.39 
The figures for the urban and rural populations are given in Table 4.2 
(over).
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Bihar and Orissa was split into three distinct geographical, 
cultural and linguistic areas. In the north of the province, Bihar 
proper consisted of the rich alluvial soils of the Indo-Ganjetic Plain. 
Less than 250 feet above sea level, many parts of Bihar proper were
Table 4.2: Population of Bihar and Orissa in 1931
Urban Rural
Bihar 1,152,117 24,575,383
Orissa 191,429 5,114,713
Chota Nagpur 310,291 6,333,643
Total 1,653,831 36,023,739
Source: Census of India, 1931, Volume VII, Part I, Chapter 1.
prone to flooding particularly the Northern districts dominated by the 
Kosi River which changed its course annually. The population was 
largely Hindu, apart from Purnea district which contained a large 
Muslim minority. Four upper castes dominated the Bihari community: the 
Maithil Brahmins, Bhumihar Brahmins, Rajputs and Kayastnas. To the 
south the Chota Nagpur Plateau was a region of hills and jungles and 
valley enclaves populated largely by tribal groups. The region had 
poor communications and yet was also the area of greatest mineral 
wealth, including coal, iron ore, wolfram and mica. The isolation of 
these natural resources helps to explain why their exploitation brought 
little benefit to the province as a whole, as suggested by Rothermund 
in his study of the Jharia coalfield.40 The districts of Orissa were 
separated from the rest of the province by the Feudatory States. 
British control was limited predominantly to three districts along the
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coast, Balasore, Cuttack and Puri. The Oriya speaking population had 
little in common with the Biharis and felt that their needs were 
subordinated to those of the densely populated northern territories. 
Orissan political leaders continually petitioned for a separate 
province to be created, which resulted in the weakening of the non­
official representation in the Bihar Legislative Council.41
The agricultural season in Bihar and Orissa was divided into three 
harvests. The bhadai harvest, principally autumn rice and maize was 
sown in May-June and harvested in August to September. In Chota Nagpur 
and the Sambalpur and Angul Divisions of Orissa autumn rice was the 
principal crop. The aghani, the major winter rice crop of the rest of 
the province, was sown in mid-June and harvested in December. This crop 
depended on a good monsoon to prepare the ground and sufficient rain in 
August to allow transplanting. The third harvest was the spring or 
rabi crop of wheat, oilseeds, summer rice, barley and grain. These 
crops needed good rain in January, but could be damaged if rain 
continued into February or March.
Rice was the dominant crop grown on 80 per cent of cultivated 
land. As can be seen from the map (over), the districts were divided 
only by the importance of the winter or autumn rice crop. While the 
Orissan districts were predominantly monocultural, in Bihar proper 
wheat, barley and maize were also cultivated widely as marketable 
foodgrains • Acreage devoted to cash crops was only a small proportion 
of total acreage. In the nineteenth century indigo cultivated on 
European managed plantations had been the major cash crop. However 
the rise of synthetic substitutes killed the indigo trade and 
plantation owners in Champa ran and Saran turned to sugarcane for gur
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production. Jute was cultivated chiefly in Purnea, in North East 
Bihar. In the Chota Nagpur districts of Ranchi, Palamau and Singhbhum, 
autumn rice was the dominant crop with shellac as the major cash 
commodity or sabai grass for export to the Bengal paper mills.42
Three quarters of the population was concentrated on the Gangetic 
Plains of North and South Bihar. Here a well-developed system of 
inundation canals supported a high population density. In most 
districts of North Bihar, population density per square mile was over 
900 in 1931, for instance 970 in Muzzafarpur District. Population 
density decreased to under 100 per square mile in Chota Nagpur as a 
whole but population was more dense in the valley areas. By 1931 the 
rising population of Bihar had placed a heavy strain on agricultural 
resources. It had been estimated that an economic holding in Bihar 
would be five acres, but statistics in the Census Report of 1931 showed 
the average to be only 3.1 acres per family.4 3
Bihari agriculture was dominated by the Permanent Settlement. 
Only the government estates (or khas mahal) in North Bihar and the 
Santal Parganas were temporarily settled, which amounted to just one— 
sixth of the cultivated area of Bihar and Chota Nagpur. Since the 
Permanent Settlement in Bihar had been at a more realistic level than 
the earlier settlement in Bengal, there had not been the large 
alienation of land from large zamindars that had occurred in Bengal.44 
Thus Bihari agriculture and politics were dominated by large zamindars 
such as the Maharaja of Darbhanga and the Hutwa Raj in Saran and 
Champa ran. Under these was the important stratum of smaller landlords, 
of whom MacDonald has argued, it was difficult to differentiate between
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the smaller zamindar and the large tenant, and often were both owners 
of their own small plot of land while renting land from the estates of 
the larger zamindars. The Congress Party in Bihar was dominated, by 
these petty zamindars and larger tenants.45
Batai (rent based on the division of the actual crop) had been the 
traditional rental system in Bihar, but increasingly since the turn of 
the century this had been replaced by danabandi or rent based on the 
estimated crop. In the 1920s danabandi rentals in kind in the Tirhut 
and Bhagalpur Divisions of North Bihar had begun to be commuted to cash 
rents, based on the market value of the estimated crop, therefore at 
the maximum price of the crop. Tenancy legislation in Bihar set 
maximum limits to the enhancement of rent, but with prices generally at 
a high level in the 1920s, the commuted rents were significantly higher 
than the produce rentals previously paid. During the 1920s, however, 
tenants were anxious to commute their produce rents to reserve as much 
as their crop as possible for sale at the high prevailing prices.46
As in parts of Bengal, Bihari zamindars retained part of their 
lands as demesne (zirat land).47 However, under Bihari tenancy 
legislation, if a tenant cultivated zirat land for three years 
continuously, the cultivator became entitled to an hereditary tenancy 
on the land and the land then became assessed as bakasht. This 
differentiated the tenancy system in Bihar from that prevailing in most 
of Bengal where the tenant had no customary rights.48 This was a major 
source of grievance to Bihari zamindars who tabled annual motions to 
the Bihar legislative Council to change the law.49
Traditionally in Chota Nagpur, the zirat or demesne land had been
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cultivated by attached or bonded labour (kamiya) . Kamiya was the 
dominant system in tribal areas where for a payment of between Rs 50 
to Rs 100 the labourer became ’attached’ to the landlord until he had 
worked off his debt. The demesne then had priority over the labourer’s 
own land at the time of sowing, transplanting and harvesting.50 
Usually the reason for accepting kamiya was to gain money to repay 
other debts.51 There is some debate over the extent to which Kamiya 
broke down during the inter-war period. Binay Chaudhuri suggested that 
the kamiya began to be transformed into a casual labour force but 
Daniel Thomer argued that the system continued until the independence 
period. Certainly reports of District Officers continued to mention the 
prevalence of kamiya labour in the depression, fearing its extension.52
The British districts of Orissa were the most densely populated of 
the Oriyan-speaking districts. Here the land was dominated by small 
landowners both in the small permanently and larger temporarily settled 
areas. Over 90 per cent of these landlords paid land revenue of less 
than Rs 500 per annum and, as one Orissan politician admitted, ’call 
themselves landlords only to have some moral control over the 
surrounding labour force. But, in fact, they are all so many peasant 
proprietors ’.5 3 The growing similarity between small zamindar and 
large tenant was because, as in Bihar proper, tenants who cultivated 
nijchas land (zamindar’s land) for three years, obtained hereditary 
occupancy rights • In British Orissa the average size of holdings was 
only 2.5 acres per family. This resulted in a system similar to Kamiya 
developing in Orissa. However, unlike their counterparts in Bihar, 
there was a tradition of Kamiya emigration to the Assam tea gardens or 
to Calcutta. The system of recruitment to the Assam tea gardens was a
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variation on kamiya. the cultivator accepting an advance which he would 
repay by labouring in Assam. Generally, the smallness of holdings in 
Orissa made it difficult to pay rent and it has been suggested that the 
advances paid to the plantation labourers was used to pay rent.5 4 The 
agrarian system in Orissa, as in Bihar itself, was therefore vulnerable 
to price and credit dislocations as was to happen in the depression.
Markets and Credit Structures
In 1931 communications throughout the province of Bihar and Orissa 
were poor. In eastern India railway lines radiated from Calcutta and 
to travel from Patna in Bihar or Ranchi in Chota Nagpur (the winter and 
summer capitals of the province) to Cuttack in Orissa meant a journey 
via Calcutta. A trunk road linking Bihar and Orissa was begun during 
the 1920s but was halted in the middle of the Chota Nagpur jungles, a 
victim of the retrenchment measures of 1932.55 In Bihar itself, the 
northern districts were cut off from the south by the River Ganges 
over which there were few bridges. Thus, until the late 1920s the 
communications network was poor and markets remained isolated.
It was only in the latter half of the 1920s that the extension of 
the local road network began to link some of the principal markets. 
The majority of roads were unmetalled and only usuable during the dry 
season but were sufficient to promote the expans ion of road transport, 
both for passengers and produce. Between 1925 and 1930 the number of 
motor cars and buses registered in the province doubled and the number 
of bicycles sold nearly tripled.56 Such was the increase in road 
transportation that there were complaints about the slump in sales of 
elephants for transport at the annual fair in Saran.57 In 1930
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Mansfield wrote of the remarkable development in road traffic in 
recent years on account of the coming of the motor bus, which is found 
penetrating in the dry months the most out-of-the-way places, on tracks 
which are hardly recognisable els roads."58
There was a major market in every district specialising in the 
produce of the area. Thus the Manufganj market in the Sadr sub­
division of Patna District, dealt in maize, Dinapore also in Patna in 
barley, Nawada in Gaya in wheat and all dealt in rice. The principal 
markets in Orissa such as Chandbali in Balasore District and Khurda in 
Puri specialised solely in rice, a sign of the lack of alternate cash 
crops in Orissa. In local districts there were rice markets every 6 
miles and a larger market with warehouse facilities run by the Arthaiya 
(wholesale) merchant every 15 miles wherever there was a connection to 
a metalled road or railway branch line. Most of the rice trade was 
carried on by arthaiyas operating in these secondary markets and there 
does not appear to have been such a complicated network of 
intermediaries as in the jute trade in Bengal or in the wheat trade of 
Punjab. There was, of course, more dealers involved between secondary 
and terminal markets but since it was estimated that only 30 per cent 
of the Bihar rice crop passed through extra-provincial dealers, the 
commissions paid to such dealers had less impact on the internal price 
of rice within the province.59
In the jute and sugar regions, prior to the depression, trade was 
conducted by intermediaries to a greater extent. The larger European 
sugar factories tended to use large zamindars or the European 
plantation agents in Champaran as intermediaries with local tenants
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through which the Banking Commission estimated cultivators received a 
fair price. The Saran factories also purchased the sugar crops through 
intermediaries, purchasing the crop either directly from the cultivator 
or through the arthaiya at the secondary local market. As an increased 
number of Indian entrepreneurs entered the sugar industry, however, 
they purchased directly from the cultivators through dadani or advances 
which managers declared secured both cultivation and delivery of the 
crop to the factory.60 In the jute trade also the crop was purchased 
by intermediaries using dadani, usually local managers acting for 
beparis (travelling salesmen) who were acting for Bengali merchants. 
Thus, by its nature, the jute trade involved the most complex marketing 
and credit structures of all the crops in the province. In Champaran a 
co-operative jute sale society was established in the late 1920s to act 
between cultivators and traders giving cultivators a guaranteed rate of 
Rs 7 per maund.61 However the jute trade of Champaran was only a small 
fragment of a trade whose main centre was in Purnea.
Throughout Bihar and Orissa, reliant as it was on essentially 
mono—culture, indebtedness was chronic. The 1930 Banking Enquiry 
estimated the average debt per family in Bihar and Orissa was Rs 282 
against Rs 160 in Bengal.62 Most of the credit in Bihar was given by 
landlords to tenants, with the Mahajans generally providing the credit 
for the zamindars. The landlords, particularly the strong, large 
zamindars of North Bihar, attempted to keep the links between 
professional moneylenders and their tenants at a minimum, fearing the 
mahajan would gain occupancy rights through alienation and thus reduce 
the hold of the landlord over his tenant.6 3
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The Depression in Bihar and Orissa
The first impact of the slump in Bihar and Orissa came with the 
fall in rice prices in late 1930. In Bihar and Chota Nagpur the 
average price of winter rice fell by Rs 2 to Re 1 per maund while in 
Orissa the average price slumped to Rs 2-5 per maund. There was a 
similar reduction in the price of autumn rice. In the following season 
prices slumped even lower, winter rice averaging only Rs 1-13 in 
Orissa.64 The impact of the depression in Bihar and Orissa will be 
discussed first in terms of output and prices and then in its effects 
on the agrarian relationships in the province.
Table 4.3 (over) shows the trends in acreage during the inter-war 
period. In the 1920s, despite the rising population, total net 
cultivated acreage increased by only 1.3 per cent, while it fell by 2.4 
per cent in the 1930s. Any discussion of changing trends in 
agricultural production in Bihar and Orissa is even more problematical 
than described earlier in relation to all-Indian statistics. As early 
as 1937, after the separation with Orissa, Bihari officials were 
admitted that there was some under-estimation of acreage (0.2 per cent) 
but over-estimation of yield figures.65 In 1949, the Indian Council 
for Agricutural Research estimated that between i944 and 1949 acreages 
of rice and wheat were under-estimated by 30 and 20 per cent 
respectively.66 Blyn has suggested that this reflected the higher 
incidence of permanently settled areas in Bihar where officials would 
rely on Chaukidars (village policemen/watchmen) rather than Patwaris 
(land recorders) to provide crop estimates.6 7 The large under­
estimation recorded by the ICAR, however, covers a period of major
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breakdown in official collaboration in Bihar in the wake of the Quit 
India Movement and the post-war political problems. Therefore the 
distortion estimated by local District Officers of only 2 per cent
Table 4.3: Bihar and Orissa - Cron Acreages
Net Area Current Total Total Cash
Sown Fallow Foodgrains Crops
1920-21 24,794,700 5,887,936 26,511,400 4,426,800
1924-25 24,897,000 6,010,559 25,943,400 4,543,400
1925-26 24,745,300 5,941,810 25,726,200 4,484,900
1929-30 24,958,400 5,837,547 25,930,600 4,455,700
1930-31 24,470,900 6,339,268 25,066,900 4,716,600
1934-35 24,131,800 6,931,605 24,932,760 4,614,500
1935-36 23,180,700 8,052,765 23,593,800 4,479,700
1939-40 24,439,255 8,515,564 25,391,254 4,482,987
Percentage Change in Acreage
Net Area Current Total Total Cash
Sown Fallow Foodgrains Crops
1920-21/
1924-25 0.36 2.08 -2.14 2.63
1925-26/
1929-30 0.86 -1.75 0.79 -0.65
1930-31/
1934/35 -1.38 9.34 -0.53 -2.16
1935-36/
1939-40 -1.05 5.74 7.62 0.07
Source: Calculated from Statistics in The Crop and Season Reports of
Bihar and Orissa (Patna, annual).
in acreages is probably a more accurate reflection of the situation in 
the 1930s and, thus, these figures have been accepted as showing 
genuine trends in acreage in the period.
Immediately noticeable in Table 4.3 is the decrease in net cropped 
area and the rise in fallow. Since the agrarian system in Bihar was
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already under stress in the pre-depression period, the rise in fallow 
probably reflects the reduction of cultivation on marginal lands, now 
no longer profitable to cultivate. This is also suggested by the 
decline in acreage given over to fodder crops. Some of this rise in 
fallow was possibly grazing land reverting to its original purpose. In 
Bihar in the depression quinquennium there does not seem to be a 
switch from cash crop production to foodgrain production. Total cash 
crop acreage declined due to the fall in jute acreage which was greater 
than the rise in sugar acreage. In the post-depression years, however, 
there is a definite rise in acreage given over to foodgrains of nearly 
8 per cent. Some of this was marginal lands once more being cultivated 
under the stimulus of a rising population. In north Bihar for instance 
population density rose from 900 per square acre in 1931 to between 
1,000 and 1,500 in 1941.68
The relationship between acreage and prices can be seen in graphs 
1-4 (over). Here the acreage has been plotted against the average
harvest price in the local principal markets with a one year time lag 
(ie 1931-32 average is plotted against 1930-31 prices). This is
obviously a crude measurement of price responsiveness but it does
reveal some interesting trends. There is a close relationship between 
the price and acreage of winter rice. However, acreage of both gram 
nr>d sugar continued to rise despite falling prices from 1929—30. 
Meanwhile for jute, acreage and price both decline well below pre­
depression levels • This seems to bear out Narain s conclusions on the 
nature of price responsiveness of the Indian peasantry that the 
cultivator responds to the relative profitability between crops.88 
Thus, while sugar prices were declining they were still higher than
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those for jute, leading to a switch from jute cultivation in Champaran 
to more extensive sugar cultivation. Even in Purnea, the major jute 
growing area of Bihar, there was some switch to sugar. Of course price 
is not the only consideration. Jute needed heavier irrigation than 
sugarcane and the years between 1930 and 1934 produced a string of 
below average monsoons. Also jute was a more labour intensive crop 
normally necessitating the hiring of additional labour.70 During the 
depression, as will be discussed later, many cultivators attempted to 
turn back to family resources of labour.
Narain has suggested that variations in rainfall were important 
for foodgrains rather than cash crop production which responded to 
profit incentives.71 In Bihar and Orissa, though, not only jute 
cultivation depended upon favourable climatic conditions, moist and 
humid, but winter rice, grown both as a foodgrain and a cash crop, 
depended heavily upon good rains for both sowing and transplanting. 
This also contradicts Blyn’s assertion that in Bihar from 1930 there 
was little correlation between rainfall and the pattern of cropping. 
Blyn correlated the Patna rainfall index with the All-Bihar acreage and 
output.72 However between 1930 and 1935 the monsoon in Bihar was very 
variable even between districts. The Patna district experienced either 
‘average’ or 'above average’ rainfall during this period while to the 
north there was a prolonged drought from 1930, as occurred in parts of 
Orissa too. In Chota Nagpur also, the acreage of winter rice in Ranchi, 
the principal growing area, also declined markedly in the early 1930s 
due to insufficient rain (284,700 acres in 1932—33 compared to 621,000 
in 1935-36).73 Therefore, in Bihar and Orissa price incentives were 
important only when climatic conditions allowed, due to the dependence
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of agriculture on inundation canals as a source of irrigation through 
most of the province.
Recently, Rothermund has highlighted another interesting aspect of 
the price relationship during the depression. He suggests that during 
the depression, price differentials re-emerged not only between 
provinces but at district levels also. These price differentials, 
common in the nineteenth century, had been assumed to have evened out 
with the spread of commercialisation, particularly in relation to the 
development of the railway network and the creation of a national 
market. Rothermund suggested that the traditional pattern re-asserted 
itself due to the sudden withdrawal of credit and the breakdown of 
marketing systems which 'led to panic sales of all stocks, so that even 
the slightest variations in the local market would be immediately 
reflected in the current price’. However, this was 'typical only for 
the time when the immediate impact of the depression was felt, and the 
local traders and moneylenders were completely flabbergasted and did 
not know how to manage the market any longer’. After the first few 
years of the depression the variations were reduced, presumably as 
traders adjusted to the new conditions7 4 .
Within Bihar and Orissa, however, the pattern was different. Due 
to the poor communications in the province and the disjointed linkages 
of the credit mechanism, there were wide fluctuations of prices of 
basic produce within the same district throughout the 1920s. It was 
only the extension of the road network that began to break down the 
rural isolation of Bihar and Orissa. There was only a slow growth of 
urbanisation in the province so that there was little stimulus to
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traders to build up extensive credit networks linking town and 
countryside. Thus, for instance, the population of the four major 
towns of the region was small: Patna had a population of 159,690,
Bhagalpur (the silk weaving centre) had 83,847, Darbhanga 60,676 and 
Cuttack, the principal town of Orissa, only 65,263.75 Mostly they 
remained largely artisan/small workshop based with little connection to 
their hinterlands. For instance, out of 1443 retail outlets detailed in 
the 1931 Census, only 9 were wholesale traders.76 Similarly in 
Singhbhum, the centre of modem industrial development in Bihar, there 
was little connection with the hinterland.77
Thus, during the depression, Bihar and Orissa was still going 
through the process of creating an integrated provincial market. 
Indeed, even by 1936 with the separation of Orissa there was little 
linkage between the two halves of Bihar. At a district level, however, 
the coming of the roads did help to reduce the marked variations in 
price. For instance, the maximum and minimum harvest price of grain in 
Patna in 1927-28 was Rs 5-6 per maund and Rs 4-12 respectively, yet by 
1933 there was only one anna of a difference in price.78 In Tirhut 
the stabilisation in grain prices was even more marked. There the 
minimum and maximum price p>er maund in 1928—29 was Rs 5-0 and Rs 6—13: 
by 1932-33 it was Rs 2-14 and Rs 3-0 respectively. There was a similar 
pattern in all the major crops of a reduction in provincial variation, 
although in some crops the gap was never closed as much as in gram. 
Thus, for instance, the minimum and maximum prices of winter rice in 
Bhagalpur Division in 1928-29 were Rs 5-6 and Rs 8-0 respectively which 
had been reduced to Rs 2-12 to Rs 3-8 per maund in 1933-34. As early 
as mid-1932, R. Williams, a senior ICS official in Bihar, wrote:
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The revolution in methods of transport and the improved roads 
have broken down the isolation of rural districts: trade
circulates more freely and prices as between one district and 
another are slowly being levelled although there is still a big 
difference between the price of rice in the dearest and 
cheapest districts. The cultivator is now much more sensitive 
than he used to be to the fluctuations of distant markets.’79
Thus, in Bihar and Orissa despite the depression the process 
of commercialisation of the region continued, if at a somewhat slower 
pace in the more backward regions of Chota Nagpur and Orissa. From 
1934 the pace of commercialisation increased as money began to be spent 
once more on road construction. In 1931 Bihar and Orissa had 28,076 
miles of road, by 1935-36 it had 32,533 miles.80 During the slump, 
then, in Bihar and Orissa, the pace of commercialisation slackened 
slightly but the market network continued to increase despite falling 
incomes and a curtailment of credit. Partly this was through the 
impact of new cash crops such as sugarcane or old cash crops sold more 
extensively such as sesame oil. In fact, by 1935 Bihar was beginning 
to create price disequilibrium in neighbouring districts of the United 
Provinces. By then it became clear that North Bihar was producing more 
sugarcane than needed by local mills, therefore Bihari sugarcane was 
sold cheaply in the eastern United Provinces helping to depress the 
price there further, and creating an increase in price disequilibrium 
in there districts.81
It seems that productivity of agriculture in Bihar and Orissa was 
failing to keep pace with population. Blyn argues that the decline in 
yields per acre was greater in Bihar and Orissa between 1930 and 1935 
than in Bengal. He explains this partly through the use of sugarcane 
cultivation on the better lands used previously for rice cultivation, 
but since this involved only 4 per cent of the total rice production,
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he admitted that 'we need another explanation’.82 Although Blyn
discounts the effect of climatic changes in the 1930s in Bihar, they 
were important. In the first two years of the depression rice yields 
were increasing, as they had been doing in the 1920s, with a bumper 
harvest in 1929-30. Blyn’s downturn in rice yields coincides with the 
beginning of a series of natural calamities in Bihar. The monsoons 
from 1931 were patchy with many areas facing drought, the earthquake of 
1934 caused devastation to the areas of Muzzaffapur, Darbhanga and
Pumea the chief rice growing areas of Bihar proper, while Blyn’s year 
of lowest yield, 1935-36, marked a year when the pre-monsoon, monsoon 
and the hathia (winter) rains all failed in succession causing a 
decline in both acreage sown and yields eventually produced.83 In an 
area, then, of high population density dependent largely upon 
inundation canals for irrigation and with the lowest government 
spending per head of population (Rs 1-8 in Bihar and Orissa, compared 
to Rs 5-4 in Punjab and Rs 8-3 in Bombay), the agricultural system
was dependent to a very high degree on the nature of the season.84 It
was the combination of climatic problems resulting in poor harvest and 
the depression in prices which proved disastrous for Bihar and Orissa. 
In a period of harvest failure prices would normally rise. However the 
slump depressed prices, and the combination halved the incomes of local 
cultivators.85 It comes as no surprise, then, that the only crop to 
significantly increase its yield was sugarcane. While cane prices also 
declined, up to 1935—36 at least the price reduction was not as great 
as that for jute or tobacco. Sugarcane needed less irrigation since 
Biharis used indigenous varieties of seed and cane required less labour 
to cultivate than jute or tobacco. Thus, despite its longer growing
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season which necessitated giving up either a portion of the bhadai or 
rabi harvest, there were still incentives to grow sugarcane, in 
particular, as we shall see, in light of the credit mechanism.
Overall, then, although it is difficult to discuss more than 
trends and the relationship between population, prices and 
output/acreage, agriculture in Bihar and Orissa was passing though a 
crisis in the early 1930s due to the combination of a failure of the 
monsson and the disaster of the earthquake and the impact of the 
depression in reducing prices and incomes of cultivators. As a poor 
province, Bihar and Orissa was dependent upon good climatic conditions 
and the monsoon failures of the early 1930s exacerbated the crisis of 
the slump. The impact of this dual crisis on agrarian relationships 
will now be assessed.
Zamindars, Mahajans and the Cultivator
After the fall in prices in late 1930, the second major impact of 
the slump was the collapse of credit within Bihar and Orissa, both from 
mahajans and from zamindars. The Administration Report of 1930-31 was 
already describing the wariness of mahajans to lend even to large 
landowners, though it was believed that the slump would prove to be 
only a temporary phenomena.86 Until mid—1932, however, the 
restriction of credit was alleviated by the use of savings in the form 
of gold to meet rentals and debt payments as reported by C. Philip, the 
Commissioner of Orissa Division and Scott, Commissioner of Tirhut 
Division in North Bihar.87 The Government of Bihar and Orissa was 
aware of the gold sales but failed to realise their significance. In 
the absence of the large scale agitation that was occurring in the
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United Provinces or the terrorist attacks in Bengal, J. Hubback from 
the Executive Council reported back to the Government of India in 
August 1932:
'The rural population has stood up well on the whole, to the 
changed circumstances up to the present, It is, for 
instance, significant that the Ranchi cultivator has paid 
without any pressure at all practically the whole costs of 
the settlement operation in that district, though there is 
some evidence that small hoards of rupees, which had accrued 
during the boom in tea prices, were drawn upon for this 
purpose. ’8 8
The district collectors, however, were aware that such hoards 
represented the last resource of the cultivators. Many reported that 
these hoards were small and exhausted by 1932 after only two 
seasons.89 There is no evidence in Bihar of bullion dealers setting 
up mofussil branch offices to collect gold as occurred in the United 
Provinces and parts of Bengal.90 In Bihar, cultivators were depleting 
their savings to meet their rent and debt burdens and to pay for 
necessities, not to make a profit through the higher value of gold.
Such distress was exacerbated in 1932 with the first impact of the 
monsoon failures. In North Bihar in particular, the rabi had failed 
and there was insufficient rain for sowing and planting the bhadai and 
next aghani crops. In these regions of greatest population density, 
holdings had been sub-divided into small plots and many depended on 
agricultural labour to supplement their incomes. Now at the busiest 
time of the year, there was little work for agricultural labourers. Nor 
was there the recourse to migration traditionally pursued in bad years 
to Calcutta or to the Bengali jute districts. Indeed, with the slump 
in the Bengali jute trade, cultivators there were turning to family
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resources and there was an exodus of Bihari labourers back to their 
villages from the Bengali districts such as Mymemsingh and Dacca.91 Not 
only was there the return of emigrants, thus increasing competition for 
agricultural labour in Bihar, but there was consequently a reduction in 
the amount of remittances coming from Bengal, a double blow to poor 
Bihari families.92 There was a similar problem in Orissa as 
emigration to Calcutta began to dry up and recruitment to the Assam tea 
gardens was restricted.93 The remittances to Bihar and Orissa from 
outwith the province, which had been rising steadily from Rs 7,63 
lakhs in 1925-26 to a peak of Rs 8,57 lakhs in 1928-29 slumped, within 
two years to Rs 6,98 by 1930-31 and declined further to Rs 4,00 lakhs 
by the mid-1930s.94
In the face of the distress created by the joint dislocation of 
depression and monsoon failure in 1930, district officials returned to 
the tried and tested method of opening test works and distributing 
taccavi (agricultural loans at 6V 2 per cent).95 Local officials were 
able to persuade some large zamindars, such as the Darbhanga Raj, to
open similar relief works. The desperation of the situation in the
Tirhut Division was such that in Muzaffarpur alone over 8,000 labourers 
turned out to work in the various relief operations at a rate of only 
Re 0-1-6 per day paid in grain or cash. The District Engineer for 
Muzaffapur reported back to Scott that:
'There are miles of fields ploughed up without any crops and 
seedlings of paddy and all drying up due to no rains... I 
had expected about 900 men to turn up in total for work at 
three centres but we got 3,000 men instead on the very first 
day... When I told them that if the pay was not suitable they
need not work as I was not forcing them to do so, they
replied that as they were starving they were compelled to 
scccpt any employment. Hundreds of these men were begging 
me to give them even three pies at once as they were starving
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for one to four days each. This sight that they presented 
was really pitiable. ’9 6
Such reports from local officials tended to fall on deaf 
ears at government level. Thus J. Whitty of the Board of Revenue 
declared that he had provided Rs 5,000 to aid the situation in Tirhut 
but that he was ’also writing to him [Scott] demi-officially as I want 
him to be particularly careful as to see that these early relief works 
are made a serious test and not a charity. *97 A view echoed by J. D. 
Sifton, an official in charge of taccavi loans who added 'I notice A.K. 
Bose at Motihari contemplating doles of charitable relief which might 
be demoralising at this stage’.98 All the Government of Bihar and 
Orissa seemed concerned about was maintaining the collection of land 
revenue and cess from zamindars and rentals from cultivators.
Land revenue and cess collections were maintained, generally 
through the coercion of the certification process. Even in the poor 
season of 1932-33, only Rs 69,677 of cess and Rs 8,811 of water dues 
were remitted, less than 1 per cent of demand.99 The Government of 
Bihar and Orissa admitted freely to the central authorities that the 
issue of certificates threatening sale of land for non-payment of 
revenue was its first resort, not its last.100 It was hoped that the 
threat of sale would force the landowner to meet this revenue demand 
before the actual sale took place. Thus, the number of certificates 
issued was generally three to four times greater than the total number 
of sales.101
Government officials argued that zamindars had 
made substantial profits during the period of high prices in the 1920s 
and, as such, had ample resources with which to meet the exceedingly
m
light incidence of the revenue payable for the permanently settled
districts which cover the greater part of the province.’102 Indeed,
officials believed that the Zamindar recognised this and 'values the
permanent settlement too much to suggest for a moment that any
variation in revenue is possible. At the most, he may ask for a
temporary suspension.’103 The smaller zamindars of the temporarily 
1 .settled districts of Orissa, however, frequently petitioned for such 
revisions, but such requests were continually rejected on the grounds 
of the chronic shortfall in government revenue created by the 
reduction of excise revenue.104 The Government continued its policy of 
certification and sales until 1932-33 by which time the number of 
estates sold had increased to 320 from 198 in 1926-27.105 The policy 
was only modified when it was realised that much of the land was being 
bought by government estate managers in the absence of private 
purchasers.10 6
In Bihar, only the large zamindars, such as the Maharaja of Chota 
Nagpur and the Darbhanga Raj, succeeded in collecting the bulk of their 
rentals. This was not necessarily a reflection of the level of rent 
dpmanrlR in these estates. In the Banaili estates in Bhagalpur Division 
rents were considered to be 'fairly easy and collection is on the whole 
fair’. Yet it was still not sufficient to prevent the Banaili Raj from 
applying for remission of revenue on some of his lands 'owing to bad 
collections’.107 Meanwhile on his estates in Bhagalpur and Tirhut 
Divisions, 'Darbhanga manages to keep his rents to a fairly high level 
and to collect as well.’ Even in 1932, the Darbhanga Raj managed to 
collect over 85 per cent of rental demands.108 In general it was 
considered that, 'broadly speaking [rent] collection has been
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difficult, but where the collecting agency is efficient, as generally 
the case of larger landlords, the bulk of the dues is collected.’109 In 
part, large zamindars were able to offer small remissions of rent to 
encourage prompt payment on the due date. Mostly, though, it was 
because large zamindars still had the finance to use the threat of 
court proceedings in a way similar to the government’s use of 
certificates.110 Thus, coercion rather than remissions maintained 
rental collections for large zamindars.
Smaller zamindars, usually with scattered holdings, had greater 
difficulty in collecting their rentals. In particular, the small 
zamindars of Orissa faced major problems with reports of rental 
collections in the coastal divisions being as low as 35 per cent, which 
led to an increase in the number of zamindars defaulting on their land 
revenue payment. In Orissa rents had been raised during the land 
settlement operations of the late 1920s and both rent and revenue had 
been pitched at 1920s price levels. The most marginal zamindars in 
Orissa lost control of their tenants during the slump. District 
officials were convinced that 'it is unquestionable that they have had 
considerable difficulty in realising their dues, particularly from the 
better class of tenants, and they have had to work hard for what they 
have been able to collect’.111 The petty zamindars of Orissa began to 
lose part of their holdings to meet revenue demands. In the coastal 
districts of Orissa there was an increase in the sale of holdings 
bfitwGen 1 and 2 acres.112 This division of fortune, the strengthening 
of control over their tenants by large zamindars in North Bihar, and 
the weakening of the position of the small zamindars repeats the 
pattern discovered by Bose in Bengal during the depression.113
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Pursued by the government for land revenue, small zamindars also 
attempted to force their tenants to pay their rents through litigation. 
By 1932-33, district officials were reporting that small zamindars in 
both Bihar and Orissa were recovering on average as little as 50 per 
cent of their rents which led to a large increase in the number of 
court actions to recover rent arrears, as shown in Table 4.4 below:
Table 4.4:___ Number of Suits for Recovery of Rent Arears in Bihar
and Orissa, 1924-25 to 1934-35
1924-25 35,968
1926-27 40,642
1930-31 60,922
1931-32 68,483
1932-33 80,803
1933-34 91,123
1934-35 100,369
Source: Report on Land Revenue Administration in Bihar and Orissa
(Patna, annual)
At the same time, there was a corresponding increase in the 
number of suits against illegal duress in pursuing rent claims and 
illegal ejectment from property, reflecting the anxiety of both 
zamindars and their agents to collect rentals. Some tenants tried to 
commute their rents back to produce rentals, but most zamindars 
fiercely resisted such moves since they did not want further stocks of 
produce which could only be sold at low prices.114
In the long run, the pursuance of rent arrears through the 
courts proved futile, merely adding to the burden of the landlord’s 
debt. The only recourse open to the courts was to evict the sitting 
tenant, but landlords then found that they could not resettle the land 
at the same rent, as had the managers of khas mahal estates. Thus, the
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Commissioner of Bhagalpur commented;
'I have just been inspecting a small wards estate where 
the manager has had some thirty holdings bought at court 
sales on his lands for more than a year. No one will take 
them at what the manager considers a reasonable rent. Though 
the manager strenously denies the suggestion, it is probable 
that the original raiyats are still getting a crop off his 
land... Private landlords tell me the same story. They have 
all rushed to court in the first instance and found 
themselves with no money and only holdings which they cannot 
settle.’115
Nor did the zamindar have recourse to the land market to 
recover his losses. As the rental income from land declined, so did 
land values. From early 1931 to 1934, land values in Bihar and Orissa 
declined by some 40 per cent.116 Instead zamindars began to reclaim 
bakasht land. Tenancy legislation only protected tenants who paid 
their rents in full, those in arrears lost their rights to remain on 
bakasht land and it reverted back to the landlord’s demesne (zirat). 
This process had several major advantages for the zamindars in both 
Bihar and Orissa (a similar return of bakasht to nijchas land was 
occurring in Orissa). Firstly, it meant that the zamindar no longer 
had to worry about resettling the land, hereditary tenants on bakasht 
land remained as occupancy-tenants on the reclaimed zirat. So, as long 
as the occupancy-raiyat could not meet his rental payment in full, the 
zirat land could not revert back to bakasht under the three year rule 
as had been happening in the 1920s.117 Most importantly, the 
reclamation of zirat land returned economic and social power to the 
zamindar. The landlord could dictate the agricultural season of 
tenants on zirat from crops sown to nature of marketing, the crop was 
no longer the raiyats but the landlords • The reclamation of zirat also 
had major implications for agricultural efficiency in the province.
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Occupancy-raiyats with little prospect of returning their hereditary 
status, lost their incentives to cultivate efficiently, to manure or 
irrigate their land or to hire additional labour and reverted to 
subsistence fanning based on family labour.118 Being downgraded to an 
occupancy-tenancy was also a major blow to the social status of the 
raiyat in the village and since franchise was linked to the ownership 
of property, political power swung back to the zamindars.119
To some extent, the restoration of zirat helped the zamindar to 
offset the difficulties created by the credit squeeze. As we have seen 
the mechanisms for transmission of credit in Bihar and Orissa were not 
as highly developed as those in provinces with better communications 
and a more sophisticated level of marketing. However, during the 
depression, unlike other provinces, there was a continued levelling off 
of price in Bihar and Orissa which indicated that the commercialisation 
of the province was continuing. This can be attributed to the changing 
nature of credit structures in the province during the slump: the
mechanisms adjusted rather than broke down completely.
With the first large reductions in the price of rice in late 1930, 
the network of cash credit in Bihar and Orissa was threatened. Grain 
dealers stopped providing credit to mahajans and to large zamindars 
since they were left with large stocks of rice sellable only at a low 
price. However, there is no indication of panic-selling leading to a 
breakdown in the provincial market, as identified by Rothermund in 
Bombay.120 Instead this squeeze on credit was a traditional feature in 
Bihar and Orissa. Whenever there was a local crisis, usually a monsoon 
failure, cash credit was withdrawn while grain dealers waited for
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prices to rise.121 This was their response in 1930 to price falls 
which many anticipated, to be of a temporary nature.12 2 However, as it 
became clear that the slump was not temporary and as it became 
exacerbated by local monsoon failures and floods, grain dealers and 
mahajans began to offer cash credits again but on a restricted basis. 
Moneylenders initially demanded the outright sale of land before
allowing zamindars to secure credit.123 However, from 1932 as land 
values plummeted mahajans were left with land they could not re-sell or 
settle. Therefore, they returned to the security of mortgages.124 This 
process was helped by the restoration of zirat which gave landlords
greater control of their tenants and provided the greater security
demanded by the mahajan.
Although official reports were sympathetic to the plight of
zamindars during the peak years of the depression, 1930-32, ultimately 
it was the raiyats who suffered most from the credit squeeze.12 5 As 
mahajans had stopped lending to landlords during these years, landlords 
in turn stopped providing cash credit for their tenants. Hereditary 
tenants desperate to maintain their right to bakasht land used all 
their savings to meet their rent demands. Thus in Bihar and Orissa, 
most of the gold and ornaments coming on to the market represented true 
'distress gold’, the forced disinvestment from hoards to meet basic 
necessities such as rental payments to maintain their claims to their 
land. Since Bihar and Orissa was a poor province, such hoards were 
small and quickly exhausted. This explains, then, the increased 
reclamation of bakasht from 1933. By then hoards were exhausted and 
tenants began to default and lost their customary rights. The 
exhaustion of credit also meant that the tenant no longer had security
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for any new cash credit.
In this situation raiyats were forced to accept credit in the form 
of dadani (advances). Occupancy-tenants on zirat land received dadani
in kind, in the shape of seed for the next harvest. Thus the zamindar
was able to dictate the nature of crops sown. The only other
alternative was to accept dadani from sugar factories or their agents. 
Usually this was in cash to meet the cost of purchasing seed and manure 
for the cane cultivation.1 26 The pattern in Bihar and Orissa was
similar to that studied by Amin in the United Provinces. Raiyats 
needed cash to meet their rent and so accepted dadani from the sugar 
factories and were forced into cane cultivation not simply through the 
price-profit motivation but because this was the only regular source of 
credit open to them after the slump. Thus, sugar cultivation far from 
being the saviour of the Bihari and Orissan cultivators, as claimed in 
Government reports, proved to be another mechanism for their
exploitation.
This short study of Bihar and Orissa during the slump has 
shown that it shared in several of the trends witnessed in other 
provinces, in particular the downgrading of hereditary tenants with 
resulting implications for agricultural efficiency. However, there 
were some differences based primarily on the backward nature of the 
provincial market at the onset of the depression. The cessation of 
cash credit in late 1930 to early 1931 was, for example, a traditional 
response to what was perceived as a local crisis. It was not simply a 
reflection of the transmission of the slump. Also, despite the cuts in 
government expenditure, the small increase in the road network during 
the depression helped to continue the commercialisation process in the
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province. Above all, because of its backwardness Bihar and Orissa was 
mercy of climatic conditions. It was the combination of 
economic depression and a series of poor seasons, culminating in the 
earthquake of 1934, which made the years 1930 to 1935 so difficult in 
the province with long-lasting effects that were ultimately to lead to 
the explosion of peasant protest through the Bihar Kisan Sabhas in the 
late 1930s described in the work of Henningham.127
Overall, then, while the depression failed to alter fundamentally 
the long-term structure in agricultural productivity, it did have a 
marked impact on the network of social and economic relationships 
within rural areas. The loss of income suffered by small peasant 
farmers and small landowners created by the twin problems of the 
collapse in prices and of cash credit, led to the alienation of their 
land and a weakening of their position vis-a-vis their landlords. 
However, rich peasants and larger zamindars benefited to the extent 
that, while the value of their land was decreasing, their social 
position was being strengthened both through the acquisition of the 
1W I  of their tenants and, most importantly, through their control of 
credit in kind. Thus during the depression the statification of rural 
society increased. At the bottom, share-croppers were further 
innniserised during the slump while at the top large zamindars retained 
their control of rural wealth. If, outwith the most backward areas 
such as Bihar and Orissa, the process of commercialisation was being 
retarded by the fall in incomes and collapse of credit and subsequent 
reduction in consumption levels of the ordinary peasant, what impact 
was there cm the Indian industrial sector? Did restricted rural 
consumption of manufactured products act as a break on industrial
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development? Or was the falling value of rural land pushing the 
investible surplus from agrarian to urban-industrial areas? To 
further our discussion of the impact of the depression we now must 
consider the development of the industrial sector.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Industrial Development. During the Depression
During the last 15 years, there has been renewed interest in 
the development of Indian industry in the inter-war period. While 
there has been increased attention paid to the questions of labour 
history, the literature has remained dominated by two themes. 
Firstly, the emergence after the First World War of Indian industrial 
capital outwith the Bombay enclave and the pressures which this 
brought to bean upon the relationship between the Indian and European 
business communities. Secondly, the impact of government policy or 
the lack thereof, most specifically in the award of protection. 
Indeed, to a large degree, industrial development in India during the 
inter-war pieriod has been seen in terms of the ability to gain 
protection and the success or failure of such protection.
Furthermore, within this literature, there has been a tendency 
to dwell on studies of individual industries, classifying them as 
either 'old' or ’traditional’ industries such as cotton or jute 
manufacturing, or as newer 'protected’ industries like iron and 
steel, sugar and cement. Little has been written, as yet, about the 
large rural sector of Indian industries based on the processing of 
agricultural produce such as cotton ginning, jute pressing and rice, 
oil and flour milling. These industries, predominantly seasonal in
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nature, provided the major additional source of income for rural 
labourers. Of course, the sugar industry itself was an agricultural 
processing industry, but it involved a greater degree of modem, 
large-scale plant than most of the generally small-scale, widespread 
processing industries.
In part, the concentrations evident in the historiography 
reflect the availability of research material. The prominent 
industries studied to date were controlled either by European 
managing agency houses or the rising Indian family groups. In both 
cases many resources remain. However, these resources are primarily 
personal papers and, while these are useful, it would be better if 
historians could have access to company records and balance sheets 
which so far have rarely been available. Thus Government official 
publications have formed the other major source of information, 
emphasising the concentration on larger units of manufacturing. For 
these reasons, the present study also concentrates heavily upon the 
major Indian industries of the period, using predominantly official 
sources and commercial publications such as the Investors * Yearbook.
While the literature tends to consider the evolution of Indian 
industry throughout the inter-war period as a whole, some 
interpretations about the impact of the depression have emerged. 
Many contemporaries such as Thomas and Anstey believed that, even in 
the face of falling income levels, India’s potentially large domestic 
market shielded Indian industry from the worst effects of the 
slump.1 Officials in Whitehall also regarded India’s industrial 
progress as a sign that the depression had had remarkably little
2X3
impact, particularly when they compared the performance of the Indian 
cotton industry with that of Lancashire. After reading the 1935 
Indian Tariff Board Report on the Cotton Industry, one India Office 
spokesman remarked that it would be difficult to find any evidence of 
a slump and that the industry no longer needed protection:
'The rest of the world has not exactly been rolling in 
prosperity since 1931 but the Indian cotton mills have 
increased their production of woven goods from 2,561 
million yards in 1930-31 to 3,396 million yards in 1934- 
35, a rise of 33 per cent ... [this] has been 
particularly marked in goods Lancashire used to supply.
If it had been the business of the Board to say whether 
protection was justified at all, this third chapter might 
have formed the basis of a negative answer.*2
This remark illustrates the way in which protection was 
regarded as an all-powerful weapon. Hence, insofar as officials of 
the Government of India believed that the depression was having a 
severe impact on certain industries, they pinned their faith on 
increased tariff protection and the potential of increasing the 
domestic market.3 Certainly the Government of India was quick to 
claim their policies were fundamental to the development which 
occurred in protected industries. In 1945 the Planning and 
Development Department boasted:
'... It is a matter of history that the cotton textile, 
the iron and steel and the sugar industry have made rapid 
strides in India largely as a result of the fiscal policy 
pursued by the Central Government.’4
Of course, officials in Delhi also had an eye to the possible 
financial consequences of increased customs duties upon which they 
relied for the greater part of their revenue. Outwith the policy of 
protection, however, lack of statistical information was used as the
:2 Lk
excuse for government inactivity.5 Schemes were proposed by Sir 
George Schuster to gather the necessary statistical data and Sir 
Arthur Salter was invited to the country to suggest a framework for a 
full-scale statistical enquiry of India. The League of Nations was 
approached to provide the necessary funding but, on receiving no 
reply, the financial stringency of the Government of India was again 
the excuse for delaying the proposed survey.
Among modem historians, there are several areas of consensus 
about the impact of the depression on Indian industry. Most agree
that there was a short period at the beginning of the slump when 
credit flows tightened as prices and profits fell.6 However, this 
proved to be a temporary phenomena and of much shorter duration than 
in other countries.7 From late 1931 credit in the westernised 
banking sector increased, partly as a consequence of the large gold 
exports.8
Bagchi and Ray have charted the rise of the Indian trading
families during the 1930s,9 arguing that it was the increased award
of protection which encouraged Indian entrepreneurs to diversify 
their interests from trade and indigenous banking into industry.10 
Tomlinson has suggested that a second phenomena also may have been at 
work, namely the 'shaking out* of capital from the agrarian to the
industrial sector, either through the flow of hoarded gold or the
depreciating profit to be made from the traditional areas of 
investment of land and moneylending.11 Baker, also, has found 
evidence of this in Madras with the diversification of the Chettiars 
from indigenous banking into sugar and cotton manufacturing.12 
Alternatively, Bagchi has argued that the repatriation of funds by
215
European firms left a capital gap which was filled by domestic 
capital. Before the slump, he argued, entry into the modem 
industrial sector was barred by European control over foreign trade 
and finance, although this grip had loosened slightly during the 
1920s. Thus, Bagchi saw the 1930s as providing a 'more suitable’ 
environment for Indian entrepreneurship.13 Whatever the underlying 
causes, the emergence of Indian capital marked an important turning 
point in investment practices. As late as 1930, the Central Banking 
Enquiry Commission had reported that Indian capital was still 'shy’ 
of entering industry.14
By international standards, the Indian industrial sector was 
little affected by the 1929 depression. Hilgerdt’s comparative study 
of manufacturing production for the League of Nations shows only a 
minor halt in industrial growth in India in 1930.15 Table 5.1 (over) 
illustrates the general trends in industrial production during the 
period.
From this it can be seen that, during the depression, India’s 
manufacturing production increased steadily above the world average. 
Only the Union of South Africa, the Soviet Union, Japan, Finland and 
Greece showed higher production increases than India, although the 
figures for Greece are highly dubious. India’s manufacturing 
production remained higher than the economies of the industrial west 
and of other primary producing economies. This performance seems 
even more remarkable when set against the problems of the trade and 
agricultural sectors catalogued in previous chapters. Hilgerdt’s 
statistics have been cited both by Morris and Ray with differing
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interpretations. Morris stressed that the increased production was a 
sign that the concentration in the historiography on India’s links 
with the international economy has been misleading. He argued that 
the domestic market was the most important outlet for Indian industry 
but it took the collapse of international trade during the 1930s for 
this to be realised. He views the growth during the slump as a key 
period in the development of Indian industry.16
Ray agreed that India’s industrial performance in the 1930s was 
'not unimpressive’ and that 'there was a significant growth in 
manufacturing output’.17 However, for Ray, this was not enough 
viewed against India’s 'potential’ development. Thus, he argued that 
the constraints to Indian industrial growth had not been eliminated, 
only weakened slightly. Implicit in his argument is the belief that 
the depression was a lost opportunity: had the Government of India
responded more positively and vigorously, growth rates could have 
matched those recorded during the Second World War and allowed the 
diversification of the industrial structure to include capital goods 
at an earlier stage.18
In such arguments, there are echoes of the studies of the Latin 
American economies during the depression. Diaz Alejandro, for 
example, has analysed how the Argentinian industrial sector was able 
to weather the most severe effects of the depression through positive 
government action.18 Fiscal policy was adapted in two ways to 
promote industrial growth by maintaining price levels• Currency 
devaluation was accompanied by exchange controls which favoured 
exporters at the expense of importers. This was backed by a vigorous 
tariff policy to promote import-substitution industries. Meanwhile,
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the Government of the Argentine sought to maintain its traditional 
export sector by securing markets in a series of bilateral trading 
agreements. Similarly, Baer has argued that the strengthening of 
tariff policy by the Brazilian Government helped to stimulate those 
industries which had begun to emerge in the 1920s.20 Not only did 
domestic investment expand, but the tariff barrier encouraged a 
renewal of foreign investment with the establishment of American 
firms, notably paper mills and motor vehicle assembly lines.21 
Furtado has emphasised that the purchase of coffee stocks by the 
Brazilian Government maintained the level of the domestic money 
supply, allowing the expansion of consumer industries.2 2 Studies of 
the Chilean and Uruguayan economies during the slump also have 
stressed the importance of the increased participation by the 
government through fiscal policies such as exchange controls, 
purchase schemes, use of contracts and loans, tax concessions and 
land grants.2 3 In most Latin American economies, the domestic 
market was seen as an antidote to falling world trade and governments 
promoted industrial growth to break traditional dependence upon the 
exportation of primary produce.
However, there are major debates about the effectiveness of 
these policies. Diaz Alejandro is positive in his assertion that 
increased government involvement in the promotion of industry helped 
to steer the Argentinian economy through the depression.24 However, 
others have argued that the moves to protect Argentina s exports, 
particularly to Britain, increased the country s dependence upon 
primary production and held back growth of the industrial sector.2 6 
Baer has disagreed with Furtado over the nature of the commitment of
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the Brazilian Government to industrial expansion, arguing that it was 
not total and lacked a development strategy, thus Brazilian industry 
failed to reach its full potential.26 Glade maintained that the 
Chilean Government made a serious effort to promote industrial 
development, but that the restriction on finance, created by the 
massive slump in the sales of copper and nitrates, limited what could 
be accomplished.27
The most striking example of industrial recovery and growth 
during the depression occurred in Japan, a recovery unique in being 
based upon export-led growth despite the general contraction of world 
trade. Allen refers to the role of the depreciation of the yen in 
lowering the price of Japan’s exports by 40 per cent and also the 
skilful rescheduling of many of Japan’s trade agreements.28 Most 
contemporaries viewed the depreciation as Japan’s most potent 
instrument in the expansion of its export of manufactured goods.29 
However, the inherent strength of the Japanese industrial base was 
the true foundation for the growth of the 1930s. Japanese 
businessmen had been quick to rationalise their concerns during the 
1920s and to re-equip with the latest technology such as the 
automatic loom. Also, there had been a general trend towards larger 
industrial units offering increased possibilities of economies of 
scale, particularly under the aegis of the zaibatsu.
A possible explanation why the depression has received little 
emphasis in the historiography of industrial development could be 
that the limited nature of the government response in India has 
denied historians the framework which can be established in other
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economies. Thus, studies on Indian industry concentrate upon 
protection because that was virtually the only form of response by 
the Government of India. The explanations of why government response 
should be so muted in India are seen in the long-term colonial 
relationship between Britain and India and so again the phenomenon of 
the depression is blurred.30
This chapter, then, will assess the nature of development of 
Indian industry during the depression: which industries felt the
impact of the crisis and which expanded. Secondly, the factors 
behind the diverse effects of the slump will be studied. For 
instance, was the key factor in development government patronage in 
the form of contracts or protection or was it changes in production 
costs which gave advantages to certain industries? To assess this 
there will be a series of case studies of individual industries.
1. Trends in Level of Employment
For Indian industry, the depression appeared to be reflected in 
falling prices, changes in the pattern of consumption and decreased 
profit levels, at least in the short-term. The limited nature of the 
slump on the industrial sector can be seen in the remarkable 
stability of numbers of factories and employees, as demonstrated in 
Table 5.2 over. This shows that the number of factories employing 
over 20 workers rose steadily with only a minor decrease in 1931. 
Numbers employed in these concerns fell by just under 10 per cent 
between 1929 and 1933, but numbers recovered rapidly so that by 1938 
the figure was nearly 12 per cent greater than in 1929.
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Table 5.2
Factories subject to the Indian Factories Act
N°» °f No. Index No. of
Factories Employed Employment (1929=100)
1929 8,129 1,553,169 100.0
1930 8,148 1,528,302 98.4
1931 8,143 1,431,487 92.2
1932 8,241 1,419,711 91.4
1933 8,452 1,405,402 90.5
1934 8,658 1,487,231 95.7
1935 8,831 1,610,932 103.7
1936 8,338 1,562,917 100.6
1937 8,930 1,675,869 107.9
1938 9,748 1,737,755 111.8
Source: Statistical Abstract, 1929-30 to 1938-39, BPP,
Crad 6333 of 1942.
Recent research on trends in Indian industry by Colin Simmons 
has shown the same remarkable stability despite the slump. In a 
series of statistical exercises based on earlier work by 
Sivasubramonian, Simmons found, that in terms of manufacturing output 
and employment, 'that over 1929-33 India’s "modern” secondary sector 
taken as a whole faltered but did not pass through a depression - 
much less a general or great depression’.31 While manufacturing 
employment did decrease (by some eight per cent between 1929/30 -
1933/34), output recovered quickly implying a gain in labour
222
productivity. Simmons’ work shows a similar trend to the figures in 
Table 5.2, but records a greater level of recovery in employment (by 
18 per cent in 1937/38) . This is because Simmons included workers 
employed in factories with less than 20 workers.
2. Trends in Profit Levels
Another indicator of the impact of the depression can be seen 
in the levels of profitability of manufacturing concerns. Table 5.3 
(over) illustrates profit levels in large scale industries (over 20 
workers). This index is taken from official Government of India 
records. It is a chain index of profits recorded by firms in the 
Investors’ Year Books. Naturally, this is not a complete source. 
Problems include fluctuations in the number of concerns included and 
the series generally accounts for only 60 per cent of individual 
industries. The profits comprise the aggregate profits of these 
concerns divided by the number of firms. The measure of profits 
defined in this official index excludes taxes, interest and 
commission but includes depreciation charges. In effect, this is an 
unweighted index of the gross profits made by some of India’s most 
important industrial companies. A later study by Munshi and Kamik, 
on behalf of the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and 
Industry, found that their index of net profits to be 'on the whole 
very similar to those indicated in the Economic Advisors’ Series’.32 
Their trends showed the same peak years and the same magnitude of 
rises in the overlapping years of the two series (1936-1941). 
Therefore it is assumed that the official series provides a genuine 
ion of trends in the Indian industrial sector during the
depression.
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On an all-India level, profit levels dropped rapidly reaching 
their lowest point in 1931. They rose again only slowly and 
unsteadily, until the affects of the Second World War finally took 
the index back over the 1928 level in 1941. Of course, the general 
index masks the varied impact of the depression on the different 
industries and it is clear that it was the problems in the jute and 
coal industries which deflated the all-India index.
The profits of jute companies seem to have been affected most 
by the depression; the index dropping to 8.7 in 1931. Recovery was 
only partial when profits fell again in 1937-38 after the period of 
unfettered competition when the output restriction scheme broke down. 
Even with war demand the profits of jute companies did not recover to 
the 1928 level. It was the impact of the depression and several 
years when even European companies failed to declare dividends that 
taught the Indian jute industry that it needed to rationalise.
The performances of the other major industries were markedly 
different. The cotton industry also had to face a period of major 
readjustment in the inter-war period. The heavy losses in profits 
during the depression gave an added vigour to rationalisation 
schemes. By the late 1930s the profits of the cotton industry were 
well above the 1929 level. However, this index masks the dichotomy 
between the Bombay Island and the up-country mills. The weaving 
mills of Ahmedabad and Delhi and the spinning mills of Madras 
consistently showed a higher level of profit than Bombay mills.
Coal profits were not affected as severely as jute and cotton 
but the general level of profits in this industry was normally low
because of the large number of small open-cast collieries. The 
lowest point was in 1934 when the index number stood at 59.7. Reports 
of the 1920s talk of a depression then, as India lost her export 
markets for coal. Possibly, when the depression of the 1930s was at 
its peak, those coal companies which were least efficient and 
economic had already gone out of production. It was reported that in 
the late 1930s when profit levels again went above 1928, many of the 
small mines were re-opened to gain quick profits.
It is interesting to note the performances of sugar, paper, and 
iron and steel industries, all of which received protection during 
the depression. Profits of the iron and steel companies were cut 
very badly during the depression probably through the initial 
retrenchment of expenditure by the Railways Department and Public 
Works Departments, both at central and provincial levels. 
Profitability was restored more rapidly than most other industries. 
The 1934 Supplementary Agreement gave Indian iron and steel semi­
manufacturers a vital preference in the British market which allowed 
the industry to gain benefit from its extended capacity. The sugar 
industry also recovered and expanded quickly with the effects of 
protection. 1929 was the lowest point on the index, marking the year 
of peak imports of refined sugar into India. However, after 1936, 
profits began to falter. Severe competition among factories pushed 
down prices and a substantial domestic market for refined sugar had 
failed to be created, so profit levels could not be maintained. The 
profits of the paper industry were affected very little by the onset 
of the depression. Indeed the depression probably helped to reduce 
production costs through lessening the prices of imported wood pulp,
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essential while research was being carried out into the use of bamboo 
pulp as a substitute. There was a slight decrease in the late 1930s, 
again through the emergence of competition, with the establishment of 
new Indian-owned paper mills. However, this was quickly overtaken by 
the effects of the war.
Thus, the general level of profits of large-scale industry in 
India recovered reasonably quickly after the depression. The 
continued problems in the jute industry clearly is the source of the 
deflated levels in the all-India index. In terms of profit levels, 
then, it seems that Indian industry did indeed recover quickly from 
the slump, although the profits of most of the export-oriented 
industries were slower to revive.
The relatively early recovery from the slump in Indian 
industry can also be traced in the development of joint stock 
compjanies, illustrated in Table 5.4 (over). As was to be expected, 
there was a reduction in the numbers of cotton, tea and coal mining 
firms registered, as well as a decrease in agricultural processing 
mills in the period 1929-30 to 1932-33. Numbers then rose steadily. 
With the award of protection in 1932, the numbers of sugar companies 
doubled. The steady increase in subsidiary financial service 
companies throughout the depression is witness to the general 
buoyancy of the industrial sector. The only strange phenomenon is 
the steady increase in the number of jute mills despite falling 
profit levels.
From this general survey of profitability it appears that the 
award of protection was an important factor in early recovery from
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the slump. However, since protection was not part of a coherent 
government development strategy, other factors beside protection must 
have been involved.
3 • Trends in Prices of Manufactured Products
The most immediate impact of the depression was the fall in 
prices for Indian manufactures both at home and abroad. However, 
goods produced for export markets experienced more heavy declines 
than those sold in the domestic market. For instance, the index 
number for price of manufactured jute in Calcutta fell from 122 in 
1929 to 76 in 1931, while that for cotton piecegoods fell from 160 to 
123 over the same period, as can be seen in Table 5.5. (over) The 
depression brought a swing in the terms of trade in favour of the 
manufacturing sector as raw material prices fell farther than those 
for finished products. Thus, the index number for raw jute fell from 
95 in 1929 to 49 in 1931 and continued to fall below 1914 levels 
while prices of manufactured jute were recovering. Therefore, 
industry could benefit from a reduction in production costs covering 
that part which was spent on raw material purchase. This saving 
would have been even greater between 1932 and 1936 as raw material 
prices continued to fall while prices for manufactured goods showed 
signs of recovery and the gap between the two widened. From this it 
can be seen that the impact of the depression was highly complex 
involving differences in factors such as market structure, 
composition of production costs, availability of capital and general 
price levels, all of which roust be considered.
From this general survey it is clear that the Indian
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industrial sector did not suffer from the depression, although it 
faltered slightly in the early period. However, there were 
significant exceptions, especially the jute and coal industries. The 
reasons why Indian industries should suffer so lightly in comparision 
to other industrial countries, have not yet been considered fully. To 
do so, the development of individual industries must be studied. For 
the sake of convenience, the case studies are divided into categories 
of ‘traditional’ and ‘new industries’. In the former category are 
jute, cotton and coal, while in the latter are included iron and 
steel, sugar, paper and cement. Analysis will be made of factor 
costs and market availability as well as the role of protective 
tariffs.
Jute Manufacturing
Since output of jute manufacturing was geared almost wholly 
to the export market, it would be expected that this industry would 
feel the most severe effects of the depression. Restriction of 
demand may have been so great as to offset the benefits of any 
changes in local factor costs. However, given the dominance of 
European capital in the jute industry, a vigorous response to the 
problems of jute manufacturers by the Government of India could have 
been expected.
The 1920s had been a period of rapid growth in the Indian 
jute industry both in terms of capacity of existing mills and in 
establishment of new mills. The new entrants to the industry were 
attracted by the high profit levels which continued until 1926. As 
Timberg and Lamb have shown, much of the new capital was provided by
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Indian groups previously involved in the local trade in raw jute who 
had made large profits during the Great War.33 In the early 1920s, 
the new capacity appeared to have been accommodated with ease. The 
expansion of the sugar industry in Cuba and Java and the revival of 
world trade in agricultural produce increased demand for jute sacking 
and bags. However, there were signs that world demand might level off 
and even decline. In America and Australia, new technology involving 
grain elevators and bulk transportation was reducing demand in the 
industry’s two most important traditional markets. Substitutes, both 
synthetic and natural, were produced on an increasingly large scale.
As the jute industry was so heavily dependent upon the health of 
the world’s agrarian producers for its sales, it was one of 
the first industries to suffer price declines, from late 1929. 
However, the depression only reduced the rate of growth of new 
capacity; it did not stop the trend, as can be seen in Table 5.6 
(over).
In comparison with the Bombay Island cotton industry, the number 
of mill closures in Calcutta was very small and later in date. 
Despite various restriction schemes loom capacity continued to 
expand. Statistics of production do not exist before 1932, but an 
estimate of production can be made from figures of consumption of raw 
jute. This fell between 1929 and 1932 but then rose steadily. Since 
the increase in output was accompanied by a reduction of employees, 
there must have been significant gains in efficiency within the 
industry as a result of the slump. However, the expansion of output 
is a sign of continued problems in the industry as demand did not
232
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recover to 1929 levels. While there may have been some increased 
demand within the domestic industry, for instance with the expansion 
of the sugar and cement industries, this does not appear to have 
offset faltering overseas demand. Jute manufacturing entered a period 
of intense internal competition between 1936 and 1939 as supply 
constantly outstripped demand.
The depression could have brought some benefits to the industry: 
lower wage bills and reduced prices for raw jute would have decreased 
production costs. However, the critical factor was the slack in 
world demand and the increasing over-production of jute goods as 
capacity continued to grow. There was only a slow appreciation of 
the problems facing the industry. Unlike the traditional industries 
of cotton manufacturing and coal, the early days of the depression 
did not bring investors rushing to off-load their shares in jute. 
There was a general belief that the fall-off in demand would prove 
only temporary and most investors believed that the industry had 
sufficient reserves accumulated to pay reasonable dividends despite 
the crisis.34 It is indeed noticeable that, in contrast to the 
cotton and coal industries, as late as 1932 about 50 per cent of jute 
mills were still declaring dividends of between 15 and 40 per cent 
and even where no dividends were declared, the mills concerned did 
not make actual losses.3 5
Production costs were decreased during the slump. The wholesale 
price of raw jute in Calcutta fell by two-thirds between 1929 and 
1931 and its price remained below 1914 levels for the rest of the 
decade.36 Since prices for manufactured jute products fell by only a
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third and then rose again after 1933, the gap with the raw material 
widened appreciably. Fuel costs also reduced as coal prices 
declined.37 New entrants also would have benefited from the reduced 
price of imported machinery.38
There were also determined efforts to decrease the cost of 
labour. The average monthly wages of Calcutta mill operatives were
reduced from Rs 17.7 per mens am in 1928-29 to Rs 14.3 per mens am in
1930-31.39 Wages rose again slightly in 1931 as a result of labour 
disputes over reduced hours but then declined once more till 1936, by
an average of 15 to 25 per cent.40 This was also accompanied by
reduced hours of work and the end of double shifts.41 Labour costs 
were also reduced by decreasing the size of the workforce. In 1929- 
30, 343,868 workers had been employed in the jute industry but this
was down to 257,175 by 1933-34. Even by 1938-39 the numbers employed 
had only risen to 295,162.42 In 1932, meanwhile, the Inspector of 
Factories in Calcutta had commented upon the easing situation in the 
city’s housing shortage as the jute labour force returned to their 
villages.43 There were significant gains in labour efficiency as a 
result of these trends since despite the falling workforce the 
average loom capacity per mill was increased from 553.9 in the period 
1926-27 to 1928-29 to 632.6 between 1936-37 and 1938-39. Meanwhile 
jute consumption per worker had risen from 17.1 to 23.26 bales in the 
same period.
Therefore, the main components in the production costs of the 
jute industry fell during the depression, yet profit levels continued 
to decline and even during the Second World War did not recover to 
1928 levels. The major problem was the shrinking world demand for
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Indian jute manufactures. During the slump, the efforts to find 
substitutes for Indian jute intensified. In some primary producers 
one response had been to increase sisal production which was rapidly 
becoming a successful substitute for jute. In America, in an attempt 
to find a use for surplus stocks of cotton as well as to reduce 
imports of manufactured Indian jute, cotton sacking was promoted. 
This represented a two-fold challenge to jute since cotton sacking 
proved to be twice as durable as its jute equivalent. Most advanced 
countries researched into synthetic substitutes. Alternatively, some 
governments, particularly in Latin America and Central Europe, helped 
to sponsor domestic jute manufacturing. They aimed to benefit from 
the larger reductions in the price of raw jute compared to the 
manufactured product and the establishment of jute factories would 
help to provide employment opportunities in their countries.4 4 Thus 
while the volume of exports of manufactured jute declined by 30.8 per 
cent between 1929-30 to 1933-34, exports of raw jute fell by only 
seven per cent. While exports of manufactured jute were slow to 
recover, exports of raw jute had reached new peaks by 1936.45
While its monopoly position had been unchallenged, the Indian 
jute industry had become complacent, failing to diversify its 
production or update its techniques. While Indian mills remained 
content to produce the traditional gunny bags and hessian cloth, 
mills in Central Europe were experimenting with jute mixtures with 
silk, wool and artificial fibres to increase its durability and range 
of uses.46 The Indian manufacturers had failed to appreciate the 
changes in world demand and so to gear their production accordingly. 
'Hie lower costs of raw materials and labour in India, allied to a
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more diversified range of products could have consolidated India’s 
position of world leader in jute manufacturing and could have 
preserved some of their continental and American markets during the 
slump.
The position of the industry was not helped by the responses of 
the manufacturers to the crisis. The years of the depression for the 
jute industry can be characterised as a struggle to overcome the 
problem of over-production in terms of falling demand and so raise 
prices while attempting to bolster the monopolistic position of 
Indian jute. The jute industry, under the aegis of the Indian Jute 
Mills Association (IJMA) was probably the most highly organised group 
of Indian manufacturers. This might have been expected to have aided 
rationalisation and product restriction, but this was not to be the 
case. The responses to the depression by the IJMA highlight the 
difficulties of guiding the operating policies of a cartel.
The initial impact of the depression was deepened by the actions 
of the IJMA in the late 1920s. By 1929 the association and its 
counterpart in London had become aware of the dangers inherent in the 
developing jute mills of Central Europe. They attempted to destroy 
any prospective competition by increasing Indian production. Hence 
the IJMA allowed an increase in the working week of jute mills from 
54 hours to 60.47 Of course, this was the worst possible moment in 
which to increase production and it must be remembered that this was 
within the context of increasing capacity. With only one year’s 
hindsight, the Investors’ Year Book lamented:
'... It is an unfortunate and striking coincidence that the
period of longer working hours should have coincided with
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financial stringency and slack trade all over the world 
resulting in the purchasing power of consuming markets 
being considerably curtailed.’48
Furthermore, since there was no wage increase accompanying the 
increased hours, the action provoked the longest strike in the 
history of the Indian jute industry.49 It was not until 1930-31 that 
the IJMA finally decided to try restricting output to increase price 
levels, as the price reductions began to affect the industry’s 
profitability. Therefore, in 1930 the IJMA tried to re-introduce the 
54 hour week. This created more labour disputes since many mills had 
been forced to increase their wages during the previous year. These 
troubles, though, were quelled quickly. The first problems in making 
an agreement such as this, however, began to emerge since it was 
binding only on those mills within the Association. Although the 
Indian manufacturers who had entered the industry in the early 1920s 
such as Birla and Hukumchand, had joined the IJMA, later entrants 
increasingly did not. Having established mills at a time of high 
cost, these manufacturers wished to increase output to reduce their 
working costs per unit and so back their relatively small capital 
stock. While the Hukumchand mills produced dividends of over 20 per 
cent until 1930 and Birla Brothers 15 per cent, few of the newly 
established mills, including European ones, produced dividends until 
the mid-1930s although they did not usually make losses.50
In October 1930, the IJMA tried to take restriction further by 
closing mills for one week per month. Even so, the problems of the 
industry grew and in 1932 the working week was decreased to 40 hours 
and 15 per cent of the loom capacity of association mills were 
ordered to be sealed. Since mills outwith the IJMA continued to
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increase their production, two mills broke away from the association. 
From this point, fearing a crisis, the IJMA. appealed to the 
Government of Bengal for assistance in maintaining an agreement by 
legislation. The local government was asked to use its influence in 
bringing the outside mills into the association. All blame for the 
ills of the industry were placed on what the IJMA viewed as the
'over-production' of these mills. At the root of their request lay
the fear that more mills would leave and the association would 
collapse totally. A Government of Bengal note summarised the 
consequences of this as predicted by the IJMA:
'... unrestricted, cut-throat competition ... output will 
at once jump and, in the absence of increased demand, 
prices will fall, profits will disappear, and many mills 
will have to be closed down. In this process, the prices
of raw jute will fall, there will be failure in the bazaar;
the banks will be involved; all other industries depending 
on jute will be seriously affected. And ... government 
revenues will suffer.’51
Constantly in their appeals, the IJMA stressed the unfortunate 
position of the cultivator who would then have no consumer for his 
crop. While sceptical about the Association’s sudden concern for the 
cultivator, government officials recognised the force of this 
argument as being the one most likely to attract public attention. 
The Government of Bengal sought to improve the position of the 
cultivator by promoting the restriction of jute sowings in the hope 
of raising the price. They also tried to popularise the cultivation 
of other cash crops especially sugar-cane.52
However, the Government of Bengal refused to legislate since it 
would be interfering with the rights of the non-association mills,
2A0
but it agreed to act as mediator between the various parties 
involved.53 The dominance of European capital in jute manufacturing 
did not provoke the anticipated response. Throughout the early 
1930s, the Government of Bengal was facing a crisis in its ability to 
control law and order. Government officials feared that they would 
promote further public disturbances if they were seen to side openly 
with Europeans against the predominantly Indian new entrants into the 
industry. In May 1932 an agreement was concluded which recognised 
the special needs of the newer mills to increase production to cover 
their higher overheads. Such mills were allowed, therefore, to 
operate a 54 hour week and one, the Agarpala Mill, to increase its 
loom capacity.54
By 1934 with the general rise in prices, the IJMA decided to 
permit the unsealing of its loom capacity, despite an appeal from 
Calcutta Gunny Traders Association that the market was not yet 
buoyant enough to absorb increased production, although stocks had 
been decreased.55 As the GTA had predicted, the rapid increase in 
production brought a fresh fall in prices and the tensions between 
association and non-association mills surfaced once more.
Under these conditions the agreement broke down in 1936. The 
Government of Bengal again refused to legislate believing that the 
industry needed a period of intense competition to stimulate 
efficient producers. This echoed the private thoughts of the 
chairman of the IJMA, Benthall, although even he hesitated to make 
such opinions public.56 Between 1936 and 1938 more looms were 
unsealed and new capacity installed, production levels rose, prices 
continued their downward trend and profits dwindled. The IJMA
2ifl
panicked but this time the Government of Bengal, now with ; an Indianf
majority, stepped in. They were worried by the effect of price falls
on the cultivator and wage cuts on the labour force.5 7 In September
1938, therefore, an ordinance decreed a maximum 45 hour week with
exceptions for certain small mills.58
The attempt at restricting production by the IJMA displayed the 
classic problems associated with such voluntary schemes. Not only 
were the agreements not binding on non-association mills they could 
not even be enforced on member mills. Throughout the 1930s the IJMA 
failed to prevent increased capacity. There was no will within the 
industry for restriction: an independent audit in 1930 had found
that association mills had deliberately under-estimated their loom 
capacity by as much as 25 per cent to prevent full implementation of 
any restriction schemes.59 Manufacturers believed restriction 
raised the work cost per unit at a time when reduced production costs 
were necessary. While a scheme was in operation there was always the
temptation to gain an advantage by being the first one to break the
agreement, but when there were mills already outwith the agreement it 
became impossible to enforce.
While the jute manufacturers cannot be blamed for failing to
anticipate the onset of the world depression, they seemed to have had 
a short-sighted approach to their business. While they talked about 
an 'absence of increased demand’ , they did not realise that the 
conditions in world markets had changed permanently. There seems to 
have been an inflated air of optimism about the prospects of the jute 
industry. This helps to explain why there was an expansion of
capacity despite the continuing difficulties in the industry.
ZkZ
However, the effects of the use of substitutes and technological 
progress were increasingly encroaching upon the demand for Indian 
jute goods. Also, it is likely that customers were becoming 
frustrated at the almost monopolistic control of the jute trade 
exercised by Indian manufacturers and their tendency to inflate 
prices. While jute manufacturers complained about warehouses full of 
unsold stock, they continued to increase production. An effective 
rationalisation scheme was needed. The local government feared to 
become involved because of the racial complications of ownership. 
With the majority of the new smaller concerns being Indian owned, the 
authorities did not want to leave themselves open to the charge that 
they favoured European businessmen. It is noticeable that it was a 
National Ministry which enacted the first compulsory legislation.
It was the failure to understand the changing nature of their 
market which was the crucial problem facing jute manufacturers in the 
1930s as it had been in the 1920s. This was the underlying long-term 
problem facing the Indian jute industry, which was exacerbated by the 
short-term problem of under-consumption of traditional jute products 
during the depression. Few managing agencies had research 
departments and it took the formation of the Indian Central Jute 
Committee to force the jute manufacturers to consider diversification 
of products and rationalisation of their means of production. With 
the heavy dependence upon the world market, knowledge about the 
conditions and requirements of customers was essential, but few firms 
seemed to take the marketing of their product seriously. Had the 
range of jute goods produced in India been diversified in the 1920s, 
Indian advantages of cheaper raw material, and labour costs could
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have preserved the Indian industry’s competitive advantage and
secured its markets. While production costs were lowered during the 
slump, this did not have a significant impact on the established jute 
firms. It enabled new capital to enter the industry at a time of 
reduced prices and profits. However, without a sustained demand for 
jute products, decreases in production costs alone could not pull the 
jute industry out of the depression.
Cotton Manufacturing
Cotton manufacturing was one of India’s traditional staple
industries. The industry had evolved from the production of yam for 
the Indian handloom weavers and for export to the Far East, 
particularly China, to the manufacture of cotton piecegoods sold 
predominantly on the domestic market. This latter transition had 
brought the Indian industry into competition with British cotton 
manufacturers, especially those of Lancashire. During the twentieth 
century the industry began to diversify its location away from the 
traditional base in Bombay Island, a phenomenon accelerated by the 
depression. The history of the cotton industry during the slump 
highlights the wide dichotomy in experience between the mills of 
Bombay Island and the newer up-country centres.
Even before the onset of the depression, the Bombay City mills 
were facing severe difficulties arising from the massive dividends
paid out during the post-war boom period which seriously depleted the
reserves of the cotton manufacturing firms.60 Attempts to solve 
these problems by rationalisation and efficiency schemes only
2kk
resulted in prolonged and damaging labour disputes in the mid-1920s 
and again at the end of the decade.61 The Bombay Millowners’ 
Association (BMA) had a long history of using its power to influence 
both the central and provincial governments to give maximum support 
to the industry. In 1925 this had led to the abolition of the 
countervailing cotton excise duty, a long-running source of dispute 
between Bombay and Lancashire.62 In the 1930s, the BMA faced a new 
threat and asserted that the position of the Bombay industry was 
being made untenable by 'unfair' foreign competition, though now from 
Japan rather than England.63
Outwith Bombay Island, the cotton industry seemed to be going 
from strength to strength. Up-country mills had been established in 
various centres already in the early 1920s, for instance in 
Ahmedabad, Sholapur, Madras and Delhi. This trend accelerated in 
the 1930s with the maturing of these earlier centres and the further 
diversification of the industry to Cawnpore and Madras Presidency. 
The considerable growth outwith Bombay Island can be seen in Table 
5.7 (over).
Bombay still retained the largest single concentration of mills 
in India. However the locational pattern of the industry was 
changing. One crucial factor may have been that the balance of factor 
costs moved in favour of the up-country centres, while the impact of 
the depression in reducing production costs must have been 
influential.
Development in the 1920s can be split into two periods. 
The cotton industry shared in the post-war boom with a rapid increase
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in the establishment of new mills, in existing capacity and in 
numbers employed between 1919 and 1923-24.64 The industry then 
entered a period of difficulty during which growth rates slowed down. 
This reflected mostly the problems of Bombay Island mills which were 
suffering from the excesses of the boom period. A programme of
Table 5.7
Regional Distribution of Mill Capacity (Percentages)
Bombay City Ahmedabad Other Indian Centres
Mills 1913-14 31.4 18.0 50.6
1938-39 17.5 19.8 62.7
Spindles 1913-14 44.4 14.2 41.4
1938-39 28.3 18.9 52.8
Looms 1913-14 46.8 18.5 34.7
1938-39 33.2 23.2 43.6
Employment 1913-14 42.3 13.5 44.2
1938-39 25.7 17.7 55.6
Source: M.D. Morris, 'Growth of Large-Scale Industry to 1947’,
C M ,  Vol. 2, Table 7.18, p.618.
rationalisation provoked severe labour problems from the mid-1920s 
preventing the full implementation of the plan and the problems of 
the Bombay industry multiplied. The effect of the labour troubles 
can be gauged by the total closure of 11 mills on Bombay Island for a 
full year in 1929 and the partial working of most other mills in the 
area.65 Thus when the depression began to affect the industry from
1930, certain sectors were already facing difficulties. While the 
number of mills and total production increased, loom capacity was 
reduced between 1930 and 1932, as can be seen in Table 5.8 (over). 
Again, it was Bombay which faced the most acute problems while the 
crisis took longer to affect up-country mills. Therefore, while the 
total number of mills in India increased from 256 to 289 between 1929 
and 1934, the number of working mills in Bombay Island decreased from 
77 to 55 including the failure of the largest group, the Currimbhoy 
mills, and the closure of 4 mills managed by Petits and 1 by 
Sassoons.66 The overall figures, then, are a measure of the 
rapidity of growth outwith Bombay.
The output of the Indian cotton industry is recorded in Table 
5.9 (over). Immediately noticeable is the almost continual growth in 
the All-India figures. Yam production, for instance, expanded 
through a large increase in the manufacture of finer counts which 
began in the early 1930s. Competition from interior mills in coarser 
cloth had forced Bombay to diversify production to finer counts, as 
had importation of cheap coarse Japanese cloth. The increased 
production of cambrics and lawns is evidence of this, although 
the small increase in the output of coloureds reflects the slow 
development of ancillary industries. The move towards finer counts 
also brought Bombay back into conflict with Lancashire manufacturers 
who also were diversifying to counteract the problems of the 
depression.67 During the boycott of foreign cloth and under pressure 
from Congress, Indian mills also began to produce more khaddar, the 
coarse cloth similar to the handwoven product.
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Table 5.9
Cotton Mill Production (000 lb)
Yam Woven Goods Coloureds Hosiery Total
1928-29 557,675 274,444 91,794 1,385 376,513
1929-30 730,819 357,680 114,761 1,732 484,621
1930-31 753,665 393,871 104,132 1,525 507,870
1931-32 848,126 449,967 124,813 1,761 585,296
1932-33 885,772 455,767 131,170 2,310 597,952
1933-34 796,711 421,678 113,330 2,183 551,398
1934-35 853,241 480,212 124,628 4,500 621,619
1935-36 900,568 491,512 127,121 4,539 637,142
1936-37 887,103 502,324 127,295 5,477 650,253
1937-38 975,619 554,110 136,689 6,881 715,486
1938-39 1,104,030 588,356 143,367 6,962 756,489
Source: Statistical Abstract 1919--20 to 1928-29, Cmd 3882 of
1931, Tables 303 and 304.
Statistical Abstract 1929--30 to 1938-39, Cmd 6333 of
1942, Tables 208 and 109.
The overall figures, representing a pattern of almost continuous 
growth, mask the problems of the cotton industry on Bombay Island. 
Between 1929 and 1932 the loom capacity of the Bombay industry fell 
by 15 per cent at a time when loom capacity in Ahmedabad was 
increasing by 10 per cent.68 While yam production in Bombay City 
mills did not decline during the depression, output was recovering 
from the impact of the labour problems of 1928 and 1929. Growth in
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yam production in Bombay Island was only 8 per cent between 1929-30 
to 1932-33 compared with 25 per cent in Madras and Delhi and 22 per 
cent in the Punjab. There was a similar trend in Bombay City 
piecegood production: the output levels of 1927 were not surpassed
until 1932.69 The decline of the overall figures in 1933-34 again 
represent the problems of the Bombay industry faced with renewed 
labour troubles. In that year alone yam production declined from 
558 million lb to 484 million lb.70
From the mid-1930s the overall figures showed signs of the 
renewed growth, now including Bombay, with rapid growth in the number 
of new mills, capacity and labour. An interesting feature of the 
late 1930s was the increased establishment of mills in the Indian 
states and the French settlements, from 51 in 1931-32 to 66 in 1937- 
38.71 Some manufacturers moved production outwith British India to 
avoid the increased costs associated with the factory legislation 
which had resulted from the recommendations of the Royal Commission 
on Labour. The Governments of the Indian States encouraged such 
developments with bounties, tax exemptions and grants.72
In explaining the diversity of experience of different sectors 
of the industry during the depression, changes in factor costs must 
be important. The evidence of the various Tariff Board reports in 
the early 1930s showed that the up-country mills had the advantage of 
lower labour and transport costs, both for the raw material and of 
the finished product.73 Also since many of subsidiary components 
such as bleaching and dyeing were local cottage industries this also 
helped reduce costs at least in the short term. The advent of 
cheaper hydro-electric power promoted rapid growth of the industry in
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Madras which had long been at a disadvantage in terms of fuel costs. 
Baker has argued that the cheap electric power was crucial to the 
development of the Madras cotton spinning industry.74 Meanwhile, in 
Bombay, land values, rents and local taxes had all increased with the 
general prosperity in the area during the early 1920s.75
Labour costs were more expensive in Bombay City to cover the 
higher cost of living than at an up-country centre. Wage rates were 
up to one-third higher than Ahmedabad and Nagpur and up to 50 per 
cent higher than Sholapur and Madras.76 In the early years of the 
depression, this would have placed a severe strain on working capital 
with a time lag between fall in the price of manufactured cotton and 
reductions in wages. To counter this, Bombay manufacturers reduced 
their labour force and worked short-time. The total numbers employed 
full-time in Bombay mills decreased by 18,000 between 1929 and 
1933.78 One official estimate put the reduction of labour as high as 
35,000 by 1932. This was probably because of the pool of badli 
workers failing to gain part-time work which they normally received 
by covering the absenteeism of full-time labourers.79 The need to 
reduce production costs forced Bombay manufacturers to rationalise 
their enterprises and increase efficiency. Between 1929 and 1932 
the number of operatives per 100 looms was decreased from 94 to 61.80
Outwith Bombay Island wages were generally lower because of the 
lack of competition for labour. In Bombay unskilled labour was 
needed also in the railway workshops and docks. Elsewhere, the main 
competition for labour came from seasonal agricultural processing 
industries therefore wage rates remained low. In Ahmedabad, however,
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the situation was different. Wage rates there were negotiated 
between the Ahmedabad Textile Labour Union and the local Millowners’ 
Association in accordance with a conciliation agreement formulated by 
Gandhi in 1921.81 This placed the Ahmedabad workers in a stronger 
position to resist wage cuts, unlike Bombay where the unsuccessful 
strikes of the late 1920s had discredited trade unions and 
consequently reduced their bargaining power. The ATLU successfully 
avoided wage cuts until 1934. By this time mills belonging to the AMA 
were complaining of the high incidence of labour costs especially 
since new mills were not bound by the agreement and were paying 
markedly lower wages.82 The AMA asked for a general wage cut of 25 
per cent, however, after nearly a year’s negotiation the ATLU 
brought the figure down to 6.5 per cent.83 Thus, by 1935 wage rates 
were higher in Ahmedabad than in Bombay. This eventually worked 
against the industry in Ahmedabad and expansion ground to a halt in
1938. By then the advantage of lower wage rates had swung to
Sholapur and the Madras Presidency.84
In terms of material costs the interior mills also had an
advantage. Most of these mills specialised in coarser cloths using 
short-stapled cotton. Since they could purchase their supplies of 
raw cotton through fewer intermediaries, there were fewer 
opportunities to mark up the price of the raw material. One 
disadvantage would have been that their purchasing season would have 
been shorter so they could not take fullest possible advantage of
falling prices unlike Bombay where stocks existed all year round. 
However, by purchasing locally in less sophisticated markets than in 
Bombay, the speculative price for their raw material would probably
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have been lower. Both Bombay and Ahmedabad concentrated on the f iner 
counts. For them the longer-stapled raw cotton imported from East 
Africa and Egypt would have fallen in price, but this would have been 
offset by the import duty on raw cotton imposed in the Emergency 
Budget of 1931 including a surcharge of 25 per cent. Both the BMA and 
the AMA complained bitterly to the 1936 Tariff Board that this duty 
artifically raised the price of imported raw cotton.85 Meanwhile, 
internal supplies of longer-staple cotton were not as reliable during 
the depression since they needed larger amounts of irrigation and 
water rates became ©proportionately more burdensome in the canal 
areas, so that cultivators reverted for a few seasons to shorter 
staple indigenous cotton.86 Where Ahmedabad had an advantage over 
Bombay was that it had turned to finer counts at an earlier stage and 
had the necessary technology to admix short-staple Indian cotton with 
longer-staple imported cotton, thus reducing costs without affecting 
the quality of their product unduly.87 Bombay mills would have had to 
invest more capital to make the necessary technological adjustment at 
a time when they were already experiencing severe financial problems. 
Gordon has argued that Bombay mills were at a considerable 
disadvantage in terms of price of its raw materials. While the 
general average decline in the price of Indian raw cotton was 59 per 
cent, prices of Broach in the Bombay markets had declined by only 
37.5 per cent between 1927 and 1931. (Gordon omits 1928 and 1929 
because of the instability created by the labour problems)88
The interior mills probably had their greatest advantage in 
transport costs. Being closer both to local suppliers and local 
markets, their transport costs were reduced considerably. At first
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Bombay mills received preferential rates for long-distance freight 
but these were phased out during the depression to the advantage of 
the up-country mills.89 This saving in transport costs could have 
explained why Ahmedabad was able to sustain higher labour costs for 
so long.
Local mills would also have a wider knowledge about their local 
market conditions and requirements. Very little has been written 
about the marketing of Bombay cloth, but in the 1936 Tariff Board 
there are several complaints that the Bombay industry was failing to 
modernise its methods and was falling into a similar trap to 
Lancashire.90 Gordon, though, has argued that one result of the 
boycott was to persuade Bombay millowners such as the Sassoons to end 
the system of marketing through Marwari agents and begin selling 
directly to their customers.91 Interior mills were probably more able 
to adapt' to changes in demand than the standardised productions of 
Bombay. This in conjunction with the price difference would have made 
interior mills highly competitive in local markets against Bombay 
goods.
Bombay mills also had higher fuel costs. Although the industry 
had managed to break away from its dependence upon coal for fuel with 
the establishment of a hydro-electric scheme financed jointly by the 
Tatas and Sassoons, the electricity supplied was relatively expensive 
if more reliable.92 Cawnpore mills were located nearer coal supplies 
and could benefit from the reduction in price during the depression. 
Meanwhile, the several large hydro-electric schemes in Madras 
Presidency supplied cheap power for an area long-hindered by its
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distance from coal supplies, thus allowing the considerable expansion 
of Coimbatore and Madura and the neighbouring Mysore State.9 3
Factor costs, therefore, were essential in explaining the 
changing regional distribution of the Indian cotton industry. 
Although Bombay millowners complained bitterly about 'unfair foreign 
competition’ especially 'Japanese dumping’, their main concern should 
have been the steadily increasing internal competition. Morris is 
correct to argue that the concentration upon Bombay in the 
historiography of the Indian cotton industry has led to an over 
emphasis on the role of protection.94 After all, Japanese imports 
were mostly in coarser cloth and hosiery, which would have competed 
with the goods of interior mills rather than Bombay which was 
increasingly turning to finer counts.
The newly emerging local centres for cotton manufacturing in the 
1930s represented the entry of new Indian capital into the industry. 
As the depression cut profits from cotton trading, many up-country 
merchants shifted their investment into the apparently more secure 
manufacturing sector. This mirrors the trend in the jute industry. 
Mostly these new concerns were small-scale: Baker estimated that new
spinning mills could be established in the Madras Presidency in the 
mid-1980s with a fixed capital of only 5 to 6 lakhs, even less if 
second-hand machinery could be used.95 This pattern was repeated in 
the Central Provinces and Cawnpore where the new mills had a much 
smaller loom capacity than the older European managed firms of the 
pre-depression period.96 The reduction in factor costs must have 
been vital to provide such small concerns with a margin of profit.
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The problems of the Bombay Island mills, however, were not 
totally economic in origin during the years of the slump. The 
depression coincided with the political crisis of the Civil 
Disobedience campaign and Bombay City was the centre of some of the 
most prolonged disturbances. Bombay mills were caught up in the 
controversy of the Swadeshi campaign and the boycott of foreign 
firms. Congress declared a boycott of all non-Swadeshi mills in 
1930. To be declared Swadeshi a mill could not spin or weave lower 
than 18 counts (so as not to compete with the handloom industry), 
could not use foreign yam or artificial silk, not have more than 25
per cent foreign directors and capital and to insure with Indian
companies.97 While Motilal Nehru was prepared to be more 
accommodating to Bombay millowners (to decrease the counts to 10s, 
for instance) the Bombay Provincial Congress Committee was not and on 
Motilal’s arrest, 24 Bombay mills were banned as non-Swadeshi: 
including the Sassoon group. Eventually this number was reduced to 
15 but these mills, still including the Sassoon group, represented 25 
per cent of the gross output of Bombay City. Banned mills found
themselves subject to picketing (often violent), hartals and the
public burning of their cloth. Constant changes by the BPCC of the 
definition of 'Swadeshi’ produced a feeling of insecurity among 
Bombay millowners during this period of economic depression. The 
boycott also affected Bombay markets. The premier Bombay cloth 
market, the Mulji Jetha Market, was frequently closed including a 
four month continuous period in 1932, which left mills with increased 
stocks of unsold cloth. Thus, the economic problems of the 
depression in Bombay city textile mills were exacerbated by the 
political uncertainties of the period.98
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In economic terms, by increasing the advantages to up-country 
mills in terms of factor costs, the depression forced Bombay mills to 
recognise the necessity of rationalisation. However, financial 
stringency meant they needed some measure of government support to 
enable them to complete the reorganisation and technical adjustments 
within the industry. To gain this help from the Government of India, 
the BMA had to stress the danger of foreign competition. The Indian 
authorities were always being pressed by Whitehall to keep in mind 
the position of Lancashire and was unlikely to be able to make a case 
for supporting Bombay only in terms of adjustment to local 
competition." The 1926 Tariff Board, supported grudgingly by 
Whitehall, had recommended protection only for a period to allow 
Bombay a breathing space to adjust to the changing face of the Indian 
cotton industry. This Bombay was slow to do, partly through problems 
of capital unwisely speculated in the early 1920s. The depression 
served to highlight the dichotomy between the traditional and newer 
centres of the Indian cotton industry and forced Bombay to accept 
that it had to meet the challenge of the up-country mills to survive.
Coal
The Indian coal industry had been a traditional industrial 
sector which had actually enjoyed export markets although producing 
predominantly for the domestic market. The years of the depression 
marked a period of severe difficulties for the industry. Prices had 
been falling from 1927, but the impact of the depression brought a 
more rapid reduction from 1930-31. The price of coal continued to 
fall until mid-1936 when one ton of Grade 1 Jharia coal could fetch
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only Rs 2.3 in the Calcutta wholesale market.1 0 0 Production also 
fell from 22.3 million tons in 1930 to 19.7 million tons in 1933, 
while the price reductions decreased the value of the coal raised 
from Rs 8.4 crores to Rs 5.5 crores in the same period.1 01 Recovery 
was not steady until 1937-38 marking a more prolonged period of 
difficulty than that faced by other industries.
India’s coal industry had been facing serious problems from the 
mid- 1920s.1 02 The fuel shortage immediately after World War One had
led to an embargo on coal exports between 1920 and 1923. This
resulted in India losing its best foreign markets, Colombo and 
Singapore, to the Union of South Africa. Since this was also a 
period of high prices for Indian coal, the domestic market did not 
expand significantly, except for demand from the iron and steel 
industry. Therefore, by the mid-1920s, since production had increased 
significantly, large stocks of unsold coal had been created and 
prices declined. In July 1925 the Member for Labour and Industry of 
the Government of India wrote to London that the Indian coal industry
was 'passing through a phase of severe depression’, diagnosing the
problem as one of 'over-production’ . He prophesied that 'a difficult 
time is ahead for the coal industry and that a good many of the 
smaller and less efficient collieries can hardly hope to surviveL103 
The response by colliery owners was to have production increased 
further in an attempt to reduce costs. Meanwhile the Government 
believed that the export market could be regained by regulating the 
quality of Indian coal exported. They adopted recommendations of the 
1924 Coal Committee for the establishment of a Coal Grading Board and 
a rebate on railway freight charges for coal destined for export from
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Calcutta.1 0 4
The major problem facing the Indian coal industry was the 
quality of much of its produce. Indian coal had a high ash content 
and there were only relatively small reserves of good quality coking 
coal suitable for industrial use and this was highly localised in 
Jharia and Raniganj coal fields. This meant that, including freight 
charges, Indian coal was at a severe disadvantage in the western and 
southern domestic markets. Thus, many industrial consumers preferred 
to use coal imported from South Wales or oil, while in the 1930s in 
certain parts of India, cheap hydro-electricity became available for 
industrial use as a by-product of some large irrigation barrages, 
notably in the Madras region. Between 1922 and 1935, according to the 
1937 Coalfield’s Commission the distribution of consumption of Indian 
coal changed only slightly.105 This can be seen in Table 5.10 (over). 
The only major new consumer for domestic coal was the expanding iron 
and steel industry which doubled its consumption. Given the general 
progress in Indian industries in this period, these changes in the 
consumption patterns were very disappointing for the coal industry.
At the height of the depression, between 1930 and 1933, 
consumption of Indian coal declined heavily despite falling prices. 
From 1931 until 1935 consumption lagged behind, as illustrated in
Table 5.11 (over). The only major benefit to the coal industry from
the depression was that the price of Indian coal fell below that of
imported coal and imports declined sharply from 218,560 loss in 1929 
to 47,544 loss in 1932. Thereafter imports of coal remained
depressed, particularly as the South African industry hit major
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Table 5.10
Consumption (estimated) of Coal by various users (000 tons)
1922 1927 1929 1935
Railways 6,186 7,259 7,583 7,293
Cotton, Jute, Paper, Tea 2,424 2,144 2,859 2,541
Iron and Engineering 2,415 5,260 5,231 5,583
Admiralty, Port Trusts 1,628 2,158 2,286 1,135
Bunker Coal, Inland Skanes 
Kilns, Potteries, Cement 437 565 691 792
Collieries and Wastage 2,471 2,208 2,342 1,220
Other Industrial/Domestic 4,521 2,085 1,879 3,721
Total 20,082 21,706 22,871 22,885
Source: Report of the Indian Coal Mining Committee, 1937, Vol. I,
p.50, para 21.
Table 5.11
Indian Coal Production and Consumption (tons)
Output Consumption
1928 21,140,104 22,083,000
1929 21,561,971 22,871,000
1930 22,362,452 23,514,000
1931 22,762,394 21,355,449
1932 20,153,387 19,679,154
1933 19,789,163 19,427,899
1934 22,057,447 21,799,458
1936 21,885,691 21,981,627
Source: Indian Coal Statistics, Indian Trade Journal (annual)
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transportation problems in the late 1930s.1 06 This provided some 
scope for import substitution from the middle of the decade. However, 
the depression was marked by reduced consumption in India and output 
from Indian mines declined with a time lag of one year. Exports also 
became almost negligible despite the attempts at quality control. 
Meanwhile, the railways which had traditionally been the single 
largest consumer of Indian coal, cut their purchases by about one 
million tons between 1931 and 1933.107 The Report of the Chief 
Inspector of Mines also referred to a marked decline in sales to 
Bombay Presidency, both to cotton mills and the port. The decline in 
sales to the Railway Board was a major problem since it was the Board 
which set the level of the price of coal in India with individual 
consumers normally not accepting higher tenders than the Railway 
Board. There were many complaints from colliery owners that the Board 
was attempting to cut its costs at their expense by forcing down the 
price of coal. To reduce tender prices, the Railway Board threatened 
to increase production in its own collieries.1 08 Thus while the Board 
was forcing down the price (by one rupee per ton in 1932 and 1935) it 
was also reducing orders, a double blow to the Indian coal industry.
Unlike other industries, it seems that there was little scope 
for reduction of production costs during the depression, nor was 
there the possibility of re-location of the industry. The working 
costs of an average colliery were not high. Entry was relatively 
easy since a large proportion of the coal could be mined open-cast 
with little technical difficulty. Throughout India, only some Rs 10 
crores was invested in the coal industry. Labour costs were also low 
with the majority of workers being recruited from local tribal
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groups.110 While this labour was often seasonal, the 1946 Labour 
Report stated that most returned every year to the same group of 
colleries giving a certain stability to the workforce.1 1 1 During the 
depression wage rates were cut in Bengal and Bihar coalfields through 
a reduction in rates per tub brought to the surface and through 
shorter hours, as illustrated in Table 5.12 (over)
Wage rates for the higher paid Central Provinces collieries were 
decreased by ten per cent between 1930 and 1932. These rates 
remained in force until the outbreak of the war and the consequent 
shortage of labour forced wages to rise again. Employers also tried 
to reduce labour costs by pressing for the re-introduction of family 
labour underground. However, the government strenuously opposed such 
pressure.112 Further cuts were made through short-time working: by
1932 most collieries in Bihar and Orissa and Bengal were working only 
a three or four day week.113 Numbers employed were also reduced, 
from 184,370 in 1930 to 163,173 in 1933, although they rose again 
after that.114 Meanwhile per capita output was falling from 187.8 
tons per worker in 1929 to 169.2 tons in 1933.1 1 5
Production costs of mining companies would have been affected by 
the increased railway charges which resulted from the depression. 
From January 15, 1932 the Railway Board imposed a 15 per cent
surcharge on coal freights.116 Thus for instance freight rates from 
Raniganj to Calcutta rose from Rs 3.6 per ton in 1929 to Rs 3.14 per 
ton in 1932, to Bombay from Rs 12.6 per ton to Rs 14.4 and to Delhi 
from Rs 8.14 per ton to Rs 10.3. By 1936 only the rates to Bombay 
had been reduced to the 1929 level.117 Owners and managers from the 
Jharia field complained to the Governor of Bihar and Orissa that
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their industry was being ruined by 'excessive and discriminatory* 
railway freights. The local government, however, refused to petition 
the Central Government on their behalf 'at least until facts are 
reported which show that this coalfield is being unfairly 
treated* J 1 8 While the Government of Bihar and Orissa was seeking to 
establish a case to renegotiate the Meston Award, they were unwilling 
to antagonise a central government under great pressure from 
Whitehall to balance the budget of the Railway Department. Only that 
coal destined for export was allowed a rebate on railway freight and 
this was increased by a further eight annas per ton for certified 
coal in 1936.119
After pressure was put on Central Government by both the Indian 
Mining Federation and the Indian Mining Association, it agreed to the 
creation of a Soft Coal Cess Board to promote a wider market for the 
product. To pay for this a surcharge of two annas per ton was placed 
on railway freight.120 The depression hit the industry before the 
effects of this legislation could be measured. Given the fall in 
income levels generally, it is unlikely that there would have been 
any great rise in demand for soft coal in more rural areas when 
traditional forms of fuel would have been available more cheaply. The 
Chief Inspector of Mines, though, in the 1937 report maintained that 
the work of the Board prevented a disastrous reduction in demand for 
soft coal at the peak of the depression and so provided some relief 
for the industry.121 Soft coke output declined only slightly from
754,000 tons in 1929 to 722,500 in 1931. Output then rose rapidly to 
reach 915,700 tons in 1936, the bulk of the sales in Calcutta.122
In general, the major difficulty facing the industry was its
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failure to modernise outwith some large-scale units. The Indian coal 
mining sector was dominated by small-scale, open cast mines. This 
was facilitated by the low capital input necessary to enter the 
industry. Also the Bengal and Bihar fields tended to be hopelessly 
sub-divided. This was a legacy of the Permanent Settlement which had 
given the land to local zamindars before the mineral resources had 
been discovered. The landowners were mostly willing to sub-divide 
their mineral rights in small plots to the highest bidder.123 Thus, 
the pattern of development for the industry emerged whereby small 
collieries were opened to secure quick profits at times of high 
prices, only to be closed rapidly when prices fell. The depression 
years were characterised by many such closures particularly since 
most of the easily mined seams had been worked by the early 1920s. 
Meanwhile, larger concerns were increasing production in the effort 
to reduce costs per unit, so their share of total production began to 
rise, and continued to do so until the end of the period, as shown in 
Table 5.13 (over).
This would have benefited the industry in the long run. The 
larger units were usually run on more efficient lines and being open­
cast could employ economies of scale. The 1937 Coalfields Committee 
reported that the 9 large scale coal companies had been able to 
reduce their raising costs by 46 per cent by increasing production by 
80 per cent between 1925 and 1935.124 They were also in a stronger 
position to improve their technological basis, for instance, through 
the employment of power-driven cutters and electrical pumps. However, 
it is noticeable that, although their share of total output had 
decreased, the numbers of the smallest mining units increased rapidly
'265
Table 5.13
Share of Production in Indian Coal Industry
1923 1928 1934 1939
Up to 5,000 tons:
No. Mines 388 171 135 190
% output 3.5 1.4 0.9 1.2
5,000 - 25,000 tons:
No. Mines 187 151 146 162
% output 14.7 9.0 8.9 8.1
25,000 - 100,000 tons:
No. Mines 175 149 137 156
%  output 44.6 32.6 30.0 27.6
100,000 - 200,000 tons:
No. Mines 20 38 41 49
% output 16.5 23.4 25.2 22.8
Over 200,000 tons:
No. Mines 12 18 22 30
% output 20.6 33.6 35.0 40.4
Source: Report of Indian Coalfields Committee, (1946), Vol. I,
p.296, Appendix VII.
again in the later 1930s as conditions improved.125 The impact of the 
depression had failed to alter the structure of the industry and the 
basic weaknesses remained. The increased share of the larger 
colliery companies was a long term feature, the major shift in output 
occurring before 1928 and after 1934. The reports on the coal 
industry in 1925, 1937 and 1946 all catalogued the same list of
problems facing the industry, particularly the number of small 
collieries. Thus, the 1946 Coalfields Report could still lament:
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'The opening up of small collieries during periods of 
prosperity and their closure during bad times both have a 
deleterious effect on the proper exploitation of the 
country’s resources. These collieries are generally ill- 
equipped and their object is to secure the easiest coal.
The result, not infrequently, is that coal-bearing areas 
become pock-marked with shallow workings which may lead to 
unsound development in the neighbourhood and may, as has 
happened in the Jharia field, be the cause of disastrous 
f ires.’126
In an attempt to solve the problems which had been exacerbated 
by the depression, a proposal for a scheme of output restriction was 
raised in 1933. The scheme would restrict output for the next three 
years in Bengal, Bihar and the Central Provinces based on a standard 
tonnage of the average of output in 1930-32. The quota would be 75
per cent for Bengal and Bihar and 100 per cent for Central Provinces.
Output of soft coke would also be restricted by the same quota. 
However, in-fighting between the rival Indian groups, the Indian 
Mining Federation and the Indian Colliery Owners Association led the 
Government of India to reject the proposal.127 The central 
authorities believed that there was no way in which an agreement 
could be made binding on all parties when there was such disunity in 
the industry. In this, they may have had before their minds, the 
example of the failure of the restriction schemes in jute
manufacturing to be binding, despite the seeming dominance of the 
IJMA.
The Indian coal industry began to show signs of recovery from 
1937. Production rates and unemployment figures increased and profits 
showed some growth. In part, this was aided by a recovery in
exports which arose from around 250,000 tons m  1936—37 to 1.3 
million tons in 1938-39 mostly sold to Burma but also to China and
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Ceylon.128 However, most of the increase came from the revival of 
internal demand from the iron and steel industry and other domestic 
consumers. Thus, once again, it was problems of demand for Indian 
coal, allied to the traditional structure of the industry, which 
exacerbated the impact of the depression on the coal industry. The 
slight reduction in production costs was offset by the failure of 
government to significantly decrease freight charges. Therefore, 
consumption of coal failed to increase significantly during the slump 
despite the general increase in industrial production.
Iron and Steel
From the beginning, through the dominance of the production of 
rails and fish-plate production, the modem Indian iron and steel 
industry had depended upon government patronage for its survival, 
culminating in the award of protection in 1924. Given this early 
dependence upon government support, especially through orders from 
the Railway Board, the depression could have proved to be a crushing 
blow, but the industry was able to diversify its lines of production 
and actually increase output during the depression. The later 1930s 
also saw the widening of the manufacturing basis of the industry away 
from the one firm, although the pioneers, the Tata Iron and Steel Co 
(TISCO) still dominated the Indian industry.
Yet, in 1929 local commentators were predicting a serious crisis 
for the industry because of the problems of TISCO. Birla’s agent in 
Jamshedpur declared 'the Tata Steel Co is at present in a very 
precarious condition.’129 Having engaged on a large extension
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programme at the end of the war at the time of maximum prices, TISCO 
needed a period of prosperity to recover. The rapid fall in the 
world price of iron and steel, especially on Continental Europe, had 
been the reason for the grant of protection in 1924. In 1927, 
however, this was modified to allow 'discriminating protection’ for 
British steel entering India.1 30 Although TISCO was awarded 
government contracts for rails, steel for construction purposes such 
as bridges was imported from Britain, so in the late 1920s, while 
TISCO production increased so did imports. A prolonged labour dispute 
in the summer of 1929 brought TISCO to the brink of crisis.1 31 
Production was halved and profits plummeted at the moment when new 
investment had begun in a further extension of the plant. This had 
been the root of the strike, since the new technology reduced 
staffing levels considerably.
Against this background, the depression, with its effects on 
government spending, could have been the final blow. However, the 
fall in costs brought about by the depression, added to the increased 
efficiency of the new plant, meant that TISCO not only survived the 
depression, but the early 1930s proved the basis for the long-term 
development of the company. The 1933 Tariff Board which, naturally 
enough, concentrated on TISCO provides page after page of evidence of 
the reduction of costs.132 Works costs for production were reduced, 
as shown in Table 5.14 (over).
These reductions were made up of falling cost of coal and 
spelter, the establishment of a Fuel Efficiency Department in 1928 
and a Retrenchment Committee with a monthly cost committee of all 
departmental heads. Technological efficiency had been improved with
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Table 5.14
Production costs of Indian iron and steel industry (Rs per ton)
1928-29 1931-32 Jan-June 1933
Pig Iron 24-4 20-8 18-6
Saleable steel (average) 92-5 76-9 69-6
Rails 86-5 74-6 64-8
Fishplates 127-0 103-3 73-2
Source: Report of the Indian Tariff Board in the Iron and Steel
Industry, 1933, pp.51-52, Statement la and lb.
the enlargement of two blast furnaces and a new boiler system in the 
foundry and these added to the reductions in costs.1 33 Labour costs 
were reduced both by the reduction of manning levels from 22,853 in 
1929-30 to 17,517 by mid-1933, and through the introduction of 
shorter hours, fewer working days 'and by adopting the system of 
leave by rotation’. Indianisation of the technical and managerial 
staff also helped to reduce labour costs since Indian senior staff 
were paid on average half the salary of European or American 
personnel.13 4
However, the Report also goes on to highlight that the company 
was not able to make as effective use of those reduced costs as they 
could have.135 The depression did bite, especially in the loss of 
government railway orders: the contract from the Railway Board for
rails decreased from 1,197,000 tons in 1929-30 to approximately
400,000 by 1933-34.1 36 To offset this TISCO had to sell more steel 
further afield in Bombay, Karachi and Madras and this entailed
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heavier freight rates, especially since the freight agreement with 
the major railway companies ended on 30 June 1933.13? TISCO 
estimated that this would add around Rs 40 lakhs per annum to costs 
on the basis of 1932-33 freights.138
Consumption figures for steel in India declined heavily during 
the depression with the reduction in construction, particularly by 
government. Consumption was halved from 1,145,900 tons in 1928-29 to 
574,100 in 1932-33.139 Consumption of pig-iron also fell off so that 
in 1931 the other major iron company, the Indian Iron and Steel Co, 
(IISCO), was operating only one furnace, thus increasing its
costs.1 4 0 For the production of pig-iron two trade treaties became 
important. The Supplementary Agreement to Ottawa of 1934 guaranteed 
free entry for Indian pig-iron into Britain providing a valuable 
market as the domestic market suffered. Morris stresses the
importance of this maintenance for the Indian industry of the British 
market.141 By 1933 Britain was taking 87 per cent of her pig-iron 
imports from India and this would have been a valuable market to 
lose. The 1933 Indo-Japanese Convention helped stabilise Indo- 
Japanese trade relations generally and helped restore some of the
lost market for Indian pig-iron. This was particularly important for 
IISCO.14 2
These difficulties brought about by the depression forced the 
Indian iron and steel industry to diversify from its dependence upon 
railway orders. In 1929 rails and fishplates had accounted for one- 
third of all production but by 1939 only amounted to one-tenth of 
total output.143 The quality of steel produced was also improved so
271
that the 1933 Tariff Board was able to recommend that a wider range 
of government contracts should be given to domestic suppliers instead 
of imported steel.144 Overall the TISCO share of the domestic market 
for steel increased from 31 per cent in 1929-30 to 65 per cent by
1936-37.145
As the Indian economy generally recovered from the depression, 
the iron and steel industry was able to take fuller advantage of its 
decreased costs. TISCO production expanded rapidly, doubling between 
1931 to 1939 when it reached 715,000 tons of saleable steel.146 
Meanwhile the IISCO was expanded by its managing agents Birds to form 
the Bengal Iron and Steel Co. By 1937 TISCO believed it could 
dispense with protection except in the case of dumping.147 The 
sustained profit levels during the depression were ploughed back into 
further extensions: two new sheet mills, a new blast furnace, a plant 
for the production of sulphuric acid in 1936 and a new power plant in 
1938.148 The strength of the small-scale domestic industry can be 
gauged by the fact that between 1934 and 1939 fifty small re-rolling 
plants were established throughout the country.149
Thus while the Indian iron and steel industry was able to expand 
during the slump, protection and the reduction of costs were not 
enough to overcome all the immediate problems created by the 
depression. However, the cost reductions achieved during these years 
allowed an even more rapid expansion of the industry in the late 
1930s, based on the willingness to plough back profits to increase 
technological efficiency.
27 2
Sugar
The Indian sugar industry has often been cited as showing the 
value of tariff protection in industrial development. For instance, 
the 1938 Tariff Board claimed that, ‘As a result of the px)licy of 
discriminating protection, it is no overstatement to say that the 
sugar industry in India has been revolutionised'.150 This can be 
compared to an earlier verdict in the Investors' Year Book of 1930 
which maintained that the Indian sugar industry could never compete 
with foreign rivals ‘and this is reflected in the price of rupee 
shares, many of which have been unsaleable for months at any figure 
in reason'.151
Until 1932, the Indian sugar industry had concentrated on the 
manufacture of the traditional product, gur. The process involved 
was highly inefficient with much wastage.152 There were a few 
factories producing refined sugar but most Indian consumption of 
refined sugar was met by imports, principally from Java. These 
imports continued to expand until 1930 when they reached a p>eak of
933,000 tons.153 The indigenous producers of refined sugar could not 
compete with the prices of imported sugar mainly because of the heavy 
freight charges to the principal consuming areas and the general 
level of inefficiency within the industry. Indeed tariff protection 
was ruled out by the 1919 Sugar Commission because they believed it 
would only strengthen the inefficient practices rather than promote 
modem techniques.154 However, by late 1930, as the depression began 
to reduce the price of Javanese sugar, this in turn depressed the 
price of gur in Indian markets threatening both producers and the
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cultivators. Gur producers manufactured more in an effort to reduce 
costs but this only served to reduce the price further.
As a purely revenue measure, the duty on imported sugar was 
raised to Rs 6 per cwt in 1930.1 55 At the same time, the Governments 
of the United Provinces, Bihar and Orissa and the Punjab had 
requested a Tariff Inquiry into the sugar industry, a plea to which 
the newly formed Imperial Council of Agricultural Research also added 
its weight.156 The demand for protection was unusual in its official 
origin compared to other industries and sprung from a concern for the 
impact of the price falls on the sugar-cane cultivator. In these 
provinces, the other major cash crops had been wheat and rice, the 
price of which had been heavily affected by the depression. While 
the local governments did not feel able to offer much help to those 
products, there was a belief that a modem sugar industry could be 
strengthened not only during the depression but also in the long­
term.157 Such government involvement is in marked contrast to the 
halting government intervention to aid cultivators of jute, the 
seemingly more important crop. Partly this can be explained in 
economic terms, in the financial difficulties of the Government of 
Bengal. Partly, however, the reasons were also political. The 
Governments of the United Provinces and Bihar were faced with some of 
the most sustained disturbances during the Civil Disobedience 
Campaigns and probably hoped that intervention to aid sugar cane 
cultivators would counter much of the anti-Government propaganda of 
the Indian National Congress.158
The Government of India accepted this idea and a protective duty 
of Rs 9-1-0 per cent was imposed in 1931.159 This effectively ended
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the import of refined sugar into India, although these were already 
falling off under the impact of the revenue tariff. With the award 
of protection, the number of sugar factories increased rapidly. In 
1930 there had been 29 factories refining white sugar and 14 gur, by 
1938-39 there were some 234 of which 79 were gur factories.160 A 
measure of the growth of the industry is the rapid increase in the 
impor of sugar machinery, which rose from Rs 921,000 in 1929-30 to 
Rs 33,639,000 in 1933-34.161 The reduced price of imported machinery 
during the depression greatly facilitated the establishment of sugar 
factories.
Large amounts of new capital were attracted to the sugar 
industry which was made more attractive by the stagnation in the
other agricultural processing industries of Northern India such as 
jute baling and rice milling. Between 1929-30 and 1936-37 the paid- 
up capital of the sugar industry increased nearly five times.162
Numbers employed rose rapidly too, from 15,253 in 1928 to 70,000 in
1936, although the growth rate then slowed down to reach 75,000 by
1938.163 Rosen has calculated that in 1938 the sugar industry ranked 
fourth in terms of capital investment and industrial production.164
The location of the industry was restricted by local supplies of 
cane, because after being cut the sucrose content of the cane 
deteriorated rapidly. The 1931 Tariff Board estimated a maximum 
location of 16 miles from the source of supply.165 Therefore, 
transport costs remained relatively unimportant to the industry, with 
most supplies being within carting range • What was important was the 
cost of the raw cane which amounted to almost two-thirds of the total
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production costs. It is this which helps to explain the location of 
the industry in Northern India and the use of the relatively inferior 
domestic cane. Although the best quality and highest yielding canes 
were the tropical varieties of Madras and Bombay, they were the most 
expensive to cultivate requiring large amounts of irrigation. It 
cost 12 annas to produce one pound of sugar cane in Madras, but only 
4 annas per lb in Bihar.1 6 6 The indigenous canes of Northern India 
required far less irrigation and while they yielded less, they did 
provide a relatively more stable source of supply.
While new capital was encouraged to enter the industry, Bagchi
has concluded that the most profitable sugar companies in the 1930s,
however, were those already in existence before the award of 
protection.167 The mills managed by Parrys, for instance, declared 
annual average dividends of between 9.25 and 17.5 per cent during the 
period 1931-40, while the two mills managed by the Narang Brothers 
that were in operation before 1930 registered dividends in the same 
period of between 17.9 per cent and 22.1 per cent. The new mills,
while profitable, could not match these dividends. Between 1934 and 
1941 the average dividend of the Babrampur Mill of Begg, Sutherland
and Co was 5.18 per cent while the Nawabganj Mill of the Narang
Brothers yielded 8.8 per cent.1 6 8
Bagchi suggests that the reason for this was the size of the 
earlier mills and their style of operation. The pre-protection mills 
tended to be larger and many owned the surrounding cane fields to 
regularise their supply of raw material • This type of factory could 
be found in Bihar and Orissa and parts of Bombay. The new mills, 
howGVGr, were predominantly small to medium sized, that is, with a
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capacity of up to 500 tons per day.1 69 These mills did not own land 
and depended upon supplies of raw cane from independent cultivators. 
Even the larger mills, as their capacity expanded, grew to depend 
more on purchases from the local product so that the Indian industry
did not become dominated by the plantation sector as in Cuba and
Java. The danger of this lay in the uneven development of the Indian 
sugar industry. As production became concentrated in the United 
Provinces and Bihar and Orissa, the supply of cane did not keep
progress with the erection of new mills.170 Remembering the limit
on distribution area of mills, this led to severe competition in 
these provinces for the supply of raw cane. Meanwhile the industry 
in Bombay and Madras remained underdeveloped until the mid-1930s.
At the same time it was becoming apparent that while protection 
had pushed out imported refined sugar, for a viable Indian industry 
demand had to be raised substantially within the domestic market. The 
figures for the consumption of white sugar and production of gur 
are contained in Table ■ 5.15 (over). The majority of Indian 
consumers, still preferred gur for various reasons including taste, 
nutritional value and adhesive quality in sweet-making.171 
Protection had also acted as a stimulus to gur production, with 
output doubling between 1929-30 and 1935-36. Some of the new capital 
was being invested in the more effective production of gur, for 
example, triple-roller crushing. Local governments also promoted 
production of gur and khandsari sugar as cottage industries which 
diverted consumption from mill-refined white sugars.172
The local governments remained involved in the development of
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Table 5.15
Production and Consumption of White Sugar and Gur in India (000 tons)
Total
Factory
Production
Production
Khandsari
Net
Production
Gur
Net
Imports
White
Sugar
Indian
Consumption
White
Sugar
1926-27 121 - 2,313 815 936
1927-28 720 - 2,276 706 826
1928-29 99 - 1,778 859 958
1929-30 113 200 1,842 933 1,046
1930-31 150 200 2,241 898 1,048
1931-32 221 250 2,758 510 731
1932-33 368 275 3,240 366 734
1933-34 519 200 3,486 249 768
1934-35 622 150 3,701 220 842
1935-36 980 125 4,101 198 1,178
1936-37 1,137 100 4,268 -17 1,120
1937-38 948 125 3,364 -35 913
1938-39 666 100 2,728 -4 662
1939-40 1,269 125 2,441 198 1,468
Source: A.K. Bagchi, Private Investment in India 1900-1939,
Table 12.3, p.372, (Cambridge, 1972).
Indian Trade Journal, Vol. CXXX1X, Oct.-Dec. 1940, p.13 
Supplement on Sugar industry in 1939-40
the sugar industry but always with the interest of the cultivator 
foremost, hence the interest in gur and khandsari. They promoted a
minimum price for sugarcane which was backed by legislation in the 
United Provinces and Bihar.173 This led to the sugar industry being
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the only industry in India which experienced greater falls in price 
for its manufactured product than its raw material. Thus, while 
prices for raw sugar delivered to factories in Bihar fell from an 
average of Rs 7.0 per maund in 1930-31 to Rs 6-4 in 1934-35, the 
price for refined sugar declined from Rs 9-11 to Rs 7-4 in the same 
period.174 In the United Provinces the average price for raw cane 
fell only from Rs 6-3 in 1931-32 to Rs 6-0 per maund in 1934-35, 
while those of refined sugar were reduced from Rs 9-12 to Rs 8-5.175 
Although the Indian Sugar Mills Association (ISMA) successfully 
negotiated a reduction in the freight on manufactured sugar from 
Cawnpore and Patna in 1933, the industry was then hit by the 
imposition of an excise duty by the Government of India in 1934 in an 
effort to recover some of the revenue lost from import duties.176 In 
1936 this was raised from Rs 1-5-0 to Rs 2 per maund.177 With the 
failure of the Indian market to expand as rapidly as had been 
anticipated, competition emerged between the old established mills 
and the new entrants and prices fell further.
In 1936 the ISMA formed a sugar syndicate, ostensibly as a 
marketing organisation, but in reality an attempt to strengthen the 
political power of the sugar lobby at both local and central 
government level. The sugar lobby maintained that the minimum price 
structure was artificially inflating the cost of raw materials and 
that if the industry was to fail, the cultivators’ position would be 
worse than ever.178 They succeeded in persuading the Government of 
India to abandon minimum price legislation and raw cane prices 
slumped by an average of Rs 2 per maund in 1936-37 alone.179 Still 
concerned about the position of the cultivator, the Governments of
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the United Provinces and Bihar attempted to regulate the industry in 
their districts through licensing of factories and zoning of supply 
districts. Although the legislation could easily be circumvented by 
both cultivator and factory manager, it meant that the majority of 
new factories established from 1937 were in Bombay or Madras, but 
since these areas had the highest costs, progress was slow, and again 
sugar mills were small in size and made little profits. 1 80
While the domestic market was slow to expand, the India sugar 
industry was denied any opportunity of establishing an export market 
when the Government of India signed the International Sugar Agreement
in 1937.181 After years of refusing to join any restriction scheme
government officials had been persuaded to accept agreement in 1937 
because it did not interfere with domestic production, but placed a 
five year embargo on all exports of sugar by sea from India.
Officials, both in India and Whitehall, did not believe that Indian 
sugar could compete with Javanese or Cuban sugar in world markets. 
Therefore, they did not think that they had anything to lose by 
signing the agreement and in so doing actually helped to strengthen 
the bargaining power of the Australian Government. The Indian 
authorities hoped that by acting in this way, they could gain
reciprocal trade advantages in the Australian market. The ISMA 
protested, but it is unlikely that Indian sugar could have captured 
world markets successfully being more expensive and of much poorer 
quality than either Javanese or Cuban sugar.
The 1919 Sugar Commission had suggested that the award of 
protection would only serve to bolster an inefficient industry, and
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this is what occurred in the greater part of the industry. The 1947 
Tariff Board reported that, according to the standards of the ISMA, 
two-thirds of all sugar factories in India were of an uneconomic 
size.182 They also severely criticised the failure to utilise by­
products to reduce costs apart from the use of bagasse as fuel. 
Unlike Java anmd Cuba, there was little research within the Indian 
industry on the utilisation of by-products.
Thus the award of protection gave the domestic sugar market to 
Indian producers, but thereafter government policy was inconsistent, 
and, for a viable industry, the demand in the domestic market was not 
large enough due to the failure of overall incomes to rise. Despite 
the necessity of securing markets, little was done to organise 
marketing of the basic product let alone the by-products. By the late 
1930s the great investment boom in sugar was over as the problems 
came to the surface.
Paper
The Indian paper industry can also be classed as a new 
'protected' industry. There had been paper mills in existence before 
the inter-war period, dominated by two European managing agents; 
Heilgers managed the largest group, the Titagarh Paper Mills Co, and 
Balmer Lawrie the Bengal Paper Mill Co. The industry lacked 
sufficient supplies of a viable indigenous pulp material and so was 
at an extreme disadvantage against imported paper in this period. 
Tariff protection was granted in 1925 because it was believed that 
bamboo pulp could provide a basis for the long-term development of 
the industry, thus allowing a reduction in production costs.183
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Protection was increased in 1931 when the Tariff Board reported that 
once technology for pulp-making from bamboo had been established 
commercially, India could have a potential export in both machinery 
and raw material.1 84
Supply of raw material proved to be the major problem facing the 
industry. The traditional raw material had been sabai grass, thus 
the original location for the industry had been in Bengal to be near 
the coal fields since it was cheaper to transport the grass to the 
mills near the fuel supply than vice versa. However, as the location 
of the supplies of sabai grass grew ever-distant, production costs 
increased as transportation costs rose.
Although the various early Tariff Boards had hoped that research 
into bamboo pulp technology would be actively pursued, only the new 
Indian Paper Pulp Co, managed by Andrew Yule and Co, maintained a 
research programme. The lack of enthusiasm is not difficult to 
understand since the Indian Paper Pulp Co, failed to make any profits 
for the first 14 years of its existence, the mill being financed by 
Yule’s wider interests.1 8 5 Active research on a wider scale was not 
considered until the early 1930s when the Yule mill was beginning to 
show some signs of progress and an import duty on wood-pulp 
necessitated the hasty research for a viable indigenous raw material.
Prior to this, protection had served mainly to increase the 
import of wood pulp (Table 5.16). The duty on imported wood-pulp was 
imposed to push the industry back into the research on bamboo-pulp 
technology and while this increased the use of the indigenous 
material, imported wood-pulp could not be dispensed with altogether.
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Table 5.16
Types of Pulp Used in Production of Paper in India
1923
%
1931-32
%
1936-37
%
Bamboo Pulp 6.1 13.2 37.7
Grass Pulp 39.4 22.8 28.5
Other Indigenous Pulp 23.2 8.3 18.2
Imported Wood Pulp 31.3 55.7 21.6
Total Wood Pulp (000 tons) 24.6 39.7 51.1
Source: M.D. Morris, 'Growth of Large Scale Industry to 1947’,
Cambridge Economic History of India, (1983), p.653.
Bamboo-pulp was unsuitable for the manufacture of newsprint so the 
duty on wood-pulp merely served to increase production costs. The 
newsprint problems were not solved until 1947.186
Other basic problems confronting the industry included the lack 
of sites with a supply of clear water throughout the year and the 
reliance on imported chemicals, particularly caustic soda and 
chlorine. Caustic soda imports continued to increase despite the 
slump reflecting its importance as an industrial raw material and the 
lack of development in the domestic chemical industry.187 The 1946 
Tariff Board on Heavy Chemicals pointed out that the bulk of Indian 
production was carried on by paper mills own chemical plants. This 
must have added heavily to production costs.1 88
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The level of protection was increased also by the general 
surcharge of 1931. However, despite this, and unlike the case of 
sugar, levels of production and employment remained stable through 
the depression years, as shown in Table 5.17 (over). This was the 
result of relative factor costs. The duty on imported wood-pulp was 
raised to Rs 56.25 per ton which offset most of the decrease in its 
price brought about by the depression.1 89 Similarly, the short-lived 
attempt between 1931 and 1934 to protect the Indian heavy chemical 
industry increased the costs of the paper industry, both by raising 
the cost of imported chemicals and the internal price of indigenously 
produced chemicals. Most seriously, railway freights for the paper 
industry increased substantially during the height of the depression 
and then were reduced only marginally between 1933 and 1936.
Bagchi has blamed the generally depressed state of the Indian 
economy in the early 1930s for effectively blocking development of 
the paper industry despite the award of protection.190 Certainly 
the strain on Government finances, particularly at the provincial 
level, must have been a severe constraint since much of the early 
development was based on government contracts. In an effort to 
counteract this the Indian Paper Makers’ Association formed a price 
pool in 1935 to try to win government orders. Reduced real incomes 
of consumers also would have curtailed the demand for paper 
producers.
Production, and investment levels did not expand until the later 
1930s, in line with the general economic recovery. Much of the new 
capital entering the industry was coming from Eastern Indian groups, 
especially the Birlas and Dalmias. The development of bamboo-pulp
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Table 5.17
Paper Mills - Number, Capital and Production
No. of 
Mills
Authorised
Capital
Rs
Average No. 
Persons 
Employed 
Daily
Production
Quantity
Tons
Value
Rs
1928 8 82,61,500 5,825 38,016 1,81,94,077
1929 9 1,44,62,500 - 40,712 1,86,75,694
1930 10 1,64,62,500 - 39,706 1,74,12,178
1931 9 1,14,62,500 - 40,558 1,85,00,489
1932 9 1,14,62,500 5,674 40,391 1,78,43,409
1933 9 1,14,62,500 5,611 43,206 1,79,36,760
1934 9 1,14,62,500 5,995 44,179 1,71,13,169
1935 10 1,19,62,500 6,621 47,305 1,89,87,767
1936 10 1,34,62,500 - 48,209 1,92,12,791
1937 11 1,81,13,250 7,276 56,593 2,48,13,096
1938 12 2,24,13,250 7,761 60,114 2,46,04,675
Source: Statistical Abstract 1919-20 to 1928-29, Cmd 3882 of
1931, Table 209, p.693
Statistical Abstract 1929-30 to 1938-39, Cmd 6333 of 
1942, Table 207, p.572.
technology slashed production costs through the cheapness of the raw 
material. In 1931 the Tariff Board estimated that one ton of 
bamboo-pulp might cost Rs 38 but by 1938 the actual cost was only 
Rs 14 to Rs 22 depending on quality of bleaching.1 91 The new 
technology also allowed the diversification of location and gave a 
new impetus to production of sabai grass by relieving the burden of 
it being the only major indigenous raw material.192 In the late
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1930s new mills were constructed by Birla in Orissa and by the 
Thapars in the Punjab. The location of the Birla’s Orient Mill was 
particularly cost-effective being situated near the Rampur colliery 
as well as good local supplies of bamboo. It was also an area of 
markedly cheaper labour costs having experienced little previous 
industrial development.1 9 3
It is interesting to consider the timing of the entry of Indian 
capital into the paper industry. Despite the problems during the 
depression the established European firms were still able to declare 
high dividends in the early 1930s: the dividends for the Bengal
Paper Mill Co ranged from 20 to 25 per cent between 1929 and 1934, 
while those for the Titagarh group were maintained between 35 and 45 
per cent in the same period.194 This probably reflects the diversity 
of interest of the managing agents involved and the extent of the 
reserves which they had been able to build up before the depression. 
Although these dividends were high, entry into the sugar industry 
offered quicker returns for new capital. In paper, large inputs of 
capital were required for the development of bamboo-pulp technology 
to break the dependence on the imported wood-pulp now at an inflated 
price. Therefore, it is not surprising that the Indian entrepreneurs 
delayed investment in paper until the necessary technological 
developments had taken place. By 1937, profit levels in the sugar 
industry were showing signs of constraint while the technology was 
now available for the paper industry to progress. It is notable that 
the Indian groups now entering the paper industry were those which 
had invested heavily in sugar in the previous period, such as the 
Birlas, the Thapars and the Dalmias.
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Cement
The Indian cement industry, unlike other industries categorised 
as 'new’ such as paper and sugar, did not officially receive 
protection, although the general surcharge on import duties imposed 
in the Emergency Budget of September 1931 did have important 
protective effects. Entry into the cement industry was not difficult 
since the technology involved was relatively simple and India 
possessed good supplies of excellent limestone, well-distributed 
throughout the country, and well located for rail transport. The 
industry, therefore, was technically in a position to secure the 
domestic market. Furthermore, as transport costs were the main 
component of production costs, the Indian cement industry should have 
had a significant advantage over foreign suppliers, which were led by 
Britain.
The prosperity of the war and post-war boom period stimulated a 
rapid expansion in the Indian cement industry allied to the growth of 
several other industries. Between 1922 and 1925 seven new cement 
companies were formed.195 However, as the boom period ended for many 
industrial consumers, supply overtook demand for cement and prices 
began to fall, cutting profit levels. A Tariff Board was constituted 
in 1925 to consider the merits of awarding protection to the Indian 
cement industry, which argued that the industry could solve its own 
problems by internal re-organisation. It pointed out that the 
industry was at a severe disadvantage in the ports of Bombay and 
Calcutta since many factories were located in the Indian interior and 
while this protected them in local markets, the ports should have 
provided them with their best market opportunities.196 The Board
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considered that the industry could rationalise with comparative ease 
since it was a virtual monopoly dominated by the Bombay finance 
companies including those of Thakurdas and Che tty. The grant of 
protection under these circumstances would merely serve to raise the 
cost to the consumer unnecessarily and so the Board recommended that 
the Bombay financiers should use their influence to stabilise the 
condition of competition within the industry. In so doing, the Board 
believed that Indian cement producers would be able to secure the 
domestic market without protection.1 9 7 However, they did recommend 
bounties on Indian cement at the ports to help the industry in the 
initial stages of rationalisation, but this was rejected by the 
Government of India.
The Indian cement manufacturers heeded the recommendations of 
the Tariff Board and in 1926 the Indian Cement Marketing Association 
was founded to create a common sales policy and to establish a fixed 
sales price.198 In 1929 the Concrete Association of India was 
established to investigate and popularise new methods of using cement 
which it did by organising free technical demonstrations and 
providing free advice to individual consumers.199 Finally, in 1930, 
the Cement Marketing Company of India Ltd was founded to organise the 
sales and distribution of all the cement companies through zonal 
allocation of markets.200
The depression did not affect production levels, as can be seen 
in Table 5.18 (over) and the industry continued the steady progress 
begun in the early 1920s.
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Table 5.18
Production of Cement (tons)
1929-30
1932-33
1933-34
1934-35
1935-36
1936-37
561,000
592,531
642,944
780,794
890,683
997,414
1937-38 1,169,894
Source: Statistical Abstract 1928-29 to 1938-39, BPP,
Cmd 6333 of 1942, Table 210, p.582.
By 1938 production had topped the one million tons mark. 
Meanwhile, the 'de facto’ protection of the surcharge was reducing 
imports of Portland Cement considerably, despite the preference 
granted to British producers at Ottawa. Imports declined from 
120,575 tons in 1930-31 to only 31,916 tons in 1937-38.201 By then, 
Indian manufacturers supplied 95 per cent of domestic requirements, 
compared to 57 per cent in the period 1920-24.202 However, the 
Indian cement industry was still not producing to maximum capacity. 
In 1937 installed capacity of the industry was 1.5 million tons 
although only 1.1 million tons was actually produced.203
Consumption levels remained steady through the depression. Since 
retrenchment in government circles, both provincial and central, led 
to a reduction of government contracts, this is a measure of the new 
consumers being found for Indian cement which helped to reduce the 
dependence upon government orders. In particular, the cement 
industry was aided by the growth of urbanisation in the 1930s, as 
suggested by Baker in Madras.2 0 4 The new sources of demand are also 
reflected in the changing location of the industry. New factories 
were opened up near the ports and also in Bihar, Punjab and the
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United Provinces. This suggests that a large part of the new demand 
might have been through the enlargement of the TISCO works at 
Jamshedpur and also with the growth of the sugar industry. 
Establishment of the new cement factories near their markets helped 
to reduce the price, reducing freight charges. It also gave cement 
companies flexibility in meeting orders. The work of the Cement 
Marketing Company helped to rationalise the production of existing 
factories so they were all able to remain profitable, despite the 
depression clearing dividends of between 5 and 18 per cent.205
A further stage in the rationalisation of the Indian cement 
industry came in 1936, with the merger of the two largest firms into 
the Associated Cement Company which then controlled ten out of the 
existing 12 production units. The board of directors of the ACC 
'represented practically all the major business groups of Western 
India’ among than Thakurdas, Mehta and Tata.2 0 6 The ACC aimed to 
rationalise production of the existing factories, increasing output 
in those factories nearest to markets and reducing output in those 
with the poorest location. In this way they hoped to reduce 
production costs and pool the cost of buying of raw materials, stores 
and plant and the marketing and distribution of the finished product.
The monopolistic position of the ACC was soon challenged. The 
general level of profits proved attractive to the capitalists of 
Eastern India and in 1938 the Dalmia-Jain Group established five 
cement factories in Eastern Provinces.207 This was to take 
advantage of the market possibilities in Bihar and Calcutta. It is 
g,lso true that these financiers had interests in jute and sugar and 
may have been diversifying into the cement industry to reduce
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production costs and rationalise their interests over the long term. 
In the general market, however, the new capacity provoked new fears 
of an over-production crisis. Confidence in the cement industry 
faltered and prices began to fall from mid-1938: the price fell
from Rs 43 per ton in May 1938 to Rs 30 in September 1938.208 The 
profits of the ACC were halved between 1934 and 1939. Eventually, at 
the end of 1939 a joint marketing and price-fixing policy was agreed 
between the two groups.209
The financial and manufacturing interests in the Indian cement 
industry proved more willing to rationalise than those in most other 
major Indian industries. The Investors’ Year Book continually made 
the claim that it was this willingness to co-operate which gave the 
industry the buoyancy it needed during the depression.210 It could 
be that the associations its managers had with other industries gave 
them a wide knowledge of market conditions and local needs, knowledge 
which the industrialists were willing to use to expand their 
manufacturing base. In the early 1930s the Indian cement industry 
seems to have come of age. It changed from being an inefficient, 
conservative industry into one in which industrialists were prepared 
to take more risks and invest more in establishing the industry on 
sound commercial lines. The fruits of this change in policy came to 
mature in the second world war period when the industry was able to 
make rapid progress in meeting war time demands.
Conclusion
It is clear from these case studies that during the 1930s there
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was a considerable increase in production in consumer industries but 
relatively little expansion of heavy industry. During the depression 
each industry faced a range of differing problems and each met these 
problems with a wide range of solutions. There is, then, no one 
theory adequate to explain the response of Indian industry to the 
slump. Instead, historians have provided partial answers, responses 
which varied between industries. Thus, the relatively early recovery 
of Indian industry in general from the depression was not solely the 
result of protection, but of a complex series of factors including 
market availability, supply of raw materials, trends in production 
costs, levels of co-operation within industries, as well as the 
degree to which individual industries could win government support. 
The jute industry, for instance, suffered from a prolonged period of 
depression since manufacturers lacked the foresight to adapt their 
production to the changing structure of world markets. Until the late 
1930s, there was little research within the industry into means of 
diversifying the range of basic products. For the paper industry, a 
long-term disability was the lack of a viable domestic raw material. 
Once the technology for the production of bamboo pulp had been 
marketed successfully, new capital rapidly entered the paper 
industry. On the other hand, the sugar industry made great progress 
in the early 1930s substituting for Javanese imports. However, 
consumption failed to increase and once domestic suppliers had pushed 
out imports, supply began to overtake demand.
The impact of the slump was vital in understanding the patterns 
of Indian investment. During the depression, the collapse of values 
in the land market, of profits in moneylending and of the former
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mechanisms for the transmission of credit from urban to rural areas, 
pushed capital from rural areas. Some went abroad, principally to 
the Far East. Much, however, was pulled towards investment in urban 
industry which seemed to offer a more secure return on investment. 
Hence the increased investment in sugar, cement,iron and steel and 
the cotton industry outwith Bombay Island. The new concerns might 
not have been as profitable as the pre-depression firms or as former 
investments in land, mortgages or moneylending but they were more 
secure. There were two patterns visible in this new investment. In 
Madras} Baker has identified what he terms ‘merchant enterprise’: 
small scale units of production with low ratio of fixed to working 
capital, a fast turnover and a predominantly unskilled labour force. 
This, he argues, gave rise to 'a rather unambitious industrial 
sector’ characterised by a volatile level of investment leading to 
over-supply of individual commodities followed by a slump and a high 
number of financial failures.211 In both the United Provinces and 
Bihar investment in the sugar industry followed a similar pattern. 
However, there was a second trend also at work in the rise of 
indigenous capital in Northern India. These new industrial leaders, 
the Birlas, Dalmias and Thapers, also evolved from trading families 
but they entered industry on a wider scale then their counterparts in 
the South. They seemed more open to risk-taking and investing in 
large-scale units.
The survey of individual industries has highlighted two aspects 
of these emerging Indian capitalists groups. Firstly, they adapted 
the managing agency structure to their own ends. The family groups 
which emerged tended to function as managing agencies with different
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branches of the family being involved in different industrial 
sectors. Again, there is a similarity with the European groups in 
that many of the traditional and managing agencies had been founded 
as family concerns. Secondly, the industrial competition which 
emerged in the 1930s was not simply a conflict between European and 
Indian businesses. So far, the literature has concentrated on 
discussion of how the emerging Indian capitalists undermined the 
control of the European agencies of India’s industrial sector. The 
1930s witnessed the growth of competing interests within the Indian 
business community itself. This is particularly notable within the 
sugar and cement industries and was a sign of the growing power of 
the Indian entrepreneurial groups.
A large proportion of this new investment was coming from 
domestic sources > but it would be wrong to maintain that there was a 
scenario of dynamic Indian capitalism versus stagnating, conservative 
European capital as painted by Bagchi and Ray. European managing 
agencies were at the forefront in many of the new industries of the 
1930s. The technology for producing bamboo pulp was developed by 
Andrew Yule and Company and Binny’s in Madras managed some of the 
most modern cotton textile mills in India. European firms owned the 
largest and most modern coal mines and sugar factories. It is true 
that most of the new European capital in the 1930s was being invested 
in sectors outwith the control of the traditional managing agencies. 
This period witnessed the emergence of the fledgling multinational 
companies in India: Dunlops, Imperial Chemicals, Lever and General
Electric Company, for instance. However, this should not be allowed 
to overshadow the expansion which did occur in firms owned by
29k
European agencies in the 1930s. Not all European capital was being 
remitted, out of India during the slump.
The major problem being faced by the traditional European 
managing agencies was not lack of entrepreneurial drive but problems 
in capital. Thus, for instance, with the decline of the import 
handling firms run by Shaw, Wallace & Co., the agency lost much of 
its business during the slump. It closed agencies for the 
importation of a wide range of goods, from piecegoods to cement, and 
ended its operations in Karachi altogether. The agency then had less 
to invest in its mining and jute companies.212 Similarly, Tomlinson 
has traced the difficulties faced by Bird & Co. in establishing new 
iron and steel capacity in Bengal in the 1930s. Again the problem 
was lack of capital rather than lack of entrepreneurial drive.21 3
By late 1939, the Indian industrial sector had diversified 
considerably, especially in the production of consumer goods. Indian 
concerns catered for the demand of many goods from cotton piecegoods, 
to steel bars, to cement. Imports of such products were now 
negligible. However, the failure to develop capital goods industries 
was hampering development. The lack of chemical and machine 
production industries was a crucial development block. Thus, it 
seems that the industrial sector can also be classed as an area in 
the Indian economy in which growth occurred without substantially 
breaking from the state of underdevelopment. Given the failure of 
incomes to rise substantially throughout the 1930s, there was a limit 
to the expansion of the Indian market. During the depression, then, 
the products produced by Indian industries were limited to import- 
substitution. There was, then, new industrialisation without new
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patterns of consumption and range of goods. Industrial development 
received a boost during the depression but it was still within the 
confines of an underdeveloped economy. However, the developments in 
the industrial sector during the slump were of crucial importance in 
the long-term evolution of the Indian economy. They laid the 
foundation for the rapid developments in Indian industry during the 
Second World War.
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CHAPTER SIX 
Industrial Labour: The Retreat in the 1930s
Within the historiography of India, little has been written 
about the industrial labour force. Predominantly, the labour force 
has been seen through the eyes of its employers. Thus, there are 
studies of the problems of recruitment and of maintenance of a 
labour force and its role in production costs. In the past, many of 
the problems of Indian industry have been blamed on an inefficient 
labour force, composed of migrant landless rural labourers who were 
categorised as undisciplined, thriftless and prone to much 
absenteeism.1 Morris’ pioneering study of the Bombay cotton 
millworkers attempted to dispel these ideas, but they have persisted 
largely because there have been so few studies since then.2 R. Kumar 
broke new ground in a short study of the role of women in the Bombay 
labour force and recent work has attempted to unravel the cultural 
and caste background of industrial workers, for instance, Simmons on 
coal workers and C. Joshi on the textile labourers of Kanpur.3
From this limited literature, two general and opposing 
conclusions have emerged about the impact of the inter-war depression 
upon India’s industrial labouring classes. Anstey, writing in 1936, 
argued that the industrial labourers fared better than their 
agricultural counterparts, enjoying rising real incomes as the prices 
of basic commodities, especially foodgrains, fell.4 This was the 
view of many contemporary officials and has been accepted by Bagchi, 
in the light of the analysis by Mukerji of textile workers in Bombay, 
Ahmedabad and Calcutta.5 At the other extreme, Morris and Mukerjee
30?
and historians of trade union development in India paint a black 
picture of wage cuts, retrenchment and cuts in working hours which 
immiserised the workforce, especially through the increased burden of 
indebtedness.6 In such arguments, employers were passing the full 
costs of the crisis on to their workers.
Neither of these conclusions are necessarily wrong. There was a 
time lag between wage cuts and price falls, so that real wages could 
have risen for those in work during the early years of the 
depression. However, by 1934, as wage cuts were pursued more 
vigorously at a time when prices were beginning to rise once more, 
real wages would have declined. This chapter will focus upon the 
issues of levels of employment, changes in wage rates, problems of 
labour unrest and the nature of the government response in 
considering the condition of industrial labourers during the slump.
Levels of Employment
Table 6.1 (over) illustrates the figures of employment in large 
scale industrial units for 1927-1934.7 These statistics show that 
the total numbers employed remained remarkably stable during the 
years of the depression, with only a slight reduction overall. There 
was not the massive industrial unemployment which occurred in western 
nations. However, while the comparative smallness of the industrial 
sector in India meant that there was no widespread distress, the 
highly localised nature of industrial development could have caused 
pockets of acute distress.
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Table 6.2
Labour in Large Industrial Establishments
1931 1933 1935 1937
Cotton Textiles 364,913 366,289 440,923 475,782
Jute - 257,175 277,986 305,785
Woollen Mills 4,846 5,051 5,926 7,378
Railway Workshops 118,953 105,772 106,186 102,078
Iron and. Steel 26,892 23,726 32,711 39,818
Sugar Factories 17,562 48,559 70,625 74,448
Chemicals 2,776 3,223 3,902 4,133
Bleaching, Dyeing 5,928 5,370 6,744 8,899
Paper Mills 5,674 5,944 6,621 7,966
Cement, Potteries 5,062 5,216 7,701 10,938
Source! Large Industrial Establishments in India, (Delhi Bi-annual), 
1931-37.
From this it can been seen that the major retrenchment came in 
government-owned railway workshops. The Railway Board sought to cut 
its losses through retrenchment of staff. The labour force was also 
cut in the iron and steel industry. While there was a 
rationalisation campaign during the depression to increase labour 
efficiency, staff was retrenched predominantly to reduce costs at a 
time of falling government contracts.9 Between 1929 and 1934, the 
many problems of the jute industry led to an 18 per cent reduction in 
numbers employed.10 Although the overall figure for nuirbers employed 
in the cotton industry increased between 1931 and 1933, this 
reflected the growth of mills outwith Bombay. New mills were under
construction in Ahmedabad until 1934 and mills in the interior were 
working multiple shifts including night shift.11 In Bombay, however, 
labour was reduced by 18,000 in an attempt to cut costs to compete 
with the double threat of expanding interior mills and Japanese 
imports.12
There are two major problems with these figures. Firstly, they
are underestimates of the numbers employed deriving from returns
provided by those establishments which came under the net of the 
Factory Act and the Mines Act. Often employers failed to send in 
their official returns, so much of the information was gathered 
informally through unofficial enquiries from local government 
officials. The general reply to such enquiries was that manufacturers 
were not reducing their labour forces, so as to maintain a good image 
with officialdom. Local governments frequently complained about the 
inaccuracy of statistical information, yet normally the first 
retrenchment measures they took were to cut the inspectorate staff.13 
The figures are supposed to make allowances for seasonal variations 
in levels of employment, but, given the paucity of inspectors, they 
are largely crude estimates.
The second major difficulty is that the figures do not
distinguish between full and part-time employment, thus disguising 
the problem of industrial unemployment in India. At first glance, 
the figures do seem to indicate that the depression in India did not 
bring about the wide-scale industrial unemployment associated with 
the crisis in western economies and the subsequent deep social
problems. Yet, given the problems in the Bombay cotton and Calcutta
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jute mills, it is unlikely that these traditional industrial centres 
of India could have avoided large-scale redundancies during the 
slump. The spectre of unemployment for industrial workers in India 
had been raised earlier by the Royal Commission on Labour. This had 
detailed the cuts in labour in cotton textiles, iron foundries and in 
the railways which had been brought about already by rationalisation 
schemeg in the late 1920s. The Commission speculated that 
unemployment could become a major problem in India with the 
depression creating new redundancies.14 However, as late as 1933, 
the Secretary to the Government of India was informing the Consul 
General for the Dutch East Indies that 'industrial unemployment in 
the true sense in which it is understood in the west does not exist 
in India to any large extent’.15 Namely that when industrial labour 
was made redundant it could be absorbed either in other forms of 
employment or by returning to the land. This became the basis for 
government arguments that a state insurance scheme was unnecessary, a 
view echoed by local government officials.
While it is difficult to get accurate data, the government was 
probably correct to some extent in its view that 'unemployment’ was 
being transferred from the urban industrial areas back to the rural 
areas. For instance, the 1931 Census of India recorded a population 
decrease in Bombay City and a corresponding increase in density in 
the main recruiting areas of the Konkan.16 On a more qualitative 
level, the Inspector of Factories for Bengal reported in 1934 that 
the drastic overcrowding of tenements in Calcutta had been alleviated 
by the number of unemployed jute workers returning to their 
villages.17 This was reiterated by officials in Bihar who spoke of
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large numbers returning from Calcutta.18 Given that the population 
was increasing rapidly at this time, it must have led to severe 
pressure on the land in certain parts of India where existing under­
employment originally had made recruitment to the industrial areas 
attractive, a problem which we discussed in the study of Bihar in 
Chapter Four. These returning workers helped to depress rural wages 
further, with more people seeking agricultural employment.19
There was unemployment in Bombay and Calcutta and in the mining 
regions. The Royal Commission on Labour had pointed out that there 
was a permanently settled labour force emerging in several industrial 
centres, created through long-distance migration and reflected in the 
changing sex-ratios shown in succeeding Census Reports.20 For 
instance, there had been considerable recruitment in Bombay from the 
United Provinces. Thus, there was a section of industrial labourers 
emerging for whom return to a village during prolonged periods of 
unemployment, would no longer be an alternative. This created a 
problem in the two major metropolitan centres, Bombay and Calcutta, 
with decreased employment opportunities in the mills, railway 
workshops, transport industries and docks.
A more widespread problem within Indian industry would have been 
under-employment during the slump. In most industries, recruitment 
through jobbers encouraged the formation of a pool of reserve labour 
which could be hired or fired as the economic conditions dictated or 
utilised to cover absenteeism of established workers, one example 
being the badli system in Bombay Island. Thus, under-employment was 
an established feature of the industrial structure of India. This was 
exacerbated during the depression as employers cut back hours worked
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to reduce costs or, as in the case of the jute industry, sealed 
looms.21 Workers could find they had a shortened working week or 
might be left without employment for one week in four. Short hours 
became widespread through several industries. The Labour Federation 
of Jamshedpur, for instance, in its evidence to the Tariff Board 
Enquiry into the steel industry in 1933, stated that the Tatas had 
resorted to reduced hours beginning with the more rigorous 
enforcement of days off.22 Short time workers led a precarious 
existence without any job security. As the Bombay millowners tried 
to compete with the lower costs of interior mills, some mills worked 
double and night shifts during periods of peak demand only to 'close 
down suddenly after demand had slackened, and often very little 
regard is paid to the disturbances on family and civic life that 
result'.23 Thus, while India did not experience the widespread 
unemployment common to western economies during the depression, this 
crisis had equally as serious an effect in India's underdeveloped 
economy through widespread underemployment.
Wages
The second major question to be considered is that of wages paid 
to industrial labourers during the slump. How far were wages cut and 
when, and what impact did this have on the standard of living in 
urban centres?
Actual data on wage levels is fragmented and unreliable, with 
confusion over wage rates and earnings. The most recent and 
seemingly comprehensive analysis on wage rates has been compiled by
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Mukerji for Bombay Island, Ahmedabad and Calcutta, whose figures are 
contained in Table 6.3 (over).
These show wide variations in each centre. In Bombay Island 
textile mills, wage rates seem to have been stable between 1926 and 
1933, falling only from 1933 to 1937. They then rose again, reaching 
a new peak in 1939. In Ahmedabad wages remained stable until 1932, 
when they rose. Thereafter, they did not fall until 1935. 4 further
decrease was recorded in 1937. However, even in 1939 wage rates had 
not recovered their level of 1932-34. Meanwhile, in Calcutta wage 
rates seem to show more volatility with the major reductions 
occurring before the onset of the depression. Wages rose in 1931 but 
this was not maintained. From 1936 wages for jute mill operatives 
rose steadily once more.
However, there must be doubt about the validity of these 
figures. For instance, the long period of stability of wage rates 
recorded for Bombay Island between 1926 and 1933 does not seem to fit 
with the violent strike activity of 1928 and 1929, which was a result 
of conflict over pay cuts. Similarly, there is no evidence for the 
pay rise negotiated by the Ahmedabad Textile Labour Association 
(ATLA) in 1929-30. The problem is that Mukerji’s figures are not 
representative, in that they rest on a very narrow base, and for 
several years are simply estimates. They represent money wages paid 
to workers for an average month of 26 working days. The statistics 
relate only to two cotton mills in each centre and one jute mill and, 
as such, cannot be said to illustrate general trends.24
An attempt was made to find a more broad selection of wage data
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Table 6.3
Average monthly wages of workers (Rupees)
Bombay Island Ahmedabad Calcutta
1925 32.75 33.62 19.8
1926 34.56 33.80 19.2
1927 34.56 33.80 19.3
1928 34.56 33.80 17.7
1929 34.56 33.80 16.5
1930 34.56 33.80 14.3
1931 34.56 33.80 16.2
1932 34.56 35.69 15.4
1933 34.56 35.69 14.6
1934 27.25 35.69 14.6
1935 27.25 33.46 14.6
1936 27.25 33.46 16.9
1937 28.44 30.96 18.3
1938 32.18 32.98 19.6
1939 35.37 35.00 19.6
Source: K. Mukerji, 'Trend in Real Wages in Cotton Textile
Industry in Bombay City and Island from 1900 to 1951’ , 
Artha Vi.jnana [hereafter AV], 1959, pp.82-97.
'Trend in Real Wages in Cotton Textile Industry in 
Ahmedabad from 1900-1951’, AV, June 1961, pp.124-132. 
'Trend in Real Wages in Jute Textile Industry from 1900 
to 1951’, AV, March 1960, pp.56-67.
with which to test Mukherji’s conclusions. However, variations in 
official statistics available are so wide as to make comparison 
almost impossible. There is widespread variation in the
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interpretation of the definition of wage rates. Some are simply 
divisions of money paid out by firms by the average numbers employed 
(as, for instance, in the data used by Mukherji) which would include 
both basic salary and dearness allowance and deductions made for poor 
workmanship or absenteeism. Others provide daily rates which 
represent only the basic rate. It has been estimated in Bombay, for 
instance, that the basic rate represented only 30 per cent of total 
money wages in 1930. Neither of these calculations of average 
monthly or daily rates include payment of kind (common, for instance, 
in Sholapur) or credit arrangements with the millshops. Whatever 
base is used, the official statistics over-estimate the level of 
average pay since they do not include deductions paid to jobbers and 
sirdars, the recruiting agents.
Despite such fragmented and problematical data we can at least 
estimate trends in wage levels, if not actual rates. Thus, there was 
a time lag between initial declines in price in 1929 and the first 
wage cuts apparent in 1931. From then, however, as the depression 
affected the price of manufactured products, employers instituted a 
series of wage cuts to help reduce labour costs. These cuts took the 
form of the reduction of dearness allowance due to declining costs of 
basic necessities. From 1936, there seems to have been some increase 
in wage rates, but by 1939 they had failed to recover 1929 levels. 
The Textile Labour Inquiry Commission discovered, for instance, that 
wage rates in Bombay City had declined by around 40 per cent between 
1931 and 1937, although there had only been a reduction of 25 per 
cent in both Ahmedabad and Sholapur. However, in all three centres 
the 1939 levels remained some 25 per cent below those of 1929 due to
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the decline of dearness allowances. Similarly, the Bihar Labour 
Enquiry Committee estimated a decline of 30 per cent in the wages 
paid to employees at the Tata Iron and Steel Works, between 1929 and 
1938. Only wages paid to furnace men had increased due to their 
greater responsibility under the TISCO extension plan. Again in the 
small workshops of urban Punjab, the Board of Enquiry reported a 
similar pattern of declining wages between 1931 and 1936, but no 
return to 1929 levels until the war boom period.25
Data on average daily earnings in the main coalfields includes 
basic rates, which were calculated by the number of tubs filled, plus 
an allowance for kerosene and grain. Again the first cuts appear in 
1931-32. Thus average daily earnings of a miner in the Jharia field 
fell from 13 annas per day in 1930 to 11 anas per day in 1933. This 
was the result of short-time working and a shortage of tubs for the 
miners to fill, as well as a cut in the basic rate of pay. There were 
also claims that tub size was being increased as a new method of 
cutting pay.26 By 1937 earnings began to rise again but they did not 
reach their 1928-29 levels until the war.
Other more impressionistic data on the extent of wage falls can 
be found in the reports of the Inspector of Factories and the 
Inspector of Mines. These reports show that there was no uniformity 
in the levels of cuts even within firms run by the same managing 
agent, just as there had been no standardisation of wages before the 
depression.27 In general cuts were in the region of 30 to 50 per 
cent.28 However, given the use of contract labour, the cuts for the 
actual labourer would have been more severe than for those employed 
directly by business owners. The depression seems to have widened
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the already large discrepancies in pay of workers engaged in similar 
operations. The Budget Reports of 1934-36 show that for one category 
of employee, for instance, a ring-spinner, the variation in wages in 
one centre could be as much as 50 per cent, while variations between 
different centres were even higher.28 Given the difficulties of 
assessing variations in wage levels, estimations of the effect on the 
real wages of the working class must be even more impressionable. The 
1934 Budget Report in Bombay stated that *... prominent mention has 
been made of the fact that, owing to a substantial fall in prices, 
especially of foodstuffs, and subsequently the fall in the cost of 
living, working class families in Bombay were substantially better 
off in 1932-33 than in 1921-22.’ The calculations of the report 
showed that the percentage of family budget spent on food and 
clothing had been reduced by 12 per cent, although the real burden of 
rent changes had increased by five per cent.30 In several 
industrial centres, official attempts were made to assess the cost of 
living. These show a steady reduction in the cost of living in Bombay 
City, Ahmedabad, Nagpur and Jubbelpore between 1929-30 and 1934-35. 
Thereafter, the cost of living began to rise again, but even in 1939 
the indices were generally one-third lower than in 1929. These 
figures are based on rent, rates and the price of a range of basic 
commodities including grain, vegetables, cloth, oil and salt, all of 
which fell between 1929 and 1934. These trends also emerge in the 
statistics of the Government of Bihar and Orissa for Jharia and 
Jamshedpur.
An attempt to relate cost of living figures to wage data to test 
changes in real wages has been made by Mukerji, whose figures are
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contained in Table 6.4 (over). There are problems in utilising 
Mukerji’s series as mentioned earlier, but it is still the only 
estimate so far made and as such needs to be examined. For easier 
comparison, the indices for Ahmedabad and Calcutta have been 
recalculated from base 100 in 1951 to base 100 in 1934.
There seems to be a similar trend in Bombay City to the official 
index with a rise in real wages up to 1933 as basic commodity prices 
fell. Wage cuts were partially restored in 1938 and real wages rose 
again. In Ahmedabad, real wages also rose to 1934, however, there 
was a major round of wage cuts in 1935-36 which were not restored 
before 1939, so real wages remained depressed. Mukerji’s index for 
Calcutta shows a decline in real wages from 1931 to 1933 with 
recovery from 1936.
The major problem with Mukerji’s analysis, as indeed with the 
official series, is that it does not take into consideration the 
effect of short-time working which was widespread through industry. 
Overtime had provided a major source of income for many workers. The 
Labour Association of Jamshedphur estimated that about one-fifth of 
workers’ total income came from overtime.31 In Bombay cotton mills, 
jute mills, mines and at the iron and steel plants of Jamshedpur, 
overtime was lost and short hours imposed. In other centres of the 
cotton textile industry, while double and night shifts continued, 
overtime and basic pay was cut so real wages must have decreased in 
the late 1930s. Nor does the index include deductions from pay for 
fines for faulty work or for payments to jobbers and sirdars. Thus 
it seems that Mukerji, like contemporary government officials,
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Table 6.4
Revised Index of Real Value Average Monthly Wage (1934=100)
Cotton 
Bombay Island
Cotton
Ahmedabad
Jute
Calcutta
1928 86 70.7 82.7
1929 85 69.2 77.5
1930 93 77.2 75.3
1931 115 94.6 98.9
1932 116 93.3 92.0
1933 123 98.6 91.1
1934 100 100.0 100.0
1935 99 93.7 96.6
1936 99 93.7 116.1
1937 102 81.0 122.5
1938 111 92.4 128.2
1939 123 95.3 129.2
Source: Recalculated from Mukerji’s series in Artha Vi.jnana
underestimated the fall in real wages after 1934. The fall in the 
cost of living did not necessarily mean rising real wages. Part-time 
working and short-term lay-offs reduced earnings and led to an 
increase in the level of urban indebtedness during the 1930s. In 
Ahmedabed in 1936 it was estimated that 69 per cent of textile 
workers* families were indebted at an average debt of Rs 320 per 
family.32 Also, during the slump, many firms suspended the 
rudimentary health benefits given to workers such as free medicines
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and medical care. This would have been another drain on real 
incomes. Therefore, any benefit of the fall in the cost of living for 
industrial workers would have been only a short-term phenomenon. Once 
the lag between reduction in prices and reduction in wages had been 
bridged, underemployment would have led to a substantial fall in real 
incomes.
Labour Unrest and Trade Union Development
With an increase in distress among industrial labourers as the 
depression progressed, it might have been expected that labour unrest 
would have increased. At the onset of the slump, trade unionism in 
India was till in its infancy. Trade unions had only been 
recognised officially in 1926, having been resisted at length by
manufacturers. The unions in existence tended to find their
leadership not from the ranks of the labour force, but from the
middle classes.
The most successful and effective union in India was the
Ahmedabad Textile Labour Association (ATLA). After a prolonged 
strike in 1920, negotiations between Gandhi and the Ahmedabad
Millowners* Association resulted in an arbitration scheme for future 
disputes. This scheme remained in operation throughout the inter-war 
period and so strike activity was rare.
Elsewhere, the labour force was split into several rival unions. 
The attempts at rationalisation in the late 1920s produced a wave of 
strike activity in Bombay, Calcutta and Jamshedpur. The major trend 
of these strikes was the emergence of more radical unions, infuriated
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by the moderate stance of existing labour organisations. In Bombay, 
for instance, the strike leadership changed from the moderate Bombay
Textile Labour Association (BTLA) to the more radical GKU, branded as
Communist agitators by the local government. Similarly in 
Jamshedpur, the official Labour Association became dominated by left- 
wing agitators such as Homi and Bose who tried to form a completely 
new union. These strikes were also accompanied by a rising trend of
violence both on the part of workers and in police suppression of
strike activity.
The strikes of 1929 created massive disruption in the industrial 
sector, but brought little success for the workers involved. Most 
had begun over the question of cuts in pay and of hours worked. 
However, rationalisation schemes added to the pool of surplus labour, 
therefore it was a simple matter for a firm’s manager to declare a 
lockout and open up again a few days later with new staff. The only 
success came in Ahmedabad where the conciliation and arbitration 
system diffused tensions and negotiations led to a five per cent pay 
increase.3 3
By 1930 the relative failure of stike activity had created deep 
divisions in the Indian labour movement. Officially the movement had 
as its controlling body, the All India Trades Union Congress, 
modelled closely on the British TUC. After 1929 the AITUC became 
dominated by the two main left-wing unions the GKU and the Great 
Indian Peninsular Railwaymen’s Federation. These unions became 
discredited by their refusal to condemn violence and intimidation and 
lost their influence with the workers as the strikes of 1929 ended 
unsuccessfully. However, they became more powerful within the AITUC.
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The final split came over the question of co-operating with the 
International Labour Organisation and the Whiteley Commission.34
The advent of Labour administration in London had created 
conflict with Delhi over the legitimate role of trade unions in 
India. The Labour ministers were convinced that the free development 
of an active trade union movement was essential for the protection of 
Indian workers. The Government of India was more concerned about the 
possible political implications of recognising unions. While London 
tended to regard the strike activity of 1929 as the legitimate airing 
of grievances by the workers, the Indian authorities complained that 
strikes were being manipulated by left-wing activists not for the 
good of the workers but for political reasons. They stressed the 
links which existed between the GKU and the GIPRF and the Communist 
International and that these two unions had put forward a motion at 
the AITUC Conference in 1930 to send the workers representatives not 
to Geneva, but to a Labour Conference sponsored by Moscow. The 
Labour Government remained convinced that the strikes were brought 
about by genuine grievances and so the Secretary of State for India, 
Wedgewood Benn, promoted the appointment of a commission to consider 
labour conditions in India with a view to making recommendations for 
their betterment.35
At the 1930 AITUC Conference much time was devoted to 
considering whether there should be co-operation with this committee. 
At the end of the Conference all the key posts on the AITUC Committee 
came to be held by left-wingers who carried motions calling for an 
eight hour day, minimum pay legislation and a scheme for unemployment
insurance. These measures were backed also by the moderate unions 
such as the Labour Association of Bombay, Ahmedabad and Jamshedpur. 
However, the new Committee also carried motions ending India’s links 
with the ILO and declared a ban on co-operation with the Whitley 
Commission. This proved too much for the moderate unions who broke 
away to form the All-India Trades Union Federation (AITUF) under the 
leadership of Joshi. The AITUF hoped that legislation resulting from 
the Whitley commission as well as the moral pressure of the ILO would 
bring rapid improvements to labour conditions in India.
The strength of the left-wing agitators was also curbed by 
government action. Worried by the strike activity of 1928 and 1929, 
the government arrested the most well known Communist leaders who 
were then tried in 1930 at the 'Meerut Conspiracy’ Trials. The 
Communist leaders were found guilty of subverting genuine workers’ 
grievances for political purposes controlled by Moscow. The 
Government of India was now in a stronger position vis-a-vis 
Whitehall. The Civil Disobedience Campaign of 1931 had provoked even 
the Labour Administration which authorised the arrest of Congress 
leaders. The Indian Nationalists had been as ready as the Communists 
to use workers’ disputes to further their cause so another source of 
agitation was removed. Finally with the formation of the National 
Government in 1932, the Government of India was no longer under any 
direct pressure to recognise the activities of trade unions instead 
being actively encouraged to widen their powers to keep control of 
the political situation. One result of this was the adoption of the 
Trades Disputes Bill which barred strike activity in public utilities 
and created a system of compulsory arbitration, although the findings
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need not be binding.
Thus, at a time of depression, when wage cuts and retrenchment 
increased from 1932, the labour force did not have the protection of 
strong united trade union leadership. This is reflected in the 
diminution of strike activity from 1929, as seen in Table 8.5 over.
The Government of India liked to claim that the reduction in 
strike activity was a result of the 'psychological and profound 
effect of the mass of labour legislation in promoting industrial 
peace’.36 This is unlikely. While there were a number of acts 
promulgated after 1932 as a result of the Royal Commission, much of 
the implementation was left to individual provincial governments. 
They lacked the finances to implement such legislation effectively, 
many having retrenched their factory inspectorate staff in the early 
1930s.
The true reasons for the restriction in strike activity were 
economic. After the prolonged strikes of 1929, few unions had the 
funds necessary to maintain workers during further industrial action. 
More crucial was the abundance of labour created by the slump. Even
more so than in 1929, employers were able to hire new labour should
there be a strike. Employment became increasingly difficult to find 
and workers were unwilling to jeopardise their positions by calling a 
strike. It is noticeable that the duration of strikes diminished to 
one or two days. If a strike lasted any longer, the employer merely
declared a lockout and reopened with new staff.
An illustration of the desire to maintain a job at all costs can 
be seen in the 1932 strike in the Madras and Maharashtra line.
3^6
Table 6.5
Industrial Disputes in India
No. Disputes No. Men Involved Working Days Lost
1928 203 507,000 31,647,000
1929 141 531,000 12,165,000
1930 148 196,000 2,261,000
1931 166 203,000 2,408;000
1932 118 128,000 1,922,000
1933 146 165,000 2,169,000
1934 159 221,000 4,776,000
1935 145 114,000 973,000
1936 157 169,000 2,350,000
Source: Bulletin of Industry and Labour No. 62, Industrial
Disputes in India 1929-36, (Delhi, 1937), p.2, para 1.
Railway workers were the only industrial workforce other than cotton
to have a reasonably powerful union, basically because almost all
railwaymen belonged to the same union which gave them some bargaining 
power. The strike was called after the Railway Board decided to
reduce working hours and maintain staffing levels rather than to 
proceed with dismissals previously agreed upon. Those who had been 
promised that their jobs would be safeguarded seem to have preferred 
to fight for their own hours to be maintained rather than to support 
those who previously would have been dismissed.
The need for a concerted action and for effective arbitration 
services were highlighted by the generally favourable conditions in 
Ahmedabad. There were no wage cuts imposed here until 1933 when the
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AMA proposed a general cut of 25 per cent. The arbitration board 
settled a standard rate for piecework for workers and increased 
working hours so that the agreed wage cuts of three per cent did not 
seriously diminish real wages. In 1936 the AMA asked for a further 
cut of 20 per cent. The success of the cotton industry in Ahmedabad 
had attracted many new manufacturers, some of whom did not join the 
AMA and who were consequently not bound by the arbitration scheme. 
They were then able to pay lower wages and operate longer shifts. The 
Textile Labour Association was able to prolong negotiations for six 
months and again reduced the level of the cuts to 6.5 per cent. This 
helps to explain the low level of strike activity in Ahmedabad during 
the depression. The ATLA represented the majority of the textile 
workers in the area which gave their threats of strike action real 
power, providing a strong basis for negotiation.
It was this bargaining power which the Indian labour movement 
lacked generally. With the split in the AITUC in 1930 Indian workers 
had no national bargaining body. These splits were reflected in 
union activity in individual industries. In Bombay, for instance, 
workers were divided between the BTLA and the GKU and probably even 
these two unions represented only 50 per cent of textile workers. In 
Calcutta the jute mill operatives had no union to speak of. Thus 
both the employers and the government were able to divide the 
workers, aided by the increasing surplus of labour created during the 
depression. The workers were left with little alternative but to 
accept reduced wages and worsening conditions of service or lose 
their employment. Hence the depression in India was marked by very 
little strike activity despite a reduction in living standards.
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Government Labour Legislation
Throughout the 1920s labour legislation was at a minimum. There 
were amendments made to the Factory Act and to the Mines Act, mainly 
concerned with reducing the number of hours worked and progressively 
elminating the employment of children in general, and of women on 
night shifts.37 In complete contrast the 1930s witnessed a whole 
series of labour legislation. Initially this was the result of the 
prodding of the Labour Administration in Britain. Mostly it was the 
gradual acceptance of the recommendations of the 1931 Royal
Commission on Labour in India. The depression had an impact in
persuading the Central Government that it had to act in the sphere of
labour legislation to cover the difficulties of provincial
legislation. More negatively, the depression had the effect of
delaying some of the legislation through retrenchment in government 
departments.
The Secretary of State for India during the Labour
Administration 1928-31 kept a keen eye on labour developments in 
India. Wedgewood Benn was as worried as the Government of India
officials about the rise of 'communistic’ elements in India and was
anxious to back the more moderate All-India Trade Union Federation
led by Joshi.38 He felt that the widespread development of trade 
unions would make the Communists less important. He thought it would 
help the moderate unionists 'to know that His Majesty’s Government, 
as at present constituted, has a lively sympathy with the growth of 
trade unionism in India and is by no means satisfied that the workers 
are always well-treated’.39 He was also suspicious of the motives of
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the Government of India, particularly in their apparent reluctance to
use what conciliation apparatus existed:
'I have an uneasy feeling that when the issue lies 
between well-to-do manufacturers and unorganised masses 
of illiterate labour, if an alternative supply is 
plentiful, the Government is apt to be too much on the 
side of the employers and when an enquiry is refused, 
colour is given to this suggestion.’40
Such views were not shared by the permanent civil servants in
the India Office who were prepared to believe that the Government of
India knew best. Hirtzel, the Permanent Under-Secretary wrote:
'I do not think that the Secretary of State can interfere 
advantageously in particular cases, nor ought to do so 
except where he was good reason to suspect some glaring 
injustice to labour or some really serious threat to 
society. He can advise the Government of India that in 
his opinion the machinery of the [conciliation] Act be 
invoked on every possible occasion (but they presumably 
know already that he thinks that): the rest, I think,
must be left to them, for they only have the necessary 
knowledge. ’41
The Government of India was considering some form of labour
legislation as an antidote to the seeming rise of communism among
labour activities, although they tried to stress the wider benefits
of such legislation. The Viceroy wrote to Wedgewood Benn:
* Recent labour problems have, on one hand, convinced us 
that extremist and communistic elements which have been 
perverting the course of the labour movement must be 
firmly checked, but this is not our whole policy, and we 
are sincerely anxious to devise a measure and method of 
improving economic conditions of India’s workers, which, 
in addition to being a matter of unquestioned importance, 
would be the best antidote to communism.’42
The Indian authorities agreed to hold an enquiry into labour 
conditions to make recommendations on necessary legislation. However 
this did not satisfy Wedgewood Benn. He wanted labour legislation 
’as soon as it can wisely be done’ and was worried that 'if the
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Commission is to make two visits, as has been suggested, and if the 
Government of India is to wait until the Commission has reported 
before making proposals, we have to face the difficulty that measures 
which might remove the causes of genuine complaint in industrial 
centres may be indefinitely and even dangerously postponed.’43
Before the Commission had reported, however, the Labour 
Administration had given way to the National Government and the new 
Secretary of State, Hoare, was less interested in labour affairs. The 
Government of India was then left to implement labour legislation in 
its own time. The process of putting legislation through the Indian 
Assembly could be lengthy and the early results of the Commission 
mostly concerned child labour, a subject upon which most agreed. In 
1933 there was an act passed to end the practice of pledging against 
loans of child labour in the weaving workshops of Amritsar and 
Ahmedabad. One recommendation to prevent this was compulsory 
education until 12 years of age. However, the Central Government 
treated this as a *transferred’ subject, leaving legislation to the 
individual provinces. By 1937 only Madras had implemented such 
legislation: a private members bill had been introduced in the
Bombay Legislature, but was rejected.44
Probably the most important result of the Commission was the 
consolidated Factory Bill which was presented to the Legislative 
Assembly in September 1933. This proposed to widen the Factory Act 
to cover workshops of ten people or over and seasonal factories. In 
an attempt to cover use of child labour in workshops a new category 
of 'adolescents’, that is those between 15 and 17 years of age, was
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to be created when enumerating workers. The commission wanted to 
make it easier for women to work and recommended extending the time 
they could work in each day over 17 hours. After the Bill passed 
through the Legislature and Select Committee several important 
changes were made. The clauses about women working were severely 
criticised, so the time limit was reduced to 13 hours. More 
importantly powers of inspection and enforcement were taken from 
Central Government and given to provincial authorities. Thus where 
the Commission had wanted a standard set of rules throughout India, 
the way was left open for different rules in the various provinces, 
or for those provinces which did not want to act.
Most labour legislation was, thus, left to the provincial 
governments. The Governments of Bombay, the Central Provinces and 
Bihar (in marked contrast to its inactivity in rural legislation, as 
seen in Chapter Four) were most active in this respect. The 
Government of Bombay, which had had to face the worst of the labour 
problems during the depression, established a Labour Office which 
made intensive studies into the conditions of the Bombay labour 
force. The legislation which resulted included a Town Planning Act 
to improve workmen’s houses, a revised code of conciliation in labour 
disputes and a Maternity Amendment Act which extended maternity 
benefit to eight weeks although it also increased the qualifying 
length of employment to nine months from 6 months. In the Central 
Provinces and Bihar legislation was passed on town planning, 
adulteration of food, first aid in factories, maternity benefit and 
debt conciliation for industrial workers. In other provinces labour 
legislation was infrequent and patchy, with most concentrating on
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rural workers rather than industrial.
In the two other bills the Government of India presented in the 
mid-1930s resulting from the Commission, the Select Committee and 
final votes in the Assembly passed the responsibility to the local 
authorities. The Commission and the Banking Enquiry had pointed to 
the indebtedness of industrial workers being the prime factor in 
their low standard of living. Many workers came to the towns to pay 
off debts accumulated in their villages, only to be burdened by fresh 
debts in the towns. The Commission blamed the moneylenders 'who enter 
into contracts which he knows the debtor cannot fulfil, or at best 
can only fulfil by suffering severe and prolonged hardship. The law 
should set its face sternly against such contracts [and] should make 
their enforcement impossible.’45 In 1935 the Government of India 
introduced a bill to allow those earning under Rs 100 per person to 
have their debt reduced through the courts and to cancel any 
outstanding debt after three years. When the bill was passed in 
October 1936, again responsibility for legislation was left to the 
local governments. In the end only the Governments of Bengal and the 
Central Provinces passed legislation but they concentrated on 
outlawing molestation in recovery of debts.
The Commission had also pointed to the method of payment as a 
source of the indebtedness of industrial workers. Often wages were 
paid up to one month late, forcing the workers to approach 
moneylenders. In 1936 the Government of India introduced a bill to 
outlaw this delay after two weeks. However the Assembly led by 
industrial manufacturers’ representatives increased the maximum limit 
of delay to one month, thus maintaining the status quo and again left
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the responsibility for legislation to individual local governments.
Finally, under the new constitution of 1935, all responsibility 
for industrial matters including labour legislation was passed to the 
local authorities. Thus, the Central Legislature could only 
establish guidelines which time and time again were ignored. The 
hopes for central labour legislation of the 1931 Commission were 
sacrificed to dyarchy as had been the hopes of the earlier Industrial 
Commission.
While labour legislation on the surface should have improved 
working conditions in India, the enforcement of legislation was left 
to the Provincial Governments who lacked the funds to implement the 
laws fully. The labour legislation which did emerge had little to do 
with the depression. The Government of India had been forced to 
accept a Labour Commission by the British Labour Administration. 
While the National Government took the pressure off the Goverment of 
India, the very existence of the recommendations exerted a moral 
pressure for action to be taken. If the legislation is considered in 
detail, it met only the basic recommendations and then only in a much 
watered down version. The depression failed to shake the Government 
of India from its laissez-faire views that working conditions 
ultimately were the responsibility of the employer and that state 
intervention should be kept at a minimum.
Conclusion
It seems clear that the industrial labour force suffered as a 
result of the depression, even as the industrial sector was expanding
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rapidly. While there may have been a slight rise in real wages in the 
first two years of the depression, this was halted by wage cuts and 
redundancies as manufacturers tried to reduce production costs. Those 
who returned to their villages would have increased competition for 
scarce agricultural labouring work and depressed wages. Those who 
remained in the industrial centres were at the mercy of jobbers and 
grain shopkeepers who extended credit at high rates of interest. 
Trade unions in India were not developed sufficiently to provide 
support for the labour force and were involved in bitter internecine 
struggles which further diminished their power. Only in Ahmedabad 
did workers have a union strong enough to promote their welfare 
successfully. Nor did the industrial labour force receive aid from 
the government. Government authorities were under pressure from 
manufacturers to limit trade unionism and to slow down the promotion 
of factory safety and improvement in workers’ conditions of work and 
living. Those working in the field, such as the Officers of the 
Bombay Labour Office, were isolated and lacked power. The impetus to 
promote labour issues under the Labour Administration of 1928-31 died 
with the establishment of a National Government whose twin aims for 
India were maintaining civil order and keeping the remittances 
flowing. In neither aim was there room for the promotion of workers’ 
rights. It was not until the boom of the Second World War that the 
welfare of workers was remembered, and that was within the context of 
the needs of a war economy.
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CONCLUSION - ECONOMY AND GOVERNMENT
The India that had emerged by 1939 was markedly different, both 
economically and politically, from that of 1919. Within this period 
of long-term structural change, the depression of 1929 was an 
important phenomenon accelerating many of the changes such as the 
rise of an indigenous industrial sector based primarily on import- 
substitution, the development of internal transportation networks and 
the disengagement of India from the global economy. This laid a 
strong foundation for the even more rapid development of the Indian 
economy during the Second World War.
The depression first hit India in early 1929 with the first 
rapid price reductions for agricultural produce, deepening with the 
crisis in the international credit market later that year. Thus, the 
depression was disseminated into the Indian economy through its 
trading links with the global economy as a primary producer, but, 
more importantly, its connections with the international money market 
created by the colonial relationship with Britain. It was the need 
to maintain a steady flow of sterling remittances to London to meet 
the 'Home Charges* that forced the Government of India to adopt a 
severely deflationary monetary policy during the depression. The 
ultimate consequence of these policies, however, was to decrease the 
colonial nature of the Indian economy and so weaken the economic 
rationale of the British presence in India.
One major consequence of the slump was to accelerate the trend 
towards the disengagement of India from the international economy, 
first noted by Baker and Tomlinson.1 This had begun prior to 1929
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with the gradual replacement of Indian exports in Asian and African 
markets by Japanese goods and the decline of British exports to 
India. The former trend was accelerated by the impact of the more 
favourable depreciation of the yen compared to that of the rupee in 
1931 which made Japanese exports more competitively priced than 
Indian. For instance, the early 1930s witnessed the end of the 
traditional trade in Indian cotton yam to China. The latter trend 
was accelerated also by the rapid, large increases in the Indian 
tariff, despite the benefit of imperial preference after the Ottawa 
Agreement, and by the inability of British goods to compete in the 
Indian market against Japanese and^ , increasingly in the 1930s; against 
German manufactured goods. The removal of Burma from the Indian 
trade statistics conducted in Chapter One has shown that the decline 
in British staple exports to India prior to the depression in 1929 
was not as marked as formerly assumed. This helps to explain the 
reaction of near panic by Manchester businessmen and their 
representatives in Parliament at the prospect of a sudden reduction 
in trade to India, their principal market, and of their hostile 
reaction to the rise of Indian business groups. The removal of Burma 
reveals that the decline in British trade to India during and after 
the depression; despite the Ottawa Agreement, was more rapid than 
appears in traditional studies. The disaggregation of Burma also 
increases awareness of the demand for new imports into India of 
better quality raw materials (such as long-staple cotton) and 
chemicals (caustic soda) and machinery. The demand stimulated a 
further enlargement of the industrial base of India and gave India a 
more stable foundation for the war economy of the 1939-45 conflict 
and one less dependent upon imported materials than had been the case
in 1914.
One of the most important of recent discussions in the 
historiography of the depression in India has been on its impact on 
the commercialisation of agriculture. The study of the Bihari 
agricultural sector in Chapter Four has shown that within the 
backward province of Bihar and Orissa the process of 
commercialisation was still continuing despite the depression. This 
was because a provincial market was still being created through the 
expansion of the road network. The railway network in Bihar was 
particularly poor and, in effect, in the 1930s through the expansion 
of the road network, Bihar and Orissa was experiencing the 
commercialisation which other provinces had experienced during the 
late nineteenth century with the expansion of the railways. While in 
other provinces the depression was marked by increasing 
disequilibrium in prices between local markets, in Bihar prices were 
stabilising towards a provincial norm. As elsewhere, there was a 
contraction of cash credit in Bihar and Orissa during the slump with 
the mahajan being replaced by the sugar manager in the network of 
credit} allowing the practice of dadani (advances on future crops) to 
spread, though now based largely on credit in kind in the form of 
seed. While this allowed the rapid expansion of the sugar industry in 
Bihar in the short-term, it sowed the seeds of future problems. Eager 
to accept whatever credit was available, dadani encouraged the rapid 
extension of cultivation far above the demand from the sugar mills 
and from the mid-1980s cane prices in Bihar began to tumble, despite 
zoning agreements under the Bihar Cane Control Act. Therefore,
income levels in Bihar and Orissa remained at a low level throughout 
the 1930s.
Throughout India, the spread of dadani marked the diminution of 
the cash economy. Partly this was the result of attempts by 
provincial governments to respond to the depression by taking action 
against moneylenders, since, as we have seen, local authorities did 
not have the resources, even if they had the inclination, to back 
price-support schemes or to purchase and store surplus stocks. Such 
legislation squeezed credit supplies further. It also strengthened 
the control of traders over rural credit since they were not defined 
eis moneylenders under the terms of the new legislation. While dadani 
spread, the influence of traditional moneylenders declined.2 Thus, in 
the late 1930s, a time of rapid population growth, per capita 
consumption of consumer goods was declining, as witnessed by the 
levelling off of demand for cotton textiles and refined sugars.
There were two forces operating during the depression in 
agrarian areas. Firstly, the road network expansion was widening the 
national market to a far greater extent than that experienced during 
the expansion of the railways in the last quarter of the nineteenth 
century. Mileage of metalled, all-weather trunk roads in India 
increased from 60,938 miles in 1927-28 to 74,048 miles by 1930-31, 
while the mileage of unmetalled (largely cold weather roads, 
therefore those used during the peak agricultural marketing period) 
roads rose from 144,051 miles to 179,091 miles in the same period. 
The pace of development slackened after 1931 since Public Works 
departments were prime targets for retrenchment, but picked up again
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after 1936 with the implementation of provincial road building 
programmes funded by the Central Road Development Fund.3 Meanwhile, 
the import of heavy goods vehicles, including trucks and buses, rose 
from 6,343 in 1926-27 to 15,300 by 1929-30.4 Road transportation 
received a major boost during the depression because of the
increasing uncompetitiveness of railway freight charges. With the
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Railway Board deeply in deficit, freight charges were raised in 1930, 
1932 and 1935. This had a catastrophic effect on railway earnings 
which fell from Rs 44,23 crores in 1928-29 to Rs 27,30 crores in 
1932-33. Freight tonnage declined from 90 million tons to 70 million 
tons over the same period.5 The loss of trade suffered by the 
railway during the depression was never fully recovered until the 
outbreak of the Second World War. Meanwhile a golden age for road 
transportation was forecast as early as 1937 by Ainscough, British 
Trade Commasioner to India, who urged British firms to increase their 
sales to India in which 'the prospects for the sale of trucks during 
the next ten years are brighter than anywhere else in the
Empire.*6
I
The development of the road network immediately before and 
during the slump had a differential impact. As we have seen, in the 
backward province of Bihar and Orissa it was the expansion of the 
road network which enabled a provincial market to be created for the 
first time during the early 1930s. In other provinces with a more 
developed railway network such as Bombay and the Punjab, the road 
network acted principally as feeder roads to railway branch lines. At 
the peak of the slump, therefore, these roads were used by traders to 
reverse the flow of agricultural produce towards the ports for
exports. This was the 'panic dumping’ by wholesalers noted by 
Rothermund in Bombay which resulted in the re-emergence of price 
variations^ even in contiguous districts of the same province.7 Over 
time the disequilibrium in prices evened out, but still on a downward 
trend.
The second major trend apparent in rural areas as a result of 
the slump, therefore, was the reduction in consumption levels by the 
late 1930s> despite a wider road network and a rising population. 
Consumption was curtailed during the height of the depression because 
of reduced incomes and lack of credit. However, the continued 
depression in prices and failure of cash credit to recover meant that 
real incomes continued to decline and consumption remained at a low 
level throughout the 1930s.
This obviously had major implications for the Indian industrial 
sector. The gradual withdrawal from the international economy was 
marked by the rise of new consumer industries and an increased
reliance on home demand by traditional industries. During the slump 
India’s last remaining foreign markets for cotton yam in Asia were 
lost to Japan, a loss not offset by an increase in piecegoods exports 
to empire markets under the stimulus of the Ottawa Agreement, so the 
Indian cotton industry relied more heavily on domestic sales. 
However, once imports had been replaced by domestic production, 
supply from Indian industry began to outstrip demand as consumption 
failed to rise in the late 1930s. Thus, there was no expansion of
commercialisation in India based on new products as Aldcroft and
Richardson argued for the United Kingdom. Instead, in the late 1930s
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Indian industry was still constrained by the low per capita national 
income and the corresponding failure of consumption to increase. In 
this situation the rise in population exacerbated the problem by 
further depressing already low incomes rather than provide a stimulus 
to increased demand.
The rise of domestic consumer goods industries during the 
depression did have important long-term effects in the rising 
economic and political strength of Indian businessmen. At one level, 
the new domestic industries helped to strengthen the lines of 
demarcation between Indian and European businessmen. The Europeans 
largely retained their business operations in the export industries, 
shipping and its services, and banking. There is evidence of 
European firms involved in the domestic sector pulling out or 
slimming operations during the early 1930s - for instance Greaves 
(cotton), Andrew Yule (paper) and Macneills (coal). Indian
entrepreneurs were involved predominantly in consumer goods 
manufacturing. However, the identification of Indian capital with 
production for the domestic market and of European capital with 
manufacture for overseas markets is not, of course, an accurate
dichotomy. While it is true that there was some repatriation of
European capital during the slump, there is still evidence of new 
foreign investment; for instance, new ventures by Bata shoes, the 
Swedish Match Company, Imperial Chemicals and Dunlop. Such ventures 
were signs of the early development of multinational companies and is 
comparable with trends in Latin America during the 1930s. Of the
traditional European managing agencies in India, there were still 
signs of involvement in production for the domestic market, in the
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coal, sugar, cement and paper industries and Binny's retained its 
major interest in the cotton industry of Madras. Conversely, Indian 
capital weis moving into export-oriented fields previously dominated 
by European agency houses. Thus, for example, the thirties was a 
decade of expansion for Walchand Hirachand’ s Scindia Shipping Line, 
winning major concessions from P and 0, if primarily in the coastal 
marine, and Indian entrepreneurs were also buying into the tea, coal 
and jute industries in greater numbers. In jute, however, this may 
reflect a greater degree of sales of these products to the domestic 
market. Overall, though, it is clear that Ray Etnd Bagchi were wrong 
to assert that Indian entrepreneurs were only able to enter areas 
which did not compete with existing European interests.8 By the 
mid-1980s there were clear indications that European businessmen in 
India were realising the importance to their own interests of co­
operating with indigenous business groups. Thus, there was increased 
incidence of Indian directors of European companies and of Indians 
gaining higher clerical and administrative posts, previously reserved 
for Europeans.
Some debate has emerged over why such substantial amounts of new 
Indian capital should have become available for investment in 
industry during the 1930s. Rajat Ray, and Bagchi, for example, have 
argued that the increased spread of protection encouraged Indian 
entrepreneurs to diversify their interests after tentative initial 
moves during the 1920s.9 However, as we have shown, much of the new 
investment by Indians was not in branches of industry receiving 
tariff protection. These arguments could be more generally 
substantiated if the protective element provided by the raising of
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revenue tariffs was considered, but this would still not be a totally 
satisfactory explanation because Indian capital was also entering 
areas which received no such protection such as Birla’s investment in 
non-protected branches of the paper industry.
The view taken by Tomlinson and Baker - that the rise of Indian 
entrepreneurship was a consequence of the redistribution of 
investment from rural to urban areas during the slump - is a much 
more satisfactory argument. This provides a rational profit- 
maximising motive behind the rise of Indian entrepreneurship in the 
1930s. Until the depression, trading, land and moneylending had 
provided the most secure outlets for profitable investment. However, 
in the early 1930s land values declined and the traditional credit 
structures of rural areas were disrupted. The depression was the key 
element in forcing this change in investment habits in India. Prior 
to the slump the increased pressure on land created by the rapidly 
rising population was forcing up land values. This was most notable 
in the districts of North Bihar in which population density was over 
900 per square mile in 1931. Without a slump in the early 1930s, the 
still increasing population would have sent "land values even higher) 
ensuring a more than adequate return on investment in land. Equally, 
the rising population faced with land hunger would have created an 
even greater demand for credit. Thus, the traditional twin pillars 
of Indian investment, land and moneylending/rural banking, would have 
been consolidated. It was the crisis of the depression which forced 
the change in investment habits by destroying the profitability of 
the twin pillars. Falling incomes led to increased incidence of rent 
arrears and a subsequent catastrophic fall in land values, and also
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to a rise in arrears in repayment of old debt and a further squeeze 
on rural credit. There were no longer profitable outlets for 
investment in agricultural production and so capital was pushed into 
the urban-industrial sector. Thus, the depression gave an added 
impetus to the tentative movement of Indian capital into industry 
seen in the 1920s.
It is into this framework that we must plane Morris* belief that 
Indian entrepreneurship was shaped by its knowledge of the domestic 
market gained through earlier experience in trade and banking.10 The 
rise of Indian entrepreneurship, like that of British 
entrepreneurship in India in earlier decades, was based upon family 
groups evolving into managing agents. Helen Lamb has demonstrated 
the links between individual segments of the Indian family group, 
each controlling separate interests in either different industries, 
or banking, or insurance.11 This is an important point. While the 
1930s witnessed the widening of the interests of India’s 
entrepreneurial families, they did not withdraw totally from their 
earlier interests. They retained their activities in rural 
money lending and indigenous banking, though now on more formal lines, 
in up-country trading and in retail distribution. These families 
exercised a business, and indeed a political, patronage over wide 
areas of Indian society. This was the domestic counterpart of the 
European managing agencies* links with international finance and 
trading. However, although Indian entrepreneurs could gain 
international experience, it was unlikely that Europeans, having 
failed to establish themselves up-country to any great extent before 
the 1930s, would do so thereafter. Thus, during the depression,
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European businesses had to face up to the realities of earlier 
complacency.
The net effect of these structural changes in the Indian economy 
was the ultimate loosening of the colonial ties between India and the 
United Kingdom. Between 1929 and 1931, the Whitehall authorities 
desperately tried to maintain control over Government of India 
policy-decisions, culminating in the rupee-sterling crisis of 
September 1931. However, the consequences of this was the loss of 
political control in the long-term. Firstly, by denying the 
Government of India the blanket protection of British trade 
agreements, Whitehall forced the Indian authorities to accept control 
over their own trade negotiations and policies. The Government of 
India tested its strengths in a series of negotiations with Dominion 
Governments, gaining vital experience that was to strengthen the 
Indian authorities vis-a-vis Whitehall. There is a marked difference 
in approach from the diffident negotiations of the Ottawa Agreement 
and the stronger more skilful negotiations conducted by the 
Government of. India with Britain in the late 1930s. Secondly, there 
was the role of the gold exports in strengthening India*s balance of 
trade position with Britian. The gold exports resulted in Britain 
becoming debtor to India. Finally, as we have seen, the depression 
ended many of the traditional markets for British goods in India. 
Thus the economic rational for a British presence in India was 
weakened.
Given the political dimensions of the relationship between India 
and Britain, it is not surprising that the major focus in many studies
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has been on government policy during the depression. Bagchi and Ray, 
for instance, have characterised the years of the slump as a missed 
opportunity for a major change in government policy.12 Ray has even 
suggested that the Government of India should have attempted some 
form of socialist planning as a response to the depression.13 It is 
true that in many countries, the 1930s heralded a major change in the 
economic thinking which lay behind government policies. Some, 
particularly, historians of Latin America such as Diaz Alejandro and 
Furtado, see the slump as a watershed, with an almost revolutionary 
change in government thinking from laissez-faire attitudes to a 
deeper commitment to planning for development.14 Faced with the 
deep-rooted problems created by a slump which had reverberated 
throughout the global economy, many governments in Latin America, 
Europe, and Asia realised that new solutions had to be found. Even 
among the colonial authorities of Africa, there were signs of a 
more interventionist government policy.15 The net effect of these 
policies was that these economies, with India, withdrew from .the 
international economy, the emphasis now on domestic development to 
counteract diminishing world trade. There was increased activity at 
an international level in the form of bilateral trade agreements, 
restriction schemes, quota bargaining and complex multiple exchange 
rate systems; but all had an increasingly restrictive effect. Most 
activity, though, was focussed on the domestic economy, with increased 
self-sufficiency the goal.
The motives behind these changes in government attitude were 
highly complex. For many Latin American countries the depression 
offered the opportunity to limit the domination of the economy by
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foreign capital and the monopolistic power of foreign owned firms. 
The Governments of Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Chile promulgated 
legislation establishing minimum proportions of national labour to be 
employed by foreign owned firms and for share capital to be of 
domestic origin.16 In Germany, Italy and Japan, the increased level 
of government intervention in the economy had militaristic dimensions 
as their economies were increasingly geared towards war. Even in the 
more laissez-faire economies of the United States and Great Britain, 
governments were prepared to back limited experiments in currency 
management, public works and distressed area schemes, if such ad hoc 
responses to the crisis could gain them political support.
It seems clear that the depression did not mark a revolutionary 
watershed of this nature in India. The slump created massive 
problems for the Government of India in the shape of balance of 
payments and currency crises, while it was called upon to deal 
effectively and promptly with the distress caused by falling prices 
and incomes in areas heavily dependent upon commercial agriculture 
for the export market. Faced with such problems the Government of 
India did pursue some new policies similar to those in other 
economies; such as renewing bilateral trade agreements and tariff 
protection, but on a limited and purely ad hoc basis. Largely it 
fell back on traditional solutions. Yet some members of the 
government were aware acutely of the need to change official thinking 
if the Government of India were to combat effectively the crisis 
created by the depression. Sir George Schuster, the Finance Member, 
was the most prominent of such officials. In June 1932 he wrote:
'... I would say briefly that no Government in present
economic conditions can afford to carry on with the old
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laissez-faire policy. The need for some kind of national 
planning is being forced on all Governments ... I must 
confess that I should like to see the Government of India 
attempting to design something in the nature of a five year 
economic plan. This may be regarded as a chimerical idea, 
but I believe that even if it led to no direct practical 
result it would be good for the country that an attempt 
should be made. *1 7
In particular, Schuster stressed the political benefits to be 
gained from a change in government economic policy.1 8 However, his 
ideas were regarded either with outright mistrust or a resigned 
scepticism. Most believed that the ultimate goal of British rule in 
India remained the maintenance of law and order. Some recognised 
that they would have to accept some form of increased government 
involvment in the economy, but most officials still clung to their 
basically laissez-faire ideology. Schuster could not even gain 
support for an economic survey of India as a first stage to improved 
government planning. Not one provincial government was willing to 
participate in a general economic census, although the Punjab 
Government had already made a beginning with its Economic Enquiry 
Board which was engaged on several local surveys. Dundas, the 
Secretary to the Government of the North-West Frontier Province, was 
most explicit that 'such schemes were in the present state of acute 
financial stringency luxuries which it cannot afford*.19
Yet it was precisely this lack of knowledge of the actual extent 
of distress which was the basis of Schuster’s criticisms of existing 
government policy. How could government, either central or 
provincial; act effectively if it did not even want to know the full 
extent of the problem which It had to face? Most of the 
Provincial Governments used financial stringency as the reason for
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their inactivity, but it was clear that just as few provincial
officials were willing to accept any radical changes in policy. Most
concentrated upon the orthodox methods of cutting expenditure to
balance the budget at a time of reduced income. Butler, the Governor
of the Central Provinces, was scathing in his attacks on Schuster,
even when he was trying to pursue purely traditional economic policy:
*... All these last two years, whilst the financial crisis 
was developing, the Government of India has been lashing 
out - the Simon Commission and its needless satellites, the 
RTC, - the agricultural board - Public Service Commission - 
Banking Enquiry - New Delhi and its celebrations - profuse 
Viceregal expenditure - growth of Secretariat - constant 
conferences at Delhi and Simla - and so on and so on ... if 
Schuster had known his job properly he would have begun 
axeing at least a year ago as we did here. Even now there 
has been little real economy! Only talk.'20
Nor could Schuster look for unqualified support from Indian 
business communities. Both Indian and European commercial 
organisations called on the Government of India to retrench its 
expenditure although at the same time, they criticised the cuts in 
government contracts.21 Neither group wished economic planning if 
it was to bring increased government interference in their 
businesses. Any attempt at labour legislation was met by loud 
protests that it increased the costs of production and thus reduced 
profitability. For Indian businessmen, the major change in 
government policy they desired was the devaluation of the rupee. 
While the insistence upon maintaining the rupee-sterling exchange 
rate at Is 6d, helped to push the Indian business community into the 
ranks of the Congress Party, they were increasingly unhappy at the 
left-wing stance of the party. It is very clear that when in 1944 the 
major Indian business men produced their blueprint for the future 
economic progress of India, it was aimed at limiting the encroachment
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of a future nationalist government into their businesses.22
Any effort to promote a change in official thinking was bound to 
be hindered by the stress on orthodox remedies being pushed by
Whitehall. The British Treasury was conscious only of the short-term 
need to maintain the flow of remittances from India and consequently 
would not tolerate any experiments which would increase government 
spending in India and possibly lead to a larger budgetary deficit. 
The principal aim was to balance the Indian budget as soon as 
possible through increased taxation and reduced expenditure, although 
it took a bitter battle to get the Cabinet to agree to cuts in 
service pay and military expenditure. Schuster’s ideas were regarded 
as dangerous heresies and he was forced to pursue policies even more 
rigorously orthodox than those of the British Government itself. In 
the end; Schuster was replaced as Finance Member by the rigidly 
orthodox, Sir James Grigg, who regarded government planning as 
expensive and unproductive.
At the local level, there was little which the provincial
governments could do to meet the basic problems created by the 
depression. The price declines which reduced the peasants incomes, 
hit at the base of provincial finances, effectively precluding local 
authorities from being agents of growth. Instead provincial 
governments set themselves the task of attempting to alleviate some 
of the social consequences of the dperession in their areas, a
process which gained further impetus with the new Congress Ministries 
of 1936. From the mid-1980s there was a flurry of legislative
activity at a provincial level to deal with the perceived evils of
355
old and accumulated debt, land alienation, and erosion of tenancy 
rights. Once again the spectre of the moneylender as the root of all 
the evils of Indian life was raised, despite the warnings to the 
contrary in the reports of the banking enquiry commissions. However, 
the provincial governments had little power to enforce their 
legislation, some tacitly admitting this by making their legislation 
*voluntary*, hence easily circumvented. The compulsory legislation 
exacerbated the rural problems by causing credit supplies to dry up 
as moneylenders refused new loans. The depression highlighted that 
without an adequate financial base, provincial government was 
ineffective as an economic force. The use of dyarchy as purely a sop 
to local Indian support rather than as a force to true power sharing 
became all too apparent.2 3
Thus, the onus of dealing with the problems initiated by the 
depression fell upon the Government of India. The impact of the 
crisis did bring some changes in government policy. The Government 
of India effectively abandoned free trade, to dabble in import 
barriers and international and voluntary internal restriction 
schemes. It was prepared to finance the establishment of Trade 
Commissions in various centres such as Hamburg and Tokyo and new 
efforts were made to improve quality control of produce for export. 
Yet, mostly these were extensions of policies established in the 
1920s. Even the Government of India, while pointing out the 
success of some protected industries in combatting the effects of the 
depression had to admit that protection was not a new policy. 
Although the Government may have been forced to abandon certain 
traditional policies, it did so for harsh pragmatic reasons. Its
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lauded protectionist policy was hardly an economic policy at all. It 
provided only tariff protection without any other vestige of
government support,such as tax concessions or bounties on exports. In 
the agrarian sector, the Government of India would promote individual 
schemes for price support only when forced by concerted political 
lobbying. Thus, while little was done to help the cultivators of 
rice and jute, the stronger wheat and tea lobbies secured the support 
which they had sought.
However, it must be asked, how free was the Government of India 
to change its economic policies. It was, after all, a colonial
authority subservient to Whitehall without the ability for autonomous 
decision making allowed to the Dominion Governments. If anything, 
the depression served to highlight the status of India as a colony 
not as the pseudo-Dominion the British authorities often referred 
to.24 For one brief moment it appeared that the Executive Council 
would rebel against the high-handed treatment accorded to it over the 
question of the sterling standard, but it acquiesced, and even 
Schuster toed the Whitehall line, if arguing against it at every 
step. In this sense, there is some validity to the arguments of
Indian historians that the British authorities used the crisis of the
depression to increase the political authority over India in the 
short-term.25 However, they ascribe the wrong motives to Whitehall. 
The British authorities were now more interested in the consequences 
on Britain of the weakness of India’s financial position than in 
securing political control. India’s traditional role as the market 
for British manufactures had declined too much to be revived.
The policies pursued by the Government of India during the
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depression are often compared to those of other governments. It is 
clear that if India had not been governed by a colonial authority, 
its government would have reacted in a different way. The rupee 
would probably have been allowed to devalue to its true market level* 
instead of being linked to sterling and the Government may have 
pursued a more avowedly interventionist policy. However, how far 
such policies would have enabled India to recover from the depression 
more rapidly is debatable. An interesting comparison, and a rather 
more valid comparison than the usual one with Japan, is with the 
economy of the Argentine Republic. Nominally independent, the 
economy was tied to that of Britain through its dependence on the 
export of meat. At one level, the Government of the Argentine dealt 
successfully with the depression. Exchange controls and import 
barriers combined with a national highway construction programme gave 
a stimulus to import substitution industries. By 1939 the 11 cement 
plants in the Argentine were producing two million metric tonnes or 
50 per cent of the entire production of Latin America.26 Yet 
overall per capita income stagnated as the rural economy remained 
depressed. Partly, this is because the need to maintain meat 
exports to Britain forced the Argentine Government into a series of 
unequal treaties with the United Kingdom. As a result of these 
treaties Argentine had to offer Britain a more favourable exchange 
rate for the peso than the United States which meant that its 
industrialists were forced into purchasing higher priced British 
machinery. Also the Argentine Government had to agree not to 
construct roads in competition to British railways which were then 
allowed to charge whatever freight rates they wished.27 Thus, even
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this nominally independent government was not free to act as it 
wished in all sectors of the economy.
In this lighty it is arguable the extent to which an independent 
Indian government would have been free to act. India was also a 
primary producer and^ while its industries did make remarkable 
progress during the depression, they were limited by the low average 
per capita income levels. An independent India would have been 
forced into unequal treaties with its major markets. As it was, the 
Ottawa Agreements proved more beneficial to India than Britain and 
while the British Government were able to impose the rupee-sterling 
link in 1931, from then on the British were in retreat. While the 
depression did not constitute an economic watershed in Indian 
history, it could be argued that its effects helped to polarise the 
political groupings in India. The rupee-sterling link pushed the 
Indian business community into the Congress camp but the weakness of 
the British position as revealed by the Ottawa Agreements of the 
following year, showed the European business community the closeness 
of the eventual independence. Closer links were forged between the 
Indian and British business communities, replacing much of their 
earlier antagonism. This proved the final betrayal for many British 
politicians.2 8
It is clear that while increased government involvement could 
have helped India’s economy to recover more rapidly, particularly in 
the agricultural sector, the level of involvement demanded by Bagchi 
and Ray is unrealistic given the limits of the Government of India as 
a colonial authority. It should be remembered that in using any 
surplus to convert its previous high interest loans, the Government
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of India was increasing its level of indpendence from the London 
money market and ultimately on the British Government whose arguments 
during the currency crisis of 1931 had been based on the need to 
maintain India's credit in London. Thus, the depression ultimately 
helped the loosening of the colonial ties between India and Britain, 
paving the way to independence. As pointed out earlier, even if the 
Government of India had attempted some form of socialist planning as 
envisaged by Ray, it is highly unlikely that it would have received 
co-operation from either European or Indian business men and may have 
hindered the indigenous capital investment which did occur.
It is not enough^ though, to consider government policy purely 
within the context of the Indian economy. It must be remembered that 
the actions of India's businessmen and statesmen had an impact 
outwith national boundaries. The policy of protection and the 
general increase of revenue duties by India exacerbated the impact of 
the depression upon other primary producers; most notably the 
restriction of sugar imports had serious repercussions on the 
Javanese economy. Traditionally India had been a centre of the intra- 
Asian trading bloc and its withdrawal left a gap not wholly filled by 
Japan.29 India’s actions also affected several of the dependent 
British colonies. The depression, in short, changed India's 
international economic relations as much as the character of the 
Indian economy itself.
At the time, however, like most other governments, the Indian 
authorities were rarely concerned with external relationships except 
when they impinged on the domestic economy. Faced with the
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depression, the Government of India resorted to ad hoc measures. 
While many of these measures became permanent features of government 
policy, there was no coherent strategy for relief, and certainly no 
ideological commitment to involvement in the economy. To cope with 
the depression, rigidly the Government of India stuck to its 
traditional pragmatic role. Most officials did not see the slump as a 
reasdn for pursuing bold new initiatives in policy and so missed the 
opportunity to play a truly effective role in the recovery. This 
reflected the nature of the Government of India els a colonial 
authority, but it is debatable, given the underlying underdevelopment 
of the Indian economy, if an independent Indian government could have 
induced a more rapid recovery.
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